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ABSTRACT 
 
In the last two decades marriage equality has emerged to become the dominant issue in 
contemporary (homo)sexual and queer governance in the so-called Western world. At the 
same time, there has been an increase in the strengthening of anti-homosexuality policies in 
the so-called non-Western world. Proponents of marriage equality have framed their 
arguments around human rights and full citizenship, while opponents have denounced 
LGBTQ rights as human rights and call for a return to ‘traditional’ values. This contestation 
between two groups in the international community presents an interesting phenomenon in 
global politics: the diffusion of marriage equality norms in opposite directions.  
This study presents an in-depth analysis of two case studies: the (Marriage) Equality 
Movement and the (Marriage) Reactionary Movement. The Equality Movement is concerned 
with the legalisation of same-sex marriage, while the Reactionary Movement advocates the 
re-criminalisation of same-sex relations. In order to determine to what extent state and non-
state actors contribute to international norm changes, it is imperative to understand how 
norms emerge, how they cascade through the legal framework, and at what point norms 
become internalised. The theoretical framework devised by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink (1998) is utilised to test the role that the respective actors play in the pursuit of norm 
change. The utility of the norm life-cycle model is validated through its capability to account 
for changes occurring in domestic as well as in international institutions.  
This study investigates how and why marriage equality has emerged as an important issue in 
contemporary global policy and practice as described and explained in the field of 
International Relations. The norm of marriage equality has been championed by norm 
entrepreneurs, in the first stage of the life cycle, who managed to get the norm onto the 
agenda of state actors. The study then turns to the second stage of the life cycle to illustrate 
how the norm cascaded through the international system, with several countries adopting the 
norm. This enabled the norm to reach its final stage of the life cycle where it is moving 
towards internalisation. On the other hand, the norm of anti-homosexuality has been 
championed by norm entrepreneurs who managed to re-introduce it. The Reactionary 
Movement presents an interesting case study as the norm cascading process is not applicable 
to the norm of anti-homosexuality; instead, the norm has moved towards norm affirmation. 
The final stage of the norm life cycle illustrates how the norm of anti-homosexuality remains 
internalised.    
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OPSOMMING 
 
In die afgelope twee dekades het huweliksgelykheid die mees dominante kwessie rakend 
kontemporêre (homo)seksuele en queer regering in die sogenaamde Westerse wêreld geword. 
Terselfdertyd is daar ‘n toename in die versterking van die anti-homoseksualiteitsbeleide in 
die sogenaamde nie-Westerse wêreld. Voorstanders van huweliksgelykheid vorm hul 
argumente rondom menseregte en volle burgerskap, terwyl die opposisie LGBTQ-regte nie as 
menseregte beskou nie en maak ‘n beroep om terug te keer na ‘tradisionele’ waardes. Hierdie 
konflik tussen twee groepe state ontbloot ‘n interessante verskynsel in internasionale politiek: 
die verspreiding van huweliksgelykheid in teenoorgestelde rigtings. 
Hierdie studie verskaf ‘n in-diepte analise van twee gevallestudies, naamlik die (Huwelik) 
Gelykheidsbeweging en die (Huwelik) Reaksionêre Beweging. Die Gelykheidsbeweging 
fokus op die wettiging van gay huwelike, terwyl die Reaksionêre Beweging ‘n voorstander is 
van die herkriminalisering van gay verhoudings. Ten einde vas te stel tot watter mate staats- 
en nie-staatsakteurs bydra tot internasionale normverandering, is dit noodsaaklik om te 
verstaan hoe norme ontstaan, hoe norme deur die wetlike raamwerk versprei, en hoe norme 
internaliseer word. Die teoretiese raamwerk van Martha Finnemore en Kathryn Sikkink 
(1998) word gebruik om die rol van akteurs te toets. Die nut van die norm lewensiklusmodel 
word geregverdig deur die vermoë daarvan om verandering in plaaslike sowel as 
internasionale instellings te verklaar. 
Hierdie studie ondersoek hoe en waarom huweliksgelykheid ontstaan het as ‘n belangrike 
kwessie in kontemporêre globale beleid en praktyk soos beskryf en verduidelik deur 
Internasionale Betrekkinge. Die norm van huweliksgelykheid is in die eerste fase van die 
lewensiklus voorgestel deur norm entrepreneurs, wie daarin geslaag het om die norm op die 
agenda van staatsakteurs te kry. Die studie verwys dan na die tweede fase van die lewensiklus 
om te illustreer hoe die norm deur die internasionale stelsel versprei het waar verskeie lande 
die norm aanvaar het. Dit het die norm in staat gestel om die finale fase van die lewensiklus 
te bereik waar dit na internalisering beweeg. Aan die ander kant het norm entrepreneurs het 
daarin geslaag om die norm van anti-homoseksualiteit weer voor te stel. Die Reaksionêre 
Beweging is ‘n interessante gevallestudie, aangesien die norm verspreidingsproses nie van 
toepassing is op die norm van anti-homoseksualiteit nie. Inteendeel, die norm het beweeg na 
norm bevestiging. Die finale fase van die norm lewensiklus illustreer hoe die norm van anti-
homoseksualiteit geïnternaliseerd bly. 
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Interview Questions 
 
The following questions were used to guide the semi-structured interviews with the study’s 
key informants: 
1. Why do you think gay marriage has emerged as an important issue in contemporary 
global policy and practice? 
2. Who are the key players involved in the framing and championing of queer 
governance? 
3. Would you say that the cascading of gay marriage will materialise and diffuse further 
in the international sphere of thinking? 
4. Would you say that gay marriage has been normalised, or is on the verge of 
normalisation in terms of legal norms and societal perceptions? 
5. Why do you think there is such a big gap between legal norms and social attitudes of 
people where gay marriage is legal? 
6. Do you think the legalisation of gay marriage will change people’s attitudes toward 
queer people and be more accepting of their gender/sexual identity? 
7. Would you say that countries where gay marriage / being gay is illegal are inherently 
homophobic?  
8. To what extent do you feel that the so-called Western world is forcing their ideals on 
the so-called non-Western world? Is neo-colonialism at play here? 
9. Do you agree with some queer theorists who argue that those who opt for gay 
marriage conform to heteronormativity? 
10. Why is the issue of gay marriage so visible and strongly advocated for when some 
queer theorists argue that it excludes queer bodies with a lower socio-economic status 
(race, class, disability) and privileges the white middle-class queer body? 
11. Would you say that gay marriage further perpetuates the inequalities that traditional 
marriage perpetuates? 
12. Would you say that the fight for the legalisation of gay marriage has sparked a 
reactionary movement in so-called non-Western countries? Example, Russia’s Anti-
Propaganda Bill and Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act. 
13. What role do institutions play in framing / enforcing norms regarding queer 
governance? 
14. Do you think that (international) institutions (for example, the UN) have the right to 
tell (force) states to conform to international law? 
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15. Do you think these (international) institutions are relevant when their international 
laws differ from / do not influence a sovereign state’s domestic laws?  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and Rationale  
The Stonewall riots of 1969 in New York City (NYC) are often regarded as the single most 
important event of the gay and lesbian movement in the United States of America (USA) 
(Altman and Symons, 2016: 38). The Stonewall riots took place on 28 June 1969 after police 
raided a gay bar frequented by drag queens and queer people of colour. These individuals, 
along with lesbian and gay individuals, battled against police surveillance of their private 
gatherings and police brutality against queer people. On 28 June 1970 the first gay pride 
march in the USA was held in NYC in honour of the Stonewall riots and subsequently every 
year since that first march. After the Stonewall riots and the politicisation of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ1) rights, organisations such as the Gay Liberation 
Front (GLF), a New Left Group, and the Gay Activist Alliance (GAA) were formed 
(Cruikshank, 1992: 69). In the 1970s these organisations and the gay and lesbian movement 
were advocating for laws that would protect openly gay individuals from housing and job 
discrimination, for example. In recent years, however, the focus of the movement has shifted 
to the legalisation of same-sex marriage.  
With the start of the new millennium the issue of same-sex marriage has taken centre stage in 
the discourse around LGBTQ rights. In the preceding years queer activists fought against 
policies such as the criminalisation of same-sex relations and sexual acts, discrimination 
based on sexual orientation within the workplace or hate crimes outside of the workplace, and 
gay men still not being allowed to donate blood. However, when the Netherlands became the 
first country to legalise same-sex marriage in 2001, the focus of the LGBTQ movement 
shifted towards advocating the legalisation of same-sex marriage – particularly in so-called 
Western countries.2 At the same time there has been a significant tightening of anti-
homosexual policies in many so-called non-Western countries such as Russia, for example, 
which implemented its Anti-Gay Propaganda Law in 2013 (Johnson, 2015: 44). Many argue 
that the legalisation of same-sex marriage is the civil rights issue of the new millennium. 
Whether this is true or not, the normalisation of same-sex marriage in Western countries and 
                                                 
1 The acronym ‘LGBTQ’ is used throughout this study as opposed to ‘LGBT’. The inclusion of the ‘Q’ is 
deliberate as it disrupts (hetero)normative views and ideas around traditional LGBT scholarly work. The ‘Q’ 
also indicates the queer theory lens that guides this study.  
2 This study acknowledges that the terms ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ may be problematic as using them can 
be considered an aspect of an imperialist agenda. However, given the lack of better alternatives, the use of these 
terms is adopted solely because of their familiarity and to make the research to be more accessible to the reader.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 2 
 
the normalisation of anti-homosexuality in non-Western countries have become increasingly 
evident.  
Contemporary attitudes in the West towards same-sex marriage and LGBTQ rights are often 
viewed as liberal. This has much to do with the fact that Denmark became the first country in 
the world to legally recognise relationships between same-sex couples in 1989 (Kollman, 
2013: 1). These same-sex relationships were called Registered Partnerships (RPs) and were 
not regarded as marriage. This meant that same-sex couples did not enjoy the same financial 
benefits as married heterosexual couples. Some of these benefits included social security, 
health benefits and even inheritance rights, to name a few. In contrast, homosexuality was 
classified as a mental illness in Russia up until 1999. Nonetheless, on 1 April 2001 the first-
ever legal same-sex marriage in the world took place in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Not 
long after the Netherlands, countries such as Belgium (2003), Canada (2005) and Spain 
(2005) followed suit. In 2006 South Africa became the first non-Western country and the first 
and, as of October 2017, the only African country to legalise same-sex marriage. It was on 23 
May 2015 that Ireland made history by becoming the first country to legalise same-sex 
marriage through a popular vote. More than 62% voted in favour of same-sex marriage (BBC 
News, 2015). Although civil partnerships between same-sex couples have been legal in 
Ireland since 2010, with the amendment of its constitution as a result of the referendum, 
same-sex couples who choose to marry will enjoy the same constitutional protection of 
families as heterosexual couples. As of October 2017 same-sex marriage is legal in 26 
countries around the world.  
Homosexuality has not always been accepted in Western Europe. Homosexuality was illegal 
in the United Kingdom (UK), for example, up until 1967. In 1957 the Departmental 
Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution in Great Britain released a report 
stating that the criminalisation of homosexuality was an impingement on civil liberty and it 
stated that homosexual activity between consenting men in private should not be regarded as 
an offence (Clements and Field, 2014: 524). As a result, in 1967 the UK government passed 
the Sexual Offences Act, which decriminalised homosexual acts. In other Western European 
countries, it has become evident that countries such as Germany, for example, are aware that 
international standards of human rights practices are changing constantly. Also, a country like 
the Netherlands is mindful of whether or not they are regarded as progressive by their 
international counterparts in terms of tolerance and/or human rights innovation (Kollman, 
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2013: 13). Western European countries are particularly influenced by newly emerging human 
rights norms and how their international reputation will be affected if they do not conform to 
these norms.   
The fact that liberal democracies are increasingly becoming aware of their international 
reputation with regards to human rights raises the question of whether the norm-alisation of 
same-sex marriage in the legal structure is being translated into the perceptions and attitudes 
of the broader global community. For example, same-sex marriage has been legal in South 
Africa for the past 11 years; however, queer individuals in the country are increasingly 
becoming victims of anti-gay violence. According to Altman and Symons (2016: 65), this 
type of anti-gay violence is often expressed through the rape of women who are perceived to 
be lesbian. These violent acts are also known as ‘corrective rape’, a term coined in South 
Africa. Clearly, laws and policies are not always sufficient to change the perceptions and 
attitudes of people.  
However, with the increasing legalisation of same-sex marriage came a concomitant 
intensification of anti-homosexuality laws in non-Western countries. On 30 June 2013 Russia 
made a very strong statement when President Vladimir Putin signed into law anti-homosexual 
legislation: “For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating a Denial of 
Traditional Family Values” (Johnson, 2015: 44). This law is more commonly known as the 
Anti-Gay Propaganda Law. This law strengthens the penalties for those who ‘promote’ 
homosexuality among minors. According to the autonomous non-profit organisation (ANO) 
TV-Novosti (2013), the law states that any individual who ‘promotes’ non-traditional sex 
relations to minors – via the media, adverts and internet – shall be fined. This law prohibits 
the LGBTQ community from distributing any pro-homosexual information to minors, and 
they are also prohibited from holding rallies in support of homosexuality. The All-Russian 
Public Opinion Research Centre (2013) conducted a public opinion poll, which revealed that 
86% of Russians who participated in the poll believe that same-sex couples do not deserve 
the right to marry. Also, 42% believe that homosexual individuals should be removed from 
society or prosecuted. Russian attitudes towards the LGBTQ community have significantly 
changed in the last decade, as being gay or lesbian is increasingly seen as being abnormal, 
particularly after the establishment of the Anti-Gay Propaganda Law. This view has become 
the norm in Russian society.  
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It is argued that many non-Western countries resist or react strongly to issues pertaining to 
LGBTQ issues, because they construct it as a form of Western imperialism. Many of these 
countries feel that LGBTQ activism is a threat to their traditional family values. This was 
very evident in the passing of Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act on 24 February 2014. With 
the passing of the law in Uganda, the country has seen the rise of a culture that approves of 
extreme violence against homosexuals. Both state and non-state actors were free to persecute 
Uganda’s LGBTQ community without exemption. However, on 1 August 2014 the Ugandan 
constitutional court declared the legislation as null and void. The reason for the court’s 
decision rests on the fact that Parliament had passed the Act without the proper quorum 
(Gettlemen, 2014). It is still illegal to engage in same-sex acts in Uganda, where people of the 
LGBTQ community can face lengthy prison sentences not only for same-sex acts but also for 
rationalising homosexuality. Uganda was heavily criticised by former president of the USA, 
President Barack Obama, and former British Prime Minister David Cameron, who threatened 
to cut foreign aid to Uganda if the legislation was not retracted. Supporters of the Act argued 
that these threats from the West were clear indications that their funding comes with the 
conditionality that the Ugandan government should not only accept their foreign aid but also 
their Western ideals and values. Laws against the LGBTQ community are, of course, not only 
specific to Uganda but are prominent in the larger African framework. In January 2014 
Nigeria passed its Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition Act, which states that those who enter into 
same-sex marriage will face a prison sentence of 14 years. The death penalty is also a legal 
penalty for homosexual relations in Northern Nigeria, Mauritania, Sudan and Southern 
Somalia under Sharia law.  
It is fair to say that there are two opposing sides to marriage equality – those who advocate 
for it in mainly Western countries, and those who advocate against it in mainly non-Western 
countries. For the purpose of this study, those who advocate for same-sex marriage are 
grouped together as the (Marriage) Equality Movement and those who oppose same-sex 
relations are grouped together as the (Marriage) Reactionary Movement.  
It is important to briefly mention a group that falls under the LGBTQ umbrella but is to a 
large extent critical of same-sex marriage: queer theorists. Queer theory is a critical theory 
that is rapidly growing in the field of International Relations. Queer theory challenges 
heteronormative norms, questions the status quo and examines intersections of gender, 
sexuality, capitalism and the state through a queer lens (Picq and Thiel, 2015: 5). Some queer 
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theorists critique activism in favour of same-sex marriage, arguing that those who are in 
favour of same-sex marriage are conforming to heteronormative principles. While some 
queer theorists believe that same-sex marriage should be legal for the financial benefits it 
confers, others believe that it should be rejected. Those who believe that it should be rejected 
argue that the institution of marriage is an inherently violent institution (particularly from a 
(radical) feminist perspective) and that it is based on heteronormative and conservative 
traditional family values. Perhaps more importantly, some queer theorists warn that the 
legalisation permitting same-sex marriage does not necessarily mean that the oppressive 
sexual system will end or that society’s attitudes on homosexuality will change.  
Problem Statement 
The legalisation of same-sex marriage has become a prominent global political issue over the 
past two decades. Although same-sex marriage is heavily critiqued by some queer theorists, 
who argue that the institution of marriage is heteronormative at its core, the issue of marriage 
equality remains at the forefront of the mainstream (Western) LGBTQ agenda. In reaction to 
this mainstream agenda, many Eastern European and African countries (amongst others) see 
this agenda as an expression of Western imperialism or moral outrage. As a result, a 
significant number of these countries have strengthened their anti-homosexuality policies. 
The Equality Movement of mainly the West, on the one hand, and the Reactionary Movement 
of the East/South, on the other hand, present an interesting binary/oppositional phenomenon 
within the discourse of social constructivism and international norm dynamics in 
International Relations.  
Constructivists believe that reality is constructed through a combination of ideational and 
material facets of existence. Some scholars have used international norm dynamics to 
examine the normalisation of same-sex unions in liberal democratic states (see Kollman, 
2013). Conversely, others have used international norm dynamics to examine the 
international polarisation of antagonistic norms (see Symons & Altman, 2015). The research 
problem or challenge of this study is to identify, describe and explain this constructed 
normative binary, and in particular the emergence, diffusion and internalisation of the two 
opposing norms around same-sex marriage in contemporary global politics. Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s 1998 article, “International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change”, is key for doing so. This study aims to gauge the heuristic utility of Finnemore and 
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Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model insofar that it can adequately explain the emerging 
norms of marriage equality and of marriage exclusivity.   
Research Question  
The study is guided by one primary and three secondary research questions:   
How and why has marriage equality emerged as an important issue in contemporary global 
policy and practice as described and explained by IR?  
The three secondary research questions are as follows:  
1. Who have acted as the norm entrepreneurs in the framing and championing of global 
(homo)sexual and queer governance?  
2. How have norms related to this materialised and diffused in the international sphere 
of thinking and practice?  
3. Which institutions have been created and what norms inform their operation in global 
(homo)sexual and queer governance?  
Theoretical Approach 
In order to solve the research problem and to answer the research questions, this study applies 
the perspectives of social constructivism in IR. Constructivists believe that reality is 
constructed through the combination and consolidation of both the ideational and the material 
facets of existence. According to Lawson (2015: 156), constructivism emphasises the 
ideational, but the material is not dismissed as irrelevant. Reality is presented as a construct 
that contains the elements of the empirical or objective reality, but this is interpreted through 
the ideational or subjective. For example, constructivism is applied by interpreting the 
objective reality of sexual politics to fashion gender politics (where sex is a 
physical/empirical reality, as opposed to gender, which is socially constructed). The 
constructivist approach is useful for this study through its use of ideation in that it facilitates 
the shaping and the granularity of social interaction around contemporary (homo)sexual and 
queer governance, and in the way that it describes and explains the development of global 
norms around these issues.  
Constructivism emerged in the late 1980s, when the Soviet Union was on the verge of 
collapse and neorealism and neoliberalism were still dominating the field of IR. Scholars 
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started to critique these orthodox theories in order to explain the novel behaviour of actors 
(norm entrepreneurs) in the global system. Two of these scholars were Rey Koslowski and 
Friedrich Kratochwil (1994), who argued that in politics (domestic and international) it is the 
actors (norm entrepreneurs) who are responsible for the reproduction and/or the alteration of 
systems through their behaviour (Adler, 1997: 342).  
According to Onuf (1998: 58), constructivism is not so much a theory in the sense that it does 
not offer general clarifications for what people do, why societies differ from one another, or 
how the world changes. As an alternative, constructivism allows theorisation about matters 
that seem to be unrelated, because the concepts and propositions generally used to talk about 
such matters are also unrelated. Although its emergence within the field of IR is recent, 
constructivism has been used in other disciplines for many years. Some of these disciplines 
include sociology, philosophy, anthropology and history. Feminist, gender and queer scholars 
often analyse political events from a constructivist perspective, as they (as noted above) find 
it useful to reinterpret the objective reality of sex to explain the constructed and contested 
reality of gender politics. As such, this study also examines the role of queer perspectives and 
the work of queer scholars in the discipline of IR. This is primarily done by examining the 
work of Cynthia Weber (2014, 2015, 2016) who argues that there is, or rather, appears to be, 
no queer international theory. 
What constructivists in these diverse fields of the social sciences have in common is that they 
view the construction of the world to be as much a physical reality as it is an ideational reality 
– arguing that the latter may be equally (if not more) important. In the case of IR, 
constructivists are interested in ideas, values and norms and how they influence the realities 
of global politics. According to Ruggie (1998: 878), constructivism is about the issue of 
human consciousness and the role it plays in international life, and it contends that identities 
and interests are socially constructed. Hence, the theory of social constructivism argues that 
the interests pursued by actors are based on norms and values which define their social (and 
political) identity. 
It is important to acknowledge that several contributions have been made by constructivists 
within the IR framework. For the purpose of this study, contributions from Alexander Wendt, 
Nicholas Onuf, John Ruggie, Emanuel Adler and in particular the work of Martha Finnemore 
and Kathryn Sikkink provide the theoretical framework. Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) 
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work on international norm dynamics has been particularly influential in the fields of 
constructivism and IR.  
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) define a norm as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for 
actors with a given identity.” Norms are agreed-upon expectations and rules by which a 
culture guides the behaviour of its members in any given situation. It is important to note that 
norms vary widely across cultural groups. Many of these norms turn into laws, which can be 
seen in the case of the USA, for example, where the broad social acceptance of LGBTQ 
individuals and same-sex relationships resulted in the legalisation of same-sex marriage. Such 
laws are formal bodies of rules enacted by the state and backed by the power of the state. 
Judge (2017) argues that the law sets the framework for the production of social attitudes, 
where law is defined as “a site in which social ideas and meanings are produced” (Interview, 
Melanie Judge, 11/07/2017). In other words, if the law is discriminatory, then it is more 
conducive to creating an environment for citizens to hold discriminatory values. However, if 
the law is inclusive and embracing, then it is more viable for social actors to invite that kind 
of embracing and inclusion. This means that members of a culture must on the whole 
conform to its norms for the culture to exist and function. Hence, members of a society want 
to and are obliged to conform and obey the values expressed as rules.  
The body politic must first internalise the social norms and values that dictate what is 
regarded as normal for the culture; then it must implement or teach norms and values to the 
society. If internalisation and socialisation fail to produce conformity, some form of social 
control is eventually needed. Social control may take the form of ostracism, fines, 
punishments and even imprisonment. This is especially evident in the case of Uganda and 
Russia, where homosexuality can result in imprisonment, or in Iran, where sexual intercourse 
between men is punishable by death in accordance with Sharia law. Note that these examples 
reflect the national level of analyses. However, norm dynamics are not limited to what 
happens inside states: take, for example, how international and transnational norms have 
become institutionalised and turned into laws on the issue of women’s suffrage. 
In the late 19th century the issue of women’s voting rights gained prominence. There was a 
particularly strong movement in countries such as the USA and the UK, even though they 
were not the first to allow women to vote. Countries such as New Zealand (1893), Australia 
(1903) and Finland (1906) paved the way for the cascading of this new norm (Markoff, 2003: 
91). Article I of the United Nation’s (1953) Convention on Political Rights of Women states 
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that ‘[w]omen shall be entitled to vote in all elections on equal terms with men, without any 
discrimination.’ Keep in mind that these rights (privileges) mostly pertained to white women. 
In the case of the USA, Native American women were allowed to vote only in 1924 (Indian 
Citizenship Act), Asian women in 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act) and African-American 
women in 1964 (Voting Rights Act). This is in contrast with white women, who were granted 
voting rights in 1920. Similarly, in the case of South Africa, women of colour were allowed 
to vote only in 1994. White South African women had been granted voting rights in 1930. 
Needless to say, in these cases the construct and normalisation around the superiority of the 
white race is evident. However, in the broader construction and normalisation the issue of 
women’s suffrage serves as a worthy example of a transnational norm becoming internalised, 
especially given the fact that as of October 2017 Vatican City remains the only country in the 
world that has not granted women voting rights.  
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891), in order to study norms one must study the 
“extensive trail of communication among actors.” This approach points to the process of 
persuasion. The process of persuasion is central to determine the level of progress that occurs 
within the norm life-cycle model. This study explains the contemporary governance of 
homosexuals and queers (in particular the norm-alisation of marriage equality internationally) 
through the norm life-cycle model. This model describes three stages, namely (1) norm 
emergence, (2) norm cascading and (3) norm internalisation. This model proves useful for 
this study as it identifies, describes and explains norms when they are first presented by norm 
entrepreneurs, how these norms then cascade into legal frameworks, and finally how they 
then become internalised.  
The first stage in the norm life cycle, norm emergence, involves the process of persuasion by 
norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 985). They aim to persuade a large group 
of actors or individuals to accept a proposed norm. Therefore, it is important for norm 
entrepreneurs to make sure that the norms which they advocate get onto the agenda of major 
actors. For example, Axel and Eigil Axgil (norm entrepreneurs) were instrumental in their 
advocacy work for same-sex marriage in Denmark and globally. Stage 2 of the norm life 
cycle, norm cascading, consists of a socialisation process where individuals and actors in the 
global system conform to a particular norm. International institutions such as the United 
Nations (UN), for example, will often condemn and pressure governments or state actors who 
do not conform to (Western) ideas of universal human rights – as seen in Russia and Uganda 
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with their anti-homosexuality policies. The third stage, norm internalisation, refers to the 
moment when the norm reaches a point where it is no longer challenged and is accepted as a 
given. This norm life cycle is used to illustrate the phenomenon of the Equality Movement 
and the Reactionary Movement: the cascading of marriage equality in predominantly Western 
countries and the cascading (or norm affirmation) of anti-marriage equality (anti-
homosexuality) in the vast majority of non-Western countries. 
At bottom, the aim of this study is to make sense of these constructivist frameworks, 
specifically by applying Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model. This is done 
in order to describe and explain the emergence of new norms in global politics, how they 
cascade and diffuse into legal frameworks, and how they become internalised. This is 
important in order to analyse how institutions influence decision- and policy-making of 
(homo)sexual and queer governance in contemporary global politics.  
Research Design and Methodology 
In order to explain the global norm cascading of marriage equality as well as its opposite, this 
study is based on consulting a number of academic journals, books and online databases to 
collect data. The method to collect the data for the study was the use of mainly secondary 
sources. This study is for the most part limited to a desktop study. However, primary data 
was also collected by conducting interviews. As a student of both Stellenbosch University 
and the University of North Carolina at Greensboro while conducting this study, the 
secondary data used was accessed through the libraries and databases of these two 
institutions. The sources used were focused on the topics of social constructivism and 
international norm dynamics and policy change, LGBT(Q) and gender studies and queer 
theory, as well as evaluations and critiques of same-sex marriage and anti-homosexuality 
policies. This study greatly benefited from the in-depth and semi-structured interviews. The 
interviews that were conducted focused on the normalisation of marriage equality, and the 
key informants were carefully selected based on their particular expertise on policy and 
legislation, LGBT(Q) issues, as well as gender studies and queer theory.   
According to Burnham et al. (2008: 39), a research design is the logical structure of the 
research inquiry that the political scientist is engaged in. A research design that is appropriate 
for this study is a qualitative design. Qualitative research involves collecting information in 
depth but from a relatively small number of cases. This type of research is more concerned 
with issues of the richness, texture and feeling of raw data, because its deductive approach 
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emphasises developing insights and generalisations from the data collected (Neuman 2005: 
137). This study seeks to contribute to existing data.   
A case study design is useful for this study. Case study designs are extremely popular and 
widely used throughout the social sciences. According to Burnham et al. (2008: 65) a case 
study design can be based on single or multiple cases. As such, carefully selected multiple 
cases can provide a robust test of a theory. The case study design enables this study to 
describe and conceptualise the phenomenon of international norm cascades and marriage 
equality in the context of IR and within the carefully selected case studies. This study 
examines two case studies. The first case study is the Equality Movement – the norm 
cascading of marriage equality in countries where gay marriage is legal. The second case 
study is the Reactionary Movement – the norm cascading (or norm affirmation) of anti-
homosexuality policies in countries where gay marriage is illegal.  
The purpose of selecting two case studies for this study is not necessarily for comparative 
purposes. These two case studies provide an interesting look into the cascading of marriage 
equality in opposite directions. It is precisely as a result of this two-way cascading that the 
case studies are analysed within the theoretical framework of constructivism and international 
norm dynamics, more specifically the norm life cycle as presented by Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998). These case studies illustrate the actors involved in the process of framing and 
constructing new norms that challenge existing norms within the sphere of global 
(homo)sexual and queer politics. 
Ethical Considerations  
Ethical considerations are very important when conducting research in the social sciences, in 
particular with regards to the collection of primary data. As such, research ethics have been 
followed very strictly in this study. The primary data was collected by conducting interviews. 
Key informants were carefully selected based on their expertise. Confidentiality of key 
informants is strictly maintained. If applicable, the identity of the key informant is disclosed 
depending on their permission to disclose their identity or not. This study follows the strict 
guidelines as set out by Stellenbosch University’s Research Ethics Committee (REC) for 
Humanities, which granted ethical clearance. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 12 
 
Outline of Study 
Chapter 1 is of a methodological nature and provides an introduction to, and formulation of, 
the research question and objectives. A background of this study is provided along with a 
theoretical framework to carry out the study. This chapter identifies the research problem this 
study is centred on, as well as stating the research questions that are posed in order to guide 
this study. This chapter focuses on the research design and research methodology. An 
explanation is provided as to which research methods are used, and why. Finally, this study 
acknowledges the ethical considerations with regards to its use of primary data. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the recent history of homosexuality and the evolution of 
marriage equality as a political norm in global queer politics. It examines the significance of 
the Stonewall riots that led to the 1970s gay and lesbian movement and its objectives, the 
emergence of same-sex marriage, and opposition to it. An overview of queer theory and its 
critiques of heteronormativity is also provided. This chapter discusses historical events such 
as World War II (WWII) and the Cold War, with specific reference to the Holocaust and the 
Lavender Scare, respectively, and the treatment of homosexual bodies in these contexts. Also, 
this chapter gives an overview of global governance and international rights provided for the 
LGBTQ community.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of constructivism within IR theory, specifically as presented 
by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Wendt (1992), Adler (1997), Onuf (1998) and Ruggie 
(1998). This chapter also examines Weber’s (2014, 2015, 2016) queer perspectives in relation 
to the discipline of IR. An in-depth look into Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle 
model explains how international norm change occurs. This is done by exploring the three 
stages of the norm life cycle: norm emergence, norm cascading, and internalisation. This 
chapter also focuses on the process that the norm entrepreneur needs to go through in order 
for a norm to be accepted and internalised. 
Chapters 4 and 5 applies Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle framework to the 
selected case studies of, respectively, the (Marriage) Equality Movement and the (Marriage) 
Reactionary Movement. Chapter 4 centres on the Equality Movement and countries, in 
particular Western countries, where same-sex marriage is legal and (possibly) normalised. 
Chapter 5 centres on the Reactionary Movement and countries, in particular non-Western 
countries, where practices and policies related to anti-homosexuality are legal and widely 
accepted.  
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Chapter 6 draws conclusions based on the study as a whole. These conclusions address the 
research problem identified and the resultant research questions. Conclusions are offered on 
the impact that international norms may have on the contemporary governance of 
homosexuals and queers regarding issues such as same-sex marriage and anti-homosexuality 
within the respective case studies. Lastly, the conclusion identifies areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Recent History of Homosexuality and the Evolution of Marriage 
Equality 
Introduction 
Homosexuality or any deviations from a heterosexual identity have for many centuries been 
frowned upon around the world. Historically, in many parts of the Western world same-sex 
relations and same-sex acts were illegal. Currently, in many parts of the non-Western world 
same-sex relations and same-sex acts are still illegal. Globally, many activists advocate for 
the rights of LGBTQ people. In the Western world in particular, many activists advocate for 
the right to marry to be extended to LGBTQ people. This relates back to this study’s primary 
research question: How and why has marriage equality emerged as an important issue in 
contemporary global policy and practice as described and explained by IR? 
In order to contextualise the research questions, this chapter describes and explains the 
contemporary history of the LGBTQ movement (read gay and lesbian movement) since the 
1970s and some of the ideational shifts that have occurred within the movement. It begins by 
providing a terminological framework for the inclusive LGBTQIAP concepts, as well as 
categories such as sex, gender and sexuality. This clarification is important given that 
understanding these concepts is crucial in understanding the intricacies of all the factors at 
play within the movement and the discourse around marriage equality. This chapter examines 
the origins of the LGBTQ movement, particularly in the Western world, given the vast and 
accessible research into these areas. This includes an account of the importance of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic that started in the 1980s and how it impacted on the movement as well 
as the inclusivity of the movement in terms of race and gender. The bulk of the literature in 
this chapter focuses on marriage: same-sex marriage and traditional marriage. This chapter 
examines the heteronormative structure around the institution of marriage and the 
construction of the nuclear family as well as opposition to same-sex marriage, whether 
through legal routes or religious opposition. This chapter also highlights the importance of 
queer theory in the marriage equality debate. Queer theory is an essential perspective, given 
that there are many queer people and scholars who oppose same-sex marriage, arguing that it 
entails an assimilation to heteronormativity – an assimilation that does not lead to liberation 
for all people within the LGBTQ community.  
This chapter then briefly explores historical periods such as WWII and the Cold War; this 
brief examination focuses primarily on the Holocaust and the Lavender Scare, respectively. A 
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brief overview on the growing discourse around LGBTQ rights as human rights is also 
provided. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how and why the issue of marriage 
equality became the dominant issue for LGBTQ advocates, which helps in addressing the 
research problem.  
Terminology 
In order to discuss the history of contemporary LGBTQ studies, a breakdown of this acronym 
is necessary. It is imperative for the reader to note that for the purpose of this study the 
acronym ‘LGBTQ’ is used throughout; however, the more inclusive acronym ‘LGBTQIAP’ 
is explored below. Of course, whether it is LGBT, LGBTQ or LGBTQ+, it is important to 
keep in mind that these categories are essentially Western concepts; these concepts are not 
universally shared by other cultures around the world. In the field of International Relations, 
however, these Western concepts are used to make the literature more accessible to the 
reader. Even so, this study recognises there are many who do not subscribe to these concepts. 
It is important to acknowledge the complexities around LGBTQ politics and the problematic 
notion of assigning fixed labels to sexualities or gender – conforming or non-conforming. 
The term ‘LGBT’ is the most recognisable in the discourse; however, Picq and Thiel (2015: 
5) rightfully point out that even the standard ‘LGBT’ categories are not large enough to 
capture the full range of sexual diversity. Given that marriage equality is the focus of this 
study, it is very important to include the ‘Q’ (queer) in the ‘LGBT’ concept. The inclusion of 
the ‘Q’ does not only indicate the queer theory lens that guides this study, but it is also used 
to disrupt the (hetero)normative views and ideas that proponents of LGBT rights are often 
guilty of perpetuating. The ‘Q’ also serves as an intersectional indicator to include those who 
do not fit neatly into the ‘LGBT’ categories. Some LGBT and queer scholars often disagree 
on issues affecting the LGBTQ community, in particular the issue of same-sex marriage. 
Whereas mainstream LGBT activists have positioned same-sex marriage as the most 
important issue for their movement, queer theorists have been critical of this move, arguing 
that it conforms to heteronormative principles. According to Picq and Thiel (2015: 6), queer 
movements play a lesser role in the advocacy of international LGBT politics, yet their views 
on issues tend to be intellectually enriching. It is precisely because of these contrasting views 
on same-sex marriage that the acronym LGBTQ is used in order to contribute to a more 
intellectually enriching conversation.  
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Given that the identities in the acronym change and shift constantly, the exploration of the 
acronym ‘LGBTQIAP’ below attempts to be as clear and accurate as possible.  
Lesbian (L) – Represents self-identified women having sexual and/or emotional preferences 
for other women. According to Cruikshank (1992: 141), a woman is a lesbian when she 
chooses other women as her sexual partners, because only women can satisfy her deepest 
feelings and needs. Lesbians also have a history of strong emotional attachments to other 
women. Lesbianism is often attributed only to self-identified women; however, it does 
include all female-bodied individuals in spite of gender identity. For example, a biologically 
female-bodied individual can continue to identify as a lesbian and at the same time date 
transmen (Rodriquez, 2015: 326).  
Gay (G) – Represents self-identified men having sexual and/or emotional preferences for 
other men. The identity of being gay, as with being lesbian, is held regardless of gender 
identity. Note that the term ‘gay’ often refers to both gay men and lesbian women. Lesbians 
often adopt the gay identity instead of lesbian. However, in mainstream society ‘gay’ 
commonly refers to homosexual men.  
Bisexual (B) – Represents self-identified men or women having sexual and/or emotional 
preferences for both men and women. According to Rodriguez (2015: 326), individuals who 
identify as bisexual can also identify with any sexual or gender identity – male, female, 
intersex, transgender. Bisexuality tends to have a lot of negative cultural connotations 
attached to it. For example, many believe that bisexuality is a myth or that it is just a phase. 
In the case of bisexual men, many argue that they are just gay men who are still in the closet. 
In the case of bisexual women, many argue that they are just straight women who experiment 
to get the attention of straight men. It is interesting to note that with bisexual men and 
bisexual women both assumptions are made around the attraction to men. Either way, as a 
result, not many choose to identify as bisexual (Pulley, 2015: 330). 
Transgender (T) – The term ‘transgender’ has a long history in the LGBTQ community, 
although it has only become widespread in the last few decades. According to Rodriguez 
(2015: 326), those who identify as being transgender do not believe that their internal gender 
identity matches the biological sex assigned to them at birth. Within the transgender 
community ‘transmen’ refers to individuals who were born with biologically female bodies 
but identify as men and live socially as men – with or without gender reassignment surgery. 
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‘Transwomen’ refers to individuals who were born with biologically male bodies but identify 
as women and live socially as women – with or without gender reassignment surgery. Those 
who choose to undergo sexual reassignment surgery often adopt the identity of being 
‘transsexual’ – physically changing their sexual morphology. The ‘transsexual’ identity 
typically falls under the umbrella term ‘transgender’. It is often very difficult for cisgender 
people (those who believe that their internal gender identity matches their biological sex) to 
accept that one’s biological sex can be different from one’s social and/or psychological 
gender (Lombaridi, 2009: 979). As such, the notion of being transgender challenges gender 
norms and gender expectations. This raises a bigger question of what those gender norms and 
gender expectations are and who benefits from them.  
Queer (Q) – Historically, the word ‘queer’ was regarded as a derogatory term (Halperin, 
2003: 339). It has always been used as a slur directed at those who did not identify as being 
heterosexual, or those who were read as not being heterosexual. Over the years many 
LGBTQ activists have reclaimed the word. However, there are those within the LGBTQ 
community, particularly the older generation, who feel that the word ‘queer’ is still a 
pejorative term. However, in recent years the term has come to mean two things. First, 
‘queer’ is regarded as an umbrella term for the entire LGBTQIAP community. Secondly, 
many adopt the term ‘queer’ as part of their individual identity – some do so for personal 
reasons and others for political reasons. For example, instead of identifying as ‘gay’, which 
many who are not familiar with the LGBTQ community will only read as ‘men who have 
sexual relations with other men’, adopting a queer identity portrays an image of alliance and 
belonging to a broader community. According to Rodriguez (2015: 327), identifying as queer 
obscures the binary sexual and gender identities that are upheld by straight, gay, and/or 
lesbian identities. Furthermore, within the academic discourse, queer theory as an academic 
discipline has also become widely accepted. Queer theory challenges the notion of 
heteronormativity (Picq and Thiel, 2015: 5). For example, some queer theorists argue against 
same-sex marriage, given that the concept of marriage is a construction by and for 
heterosexual individuals and hence embarking upon such a union plays into the notion of 
heteronormativity.  
Intersex (I) – Being intersex is not regarded as a sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Instead, it refers to a variety of conditions where an individual’s reproductive or sexual 
anatomy at birth does not fit the typical definitions of male or female bodies (Rodriguez, 
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2015: 327). This means that is possible for male bodies (XY) to look female at birth; some 
male bodies (XY) are born with genitalia that are a mixture of both male and female. In the 
case of female bodies (XX), some are born without vaginas, some without a womb, and 
others without ovaries (Stryker, 2008: 9). Intersex used to be referred to as 
‘hermaphroditism’. Today, many prefer the term ‘intersex’, while others prefer ‘disorders of 
sexual development’ (DSD). More often than not, intersex individuals identify with one or 
more of the gender or sexual identities within the queer community.  
Asexual (A) – Typically, a person who is asexual does not experience sexual attraction 
towards others (Cerankowski and Milks, 2010: 348). This does not mean, however, that 
asexual individuals are not sexually active or in romantic relationships. Some choose to be 
sexually active, others do not. Some choose to be in romantic relationships, others do not. 
Many who identify as asexual believe that sexual behaviour and sexual identity do not carry a 
lot of significance. Yet many do identify with one or more of the gender or sexual identities 
within the queer community. 
Pansexual (P) – Represents individuals having sexual or emotional preferences for persons 
of any gender or sexual identity (Rodriguez, 2015: 327). Often people confuse bisexuality 
with pansexuality. Unlike bisexuality, where there is a preference for both men and women, 
pansexuality does not conform to gender and sexual binaries. For example, a person who 
identifies as pansexual can be sexually or romantically involved with another person who 
identifies as male, female, intersex and/or transgender.   
Sex vs. Gender vs. Sexuality 
It is imperative to understand sex, gender and sexuality as three distinctly different concepts. 
According to Lombardi (2009: 978), the interchangeable use of sex and gender in the 
discourse has led to a confusion of how normative society sees gender-variant people. 
According to Stryker (2008: 8), sex refers to the reproductive capacity or potential an 
individual body possesses. The words ‘male’ and ‘female’ are typically used when referring 
to sex. Sex is determined genetically by chromosomes – X or Y. Although ‘male’ and ‘female’ 
are used to refer to sex, it is important to keep in mind that this does not mean that there are 
only two kinds of bodies. For example, intersex bodies mix different characteristics of male 
and female.  
In contemporary society many believe that gender is determined by biological sex. This 
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means that many automatically assume that a male body is considered a man and a female 
body a woman. Stryker (2008: 11) argues that sex and gender are not the same. She argues 
that gender is a cultural phenomenon and that the words ‘man’ and ‘woman’ typically refer to 
gender. According to Valocchi (2005: 752), gender representations are often seen through the 
lens of being masculine or feminine. Being a man or a woman is not something one is born 
with; rather, it is acquired through social construction.  
Sexuality, on the other hand, often refers to what individuals find erotic and how individuals 
find sexual pleasure and with whom. Stryker (2008: 16) states that although sexuality and 
gender are different, they are still intimately bound together. Labelling one’s sexuality (for 
those who feel the need to) depends on the gender of the person towards whom the desire is 
directed. This act of labelling often comes in three forms: (1) heterosexuality – the desire for 
a member of the opposite gender; (2) homosexuality – the desire for a member of the same 
gender; and (3) bisexuality – the desire for members of both genders.  
It is important to acknowledge that many queer theorists argue that the social identities of 
sex, gender and sexuality are too complex to neatly fit into the aforementioned categories. 
According to Valocchi (2005: 753), queer theorists focus on the social categories or ‘deviant’ 
cases that disrupt this normative view on sex, gender and sexuality. Of course, although 
differences will always exist in the discourse, Das (2015) summed the situation up perfectly: 
“Sex is what you are born with, gender is what you develop, and sexuality is what you 
discover.” 
Gay and Lesbian Movement 
In contemporary literature and the discourse in popular culture around LGBTQ studies, the 
Stonewall riots of 1969 are often regarded as the pivotal moment for the gay and lesbian 
movement. Before attempting to explore the gay and lesbian movement, it is important to 
acknowledge that the movement in itself is not an exclusionary movement open only to gay 
men and lesbian women. On the contrary, it has come to represent the broader LGBTQIAP 
community as a whole. Some do critique the movement for representing only gay men and 
lesbian women, and in particular white gay men – a point that will be explored later on. In 
order to remain true to the focal point of the origins of the movement, the phrase ‘gay and 
lesbian movement’ is used for this section.  
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Because of the ever-changing and ever-expanding literature and to avoid any repetitive 
labelling, this study uses phrases such as ‘gay men and lesbian women’, ‘gays and lesbians’, 
‘homosexuals and queers’, and/or ‘same-sex marriage and gay marriage’ interchangeably 
throughout. Terms such as ‘same-sex marriage’ and ‘gay marriage’ are used, because of the 
arguments around the topic and its familiarity in the discourse, and to ensure that the work is 
accessible. This study is aware that these terms tend to refer only to specific groups within 
the LGBTQ community – gay men and lesbian women – which might exclude others. As 
such, this study also refers to ‘marriage equality’ in the same context to uphold a sense of 
inclusivity and to respect the diversity within the LGBTQ community as far as possible.  
Stonewall 
Greenwich Village, a neighbourhood in Lower Manhattan, NYC, is best known as the 
birthplace of the modern gay and lesbian movement. By the later 1960s Greenwich Village 
had managed to establish a vibrant gay culture. In Greenwich Village the Stonewall Inn was a 
popular gay bar. According to Engel (2001: 40), the bar was seen as sordid. It was believed 
that the bar did not have running water and that its filthy glasses were the cause of a hepatitis 
outbreak. Yet, the bar’s popularity was because it was one of the few gay bars in NYC that 
allowed dancing. Those who frequented the bar were mostly queer men of colour, ages 
ranging from the late teens to early thirties, in particular drag queens or runaways (Piontek, 
2006: 24).  
According to Engel (2001: 20), police officers often raided gay bars in NYC. According to 
Poindexter (1997: 607), Mayor John Lindsay at the time used these police raids of gay bars as 
part of his platform for his re-election campaign. The police raid of Stonewall Inn bar on 
Saturday 28 June 1969 was different, however. The patrons of the bar did not act in their 
usual passive manner during the raid, but instead they resorted to violence. The patrons threw 
beer cans and bottles at police out of anger and being fed up with the policing of their private 
and safe spaces (Cruikshank, 1992: 69). These safe spaces were important, as they were 
places where queer men could meet other men without the pretence of heterosexuality, and 
they were spaces where queer identities were shaped and a sense of belonging to a 
community was instilled. The confrontation at Stonewall lasted two days and nights. It is 
believed that approximately 2,000 queer men and women, mostly queer people of colour, 
battled 400 policemen (Engel, 2001: 20). Word got out to the press and the media, which 
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quickly echoed through the country and the rest of the Western world. And so the modern 
gay and lesbian movement was born.  
Two very important events emerged out of the Stonewall riots. The first was the claiming of 
the word ‘gay’. Ever since homosexuality was classified as a mental illness by the American 
Psychiatric Association in the 1950s, the term ‘homosexual’ was inevitably imposed on gay 
men and women, with a stigma attached to it. Stonewall was a transcendent moment for gay 
people not to see themselves as victims any longer. As such, adopting the word ‘gay’ 
symbolised self-definition and the rejection of definitions imposed on them. Being ‘gay’ 
meant having internal power (Engel, 2001: 43). It is important to note here that with this 
adoption of a gay identity came the courage to ‘come out’ and redefine what this meant; it 
was not only a personal move, but also a political one (Cruikshank, 1992: 71). This act of 
coming out strengthened the movement as a whole by attracting a larger following. It also 
meant personal liberation for gay people. As Engel (2001: 44) put it, “by coming out, the 
homosexual became gay.” 
The second crucial event to come from Stonewall was the formation and emergence of 
various LGBTQ organisations. After the riots, many of these organisations emerged, such as 
the Gay Liberation Front (GLF), the Gay Activist Alliance (GAA), the National Gay Task 
Force (now known as the National LGBTQ Task Force), and the Gay Rights National Lobby 
(GRNL) (Engel, 2001: 40). It was particularly the GLF and the GAA that became more 
influential in the early stages of the movement. The GLF was established in July 1969, while 
the GAA was established in December 1969. The GLF was formed seeking liberation from 
capitalism and stood in coalition with other minority groups and organisations – in other 
words the New Left – such as the student movement, black power movement, anti-war 
movement and the feminist movement. In contrast, the GAA took a more single-issue 
approach: focusing on working within the system in order to improve the everyday lives of 
gay men and lesbian women. As with many new organisations, internal conflict was rife in 
the GLF and the GAA, and their predominantly male-centred leadership often pushed away 
lesbians, who opted for and joined the feminist movement (Engel, 2001). The GLF and the 
GAA collapsed in 1973 and 1974, respectively. Although these two organisations collapsed, 
the movement still grew. Arguably, they paved the way for many other organisations to learn 
from their mistakes and thrive, as was seen with the National LGBTQ Task Force, which 
became and still is one of the leading LGBTQ organisations in the USA.  
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Needless to say, with the emergence of these various organisations and the growth of the 
movement, opposition also emerged. Not everyone agreed that the gay and lesbian movement 
was good for society. One such person was Anita Bryant. In 1977 Bryant launched the ‘Save 
Our Children’ campaign (Fetner, 2001: 412). This was the first reactionary movement to 
counter the influence of the gay and lesbian movement. Dade County in Florida, USA had 
adopted legislation that protected gay people from sexual discrimination. Bryant, however, 
who was a resident of Dade County, advocated repeal of this legislation (Engel, 2001: 39). 
Bryant successfully managed to gather enough signatures in Dade County that led to the 
overturning of the legislation. With the success of Bryant’s campaign, many other reactionary 
or anti-gay movements emerged that aimed to stop the equality movement and its perceived 
spreading of homosexuality. According to Fetner (2001: 411), Bryant said the following: 
 I don’t hate the homosexuals! But as a mother, I must protect my children from 
their evil influence… They want to recruit your children and teach them the 
virtues of becoming a homosexual. 
Bryant’s sentiments were shared by many others. According to Cruikshank (1992: 72), in 
1978 California State Senator John Briggs proposed an initiative that would give schools the 
right to fire gay teachers or teachers who spoke positively about homosexuality in 
classrooms. Briggs’s initiative was known as Proposition 6. At the polls in November 1978 
Proposition 6 was rejected by voters. This victory was largely the result of the ‘No on 6’ 
campaign which was led by gay and lesbian activists (Fetner, 2001: 415). This celebration 
was short lived, however, as Harvey Milk, the first openly gay person elected to office in a 
major city, was assassinated. Milk was a major advocate against Briggs’s Proposition 6 
(Cruikshank, 1992: 73). In California any person who commits the murder of a public official 
could be allowed to receive the death penalty. In Milk’s case his assassin only received a 
seven-year sentence for manslaughter – he served only five. Whether this ruling was 
homophobic or not could not the established with certainty. One thing that was certain, 
however, was that gay men and women were outraged. They took to the streets, marching and 
setting police cars alight. Many more anti-gay movements emerged, in particular right-wring 
Christian opposition groups that aimed to stop the gay and lesbian movement from gaining 
more political ground (Fetner, 2001: 415). It was too late, however, seeing that by the late 
1970s the movement and its patrons had managed to establish themselves as a powerful 
minority in society.    
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The HIV/AIDS Epidemic 
As the gay and lesbian movement started to gain momentum and gay people started to 
embrace their gay identity, the gay community in the West was hit with a mysterious virus 
called HIV (human immunodeficiency virus). According to Altman (2013: 106), it is 
impossible to reflect on the contemporary history of the gay and lesbian movement without 
taking into consideration how drastically the HIV/AIDS (acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome) epidemic in the 1980s altered and shaped the movement.  
According to Engel (2001: 47), the first cases of HIV/AIDS in gay men in the USA were 
reported by The New York Times in 1981. It was believed to be some sort of curious cancer. 
Altman (2013: 106) states that it presented as Kaposi’s cancer – a cancer typically found in 
the elderly and the infirm. This was a disease that spread quickly among gay men. By the end 
of 1981 225 cases of AIDS in gay men were reported in the USA. It is estimated that between 
1981 and 1998, of the 300,000 people who succumbed to AIDS in the USA, 200,000 were 
gay men. It became known as the ‘gay disease’ and even to this day the stigma of having 
HIV/AIDS is connected to homosexuality.  
What was unfortunate about the HIV/AIDS epidemic was that the official channels – in 
particular the Ronald Reagan and George Bush administrations – were not interested in 
saving the lives of gay men affected by the disease. Because of this lack of response and lack 
of visibility in the mainstream media and global politics, the gay community took matters 
into their own hands and created the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) 
(Cruikshank, 1992: 76). The aim of ACT UP, when it was established in March 1987, was to 
raise awareness of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in order to acquire political leverage that would 
save gay people. ACT UP became very successful in rallying support from the LGBTQ 
community and even the straight community. In just three years after its creation it managed 
to branch out to 60 cities. Transnational mobilisation around the HIV/AIDS epidemic also 
spread across other Western countries such as Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
Australia (Altman, 2013: 108). Even in the UK, after the first case of AIDS in a gay man was 
reported in 1982, various campaigns and organisations were launched to raise awareness and 
funds to help those affected by the disease (Engel, 2001: 88).  
Not surprisingly, the HIV/AIDS epidemic brought with it a backlash from mostly religious 
and conservative groups. It was a way for these groups to exploit the epidemic and use it to 
maintain inequality and re-establish traditional family values. In the USA two major domestic 
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airlines banned HIV-positive people from flying (Altman, 2013: 109) and the US military 
imposed mandatory HIV testing (Engel, 2001: 51). In the UK the Conservative Party became 
increasingly hostile toward its gay community, with Margaret Thatcher saying: 
Children who need to be taught to respect traditional values are being taught that 
they have an inalienable right to be gay (quoted in Engel, 2001: 90).  
Engel (2001: 49) puts forward the very important argument that the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
strengthened the interactions between the gay and lesbian movement and the feminist 
movement. As mentioned earlier, because of the male-centred and exclusionary nature of the 
gay and lesbian movement, many lesbians opted to join the feminist movement instead. 
However, the epidemic and in particular the US government’s ignorance about the epidemic, 
revealed the inherently homophobic nature of American culture at the time. Altman (2013: 
111) takes this further by arguing that although gay men and lesbian women came together 
during these difficult years, they disagreed on the fact that the gay and lesbian movement 
essentially revolved around the issue of HIV/AIDS. Altman (2013) argues that this is 
somewhat ironic, given that gay men and women (lesbian or otherwise) were fighting the 
same hierarchical and financial constraints in the healthcare system.  
It is important to briefly acknowledge that HIV/AIDS predominantly affects heterosexual 
people in the developing world, particularly in Eastern and Southern Africa. According to 
Cianelli, Ferrer and McElmurry (2008: 297), nearly all women in developing countries living 
with HIV were infected through heterosexual intercourse. Even so, in these countries many 
still regard it as the ‘gay disease’, which has made it difficult to mobilise support and raise 
awareness on HIV/AIDS. South Africa presents an interesting case in that in April 2000 then 
President Thabo Mbeki publicly declared that the difference between AIDS in the West and 
in Africa is that in the West the disease is contracted mostly through homosexual relations 
and that the opposite is true for Africa (Sheckels, 2004: 73). Instead, he blamed the disease 
on poverty and on the West, refusing antiretroviral treatment to those affected by the disease, 
arguably contributing to the deaths of many thousands of people infected with HIV.  
Despite the major missteps of the South African government and its handling of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, Altman and Symons (2016: 91) point to the Chinese government, as an 
example, who successfully managed to engage with the epidemic in their country. Although 
initially not considered a disease that affected only gay men, China managed to shift its 
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attitudes on men who have sex with men (MSM). This is interesting because in Chinese 
society sexuality is not discussed very openly, yet the government’s Ministry of Health 
managed to involve MSM in its Comprehensive AIDS Response Programme (China 
CARES). 
This section illustrates that the HIV/AIDS epidemic of the 1980s drastically changed the 
approach and focus of the gay and lesbian movement. This study also acknowledges that this 
is a disease that did not only affect the gay communities in the Western world. In fact, the 
majority of those affected by the disease today are women in developing countries. Those 
most vulnerable to the disease are also intravenous drug users, sex workers, those trapped in 
the criminal justice system, lesbian women subject to corrective rape, transpeople and ethnic 
minorities, to name a few. What the HIV/AIDS epidemic as part of the agenda of the gay and 
lesbian movement managed to do was to spark a global conversation around human rights, 
sexual rights and health rights not only for gay people but for everyone. 
The Inclusiveness of the Gay and Lesbian Movement  
What has plagued the gay and lesbian movement for years is the lack of visibility or 
representation of queer people of colour, lesbians and transpeople. Many argue that it is a 
movement that privileges the middle-class white gay male. As complex as it is, this remains 
an important issue worth addressing, in particular the subject of race. 
According to Poon (2011:146), race is a social marker that differentiates people of colour 
from the white population. Even within a movement where an LGBTQ identity is shared, 
race is still a differential factor. As mentioned earlier, the vast majority of queer people who 
participated in the Stonewall riots were queer people of colour. Yet contemporary LGBT(Q) 
history has been reduced to that of the white gay male, most evident in popular culture. 
Pionek (2006: 24) argues that the way the Stonewall story is told clearly highlights the gay 
and lesbian movement’s failure to understand how race complicates the relationship between 
sexual identity and gender identity. Cruikshank (1992: 173) speculates that part of the reason 
queer people of colour is not represented fully in the movement could be as a result of their 
white counterparts not being fully aware of how multicultural their community is. This is 
problematic, however, seeing that this ignorance or unawareness plays right into the notion of 
white privilege and the way it excludes or invalidates the lived experiences of people of 
colour. 
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According to Poon (2011: 147), white queer people (in particular white men) are assumed to 
face only one form of oppression: their sexual identity; whereas queer people of colour are 
seen as a ‘double minority’. The way race has made the whole issue more complex was 
evident in the early stages of the movement, when it was popular to come out and claim a gay 
identity. Queer people of colour found this process difficult as they had at the same time to 
maintain their loyalty to their families for protection in a white-dominated society. Queer 
people of colour who chose to come out and join the movement during the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic began to establish their own sexual minority rights as well as found AIDS 
organisations in order to assist those within their communities affected by the disease (Engel, 
2001: 54). The 1989 documentary Tongues Untied directed by Marlon Riggs is a powerful 
attempt to address the silence of the gay and lesbian movement on matters of sexual and 
racial difference. 
Engel (2001: 61) argues that the visibility of the gay and lesbian movement as portrayed by 
the media and in consumer culture is an exclusive one – exclusive to the middle-class white 
male. This is particularly evident in TV shows such as Will and Grace and Queer as Folk 
(Farrow, 2014: 39). Engel (2001: 61) argues that this level of visibility is tolerated by 
heteronormative society as it is a visible representation that does not threaten its own 
foundation and normative space. It is this conforming to a sense of normativity that is 
palatable to heterosexual society that makes the diversity and strength of the gay and lesbian 
movement invisible.  
For many queer women of colour (particularly lesbian, bisexual and transwomen) advocacy 
around the issue of access to sexual reproductive health services within the gay and lesbian 
movement has been minuscule. Instead, the movement has shifted its focus to that of 
marriage equality. According to Halberstam (2012: 104), this single-issue move borrows 
heavily from the Civil Rights-era in the discourse around inclusion and extension of the status 
quo. Many same-sex marriage supporters and advocates often compare their stance to that of 
the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. The equating of ‘Gay Civil Rights’ to that of ‘Black 
Civil Rights’ is often pushed by mostly-white gay organisations such as the Human Rights 
Campaign (HRC) (Farrow, 2014: 41). This is troubling, given that these narratives tend to 
ignore the fact that during the Civil Rights era white gay individuals were allowed to vote, 
they were allowed to sit in the front of the bus and they were allowed to use the main 
entrances of stores and movie theatres, i.e. rights and privileges African-Americans did not 
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enjoy. This appropriation is concerning and problematic as it, yet again, diminishes the lived 
experiences of (queer) people of colour and in this case specifically African-Americans.  
The conversation around the exclusion of racialised bodies in the gay and lesbian movement 
is an important one to conduct and to critique. This is not to assume that other bodies – such 
as lesbian women and transpeople, for example – are not excluded too. However, the 
exclusion around race generates an interesting narrative.    
Marriage 
At the start of the new millennium the issue of marriage equality has taken centre stage in the 
discourse on LGBTQ rights. In the preceding years LGBTQ activists fought against 
campaigns and policies such as the ‘Save Our Children’ campaign and Proposition 6. These 
reactionary campaigns and policies were intended to sustain a society and culture that 
privilege the heteronormative and essentially nullify the strides made by the equality 
movement. However, when the Netherlands became the first country to legalise same-sex 
marriage in 2001, the focus of the LGBTQ movement shifted towards advocating for 
legalisation validating same-sex marriage – most notably in Western countries. In order to 
grasp the intricacies of same-sex marriage, it is important to first understand the 
contemporary history of traditional marriage. 
Marriage and the Nuclear Family 
According to Hull (2006: 1), marriage is seen as: 
Personal commitment. Pillar of civilisation. Spiritual covenant. Legal bond. 
Political football. Source of social status. Site of gender inequality. Tool of sexual 
regulation. Dying institution. Partnership for reproduction and childrearing. Path 
to material gain. Reflection of divine love. Legalised prostitution. 
The institution of marriage is often grouped together with the concept of family, procreation, 
mothering and child care, which gives its upholders a sense of moral superiority in society. 
Of course, this argument is countered by those cohabitants who are unmarried or who are in 
same-sex or multiple sexual relationships. In recent years it has become evident that the 
institution of marriage is not a static institution and it has been challenged/protested by many. 
For example, millennials are often opposed to the concept of traditional marriage, either 
opting to marry later or not at all; some women and in particular feminist women are opposed 
to the institution as a form of oppression for women; and then there are gay couples who 
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argue for the redefining of the institution itself. For the purpose of this study, it is important 
to first understand the institutions of marriage and family in their traditional sense before the 
intricacies of same-sex marriage can be explored. 
Duncan (1997: 241) defines (traditional) marriage as “a dual-gender relationship in the sense 
that a lawful marriage requires participation by both a man and a woman.” Eskridge (1993: 
1420) goes into a bit more detail, defining marriage as the “legal status, condition, or relation 
of one man and one woman united in law for life, or until divorced, for the discharge to each 
other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose association is 
founded on the distinction of sex.” As such, (traditional) marriage has been and still is 
regarded as a symbol of union between a husband and a wife – with husband/wife, 
man/woman being the key factors of this institution.  
According to Garrison and Scott (2012: 23), many traditionalists and religious folk view the 
sole purpose of marriage as a union designed for procreation. In the case of two gay men, for 
example, natural procreation is not possible, which in effect makes them ineligible for 
marriage within this framework. Even so, any procreation or sex that occurs outside of 
marriage is seen as sinful and contributing to the decay of society as a whole. This 
procreation leads to the creation of what is known as the family, in particular the nuclear 
family. The concept of the nuclear family in modern Western societies denotes a unit that is 
comprised of the husband, the wife and their children (Elliot, 1986: 4). It is this shared 
biology that creates a sense of common identity. The constant in this (normative) nuclear 
family relationship is a permanent heterosexual identity. This nuclear setup often assumes the 
man to be the dominant figure in the unit, while the woman takes on a more caring role on 
which the child is dependent. Of course, this traditional view of family gets disrupted when 
biology and adoption, divorce and remarriage, and single-parent and gay parents get taken 
into account.  In recent years the advocacy of same-sex couples for social and legal 
recognition of their relationships signifies an intense challenge to the marriage status quo 
(Hull, 2006: 1). 
Naturally, if traditional marriage is defined as a union between a man and a woman, then 
same-sex marriage is defined as a union between persons of the same sex or gender. It is 
important to note that, although the fight for legalising same-sex marriage has been 
widespread at the start of the new millennium, its roots date back to the early 1970s and most 
prominently in the 1990s. It is through Denmark’s landmark ruling in 1989 to legally 
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recognise RPs that initially brought widespread attention this norm cascading of gay 
marriage. Those in favour of gay marriage argue that the refusal of governments to allow 
same-sex couples to marry legally is a violation of gay citizens’ constitutional rights to marry 
(Eskridge, 1993: 1426). One could argue that the construction of marriage and the 
heteronormative nuclear family and its opposition to same-sex marriage is a deeply 
embedded belief that has been constructed around views on homosexuality.  
Interracial Marriage vs. Same-Sex Marriage 
In October 2010 the British Equality and Human Rights Commission reported that the 
biggest advance in tolerance over the past 20 years was the dramatic shift in attitudes to 
homosexuality (Altman, 2013: 156). It is often argued that, as with racism, many people, 
especially young people, are distancing themselves from anti-homosexual sentiments. 
However, Altman (2013: 156) points out that racism is not dead and not all young people 
have distanced themselves from it. Nonetheless, it is clear that people today are much more 
open to and accepting of the idea of and discussions on homosexuality – in particular in 
Western societies. Is it evident that there has been a norm cascade at work in the Western 
world, not only in the acceptance of homosexuality, but in accepting the view that the 
legalisation of gay marriage should be regarded as a fundamental human right. 
As history shows, in many Western and non-Western governments certain groups have 
always been restricted from marrying. It is important to note that restricting a group from 
marriage can be regarded as a form of social control – the Immorality Act of 1950 during 
apartheid in South Africa being a particularly grotesque example. According to Umberson 
(1987: 309), there are two primary ways in which social control occurs. The first is through 
internal influence, primarily through the internalisation of hegemonic norms of conventional 
behaviour. The second way is through external influence, which usually occurs in the form of 
sanctions for behaviour defined as unconventional. Examples of this would be slaves who 
were not allowed to marry, given the fact that they were regarded as ‘property’. Also, 
interracial couples were not allowed to enter into civil marriage up until 1967 in the USA 
based purely on racial differences. In this day and age, the same is true for same-sex couples. 
In the USA, for example, the freedom to marry has been an important constitutional issue for 
years in American history and an important contemporary issue for homosexuals. Many 
academic scholars often compare the battle for the legalisation of same-sex marriage to that 
for interracial marriage in the case of Loving v. Virginia.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 30 
 
In 1958, Richard Loving and Mildred Loving were arrested for marrying someone of a 
different race. Richard was a European-American man and Mildred an African-American 
woman. They were charged with violating the ban on marriage for interracial couples. It is 
important to note that Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law stated that “[a]ll marriages between 
a white person and a colored person shall be absolutely void without any decree of divorce or 
other legal process” (Marriage Equality USA, 2014). With the possibility of receiving a five-
year jail sentence, the Lovings pleaded guilty. They did, however, receive a one-year jail 
sentence, which was suspended on the condition that they leave the state of Virginia and not 
return for 25 years. The Loving’s appealed the case and in 1967 the United States Supreme 
Court held that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry 
not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations” (Duncan, 1997: 239).  
What is interesting to note about Loving v. Virginia is the fact that many academic scholars 
who are advocating gay marriage argue that traditional marriage laws violate equal protection 
because of discrimination on the basis of gender (Duncan, 1997: 240). However, it is 
important to note that traditional marriage laws do not treat men and women differently. 
Looking at gay marriages, it is evident that a man is not allowed to marry another man and a 
woman is not allowed to marry another woman. Thus, both genders are discriminated against. 
As such, one could argue that the battle for gay marriage is not based on discrimination on 
the basis of gender, but rather on discrimination based on sexual orientation and acceptance 
of gender identity. This argument revolves around a construction of internalised homophobia 
and an internalised normative view that traditional marriage and family form a unit exclusive 
to those adopting a heterosexual identity. It is this normative view of sexual identity that 
allows governments to implement laws that restrict gay people from legal marriage. 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
In the early 1990s the Hawaiian Supreme Court found that it is discriminatory to deny same-
sex couples the right to marry (Hull, 2001: 213). However, the favourable ruling led to many 
opposition parties reacting and successfully blocking this ruling. In 1996 US President Bill 
Clinton signed very controversial legislation known as the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA). Under Section 3 of DOMA marriage is defined as “a legal union between one man 
and one woman as husband and wife” and a spouse, under Section 3, is defined as “only a 
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife” (United States of America, 1996). 
DOMA expressly gave states permission to prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriages in 
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other jurisdictions. According to Freedom to Marry (2013), DOMA was a federal issue. For 
over 200 years each state could define marriage and any marriage that was legally entered 
into under state law as a valid marriage for federal purposes. Under DOMA married same-sex 
couples were denied a long list of important protections and responsibilities in the USA. 
These include Social Security survivor benefits, immigration rights, family and medical 
leave, and the ability to pool resources as a family without unfair taxation. At the end of 1996 
a judge ruled that the US did not have a legitimate reason to deprive same-sex couples of the 
freedom to marry. However, it was not until 2013 that DOMA was ruled unconstitutional by 
the US Supreme Court (Savage, 2013).  
In the early 2000s some US states began to recognise same-sex relationships. In April 2000 
the State of Vermont approved legislation that recognises civil partnerships between same-
sex couples (NCSL, 2014). This decision came as a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
the case of Baker v. Vermont that same-sex couples are entitled, as stipulated in the state 
constitution’s “Common Benefits Clause”, to the same benefits and protections as married 
heterosexual couples. Then in 2003 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that 
prohibiting same-sex couples from civil marriage was unconstitutional. Hull (2006: 78) 
points out that on 17 May 2004 Massachusetts became the first state in the USA to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  
However, it was still a long way for the rest of the USA to follow in the footsteps of 
Massachusetts. On 2 June 2008 the California Marriage Protection Bill was submitted. More 
than one million signatures appeared on the Bill. It appeared as Proposition 8 on the 
November ballot. The proposition expressed resistance to same-sex marriage and proposed 
that only marriages between a man and a woman should be recognised as valid. On 8 
November 2008 the bill passed with 52% of the vote despite hefty opposition from LGBT(Q) 
activists and allies. In 2010 the Supreme Court ruled Proposition 8 as unconstitutional in the 
case of Hollingsworth v. Perry (Sacks, Siddiqui and Reilly, 2013). However, the court’s 
decision only came into full effect on 26 June 2013. Coincidentally, on 26 June 2013, in the 
case of U.S. v. Windsor, DOMA was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (Reilly and 
Siddiqui, 2013). This was a huge victory for the proponents of marriage equality. 
Same-Sex Marriage Around the World 
At the time of writing same-sex marriage is fully legal in 26 countries around the world. 
Countries that have legalised same-sex marriage are as follows: 2001 – the Netherlands; 2003 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 32 
 
– Belgium; 2005 – Canada, Spain; 2006 – South Africa; 2009 – Mexico (only legal in some 
states), Norway, Sweden; 2010 – Argentina, Iceland, Portugal; 2012 – Denmark; 2013 – 
Brazil, England, France, New Zealand, Uruguay, Wales; 2014 – Luxembourg, Scotland; 2015 
– Ireland, United States of America; 2016 – Colombia, Greenland (part of Denmark); 2017 – 
Finland, Germany, Malta, Slovenia. South Africa remains the only African nation to have 
legalised same-sex marriage. No Asian or Middle Eastern country allow same-sex marriage 
(Crossley, Gourlay and Spraggon, 2017). However, in May 2017 Taiwan’s Constitutional 
Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to deny same-sex couples the right to marry. According 
to Chappell (2017), Taiwan’s parliament has been given two years to amend or enact 
marriage laws to include same-sex couples – if not, same-sex couples will automatically be 
allowed register for legal marriage.  
There is also an alternative norm in play – the norm of anti-homosexuality. In May of 2017 
the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) published 
the 12th edition of its annual State-Sponsored Homophobia report detailing contemporary 
governance internationally around (homo)sexual and queer bodies, primarily LGBTQ 
legislation. According to Carroll and Mendos (2017: 8), the report found that 72 states have 
legislation in place that criminalises consensual same-sex sexual acts.  Out of these 72 states, 
33 are African nations (note that Egypt is included here because of its de facto outlawing of 
same-sex sexual acts), 10 are in the Americas, 23 are Asian states, and 6 states in Oceania. 
Furthermore, 45 out of the 72 states apply their laws to women as well as men engaging in 
same-sex sexual acts – 24 in Africa, 13 in Asia, 6 in the Americas, and 2 in Oceania. 
This dichotomy between the (Marriage) Equality Movement and the (Marriage) Reactionary 
Movement is an interesting one. It is often argued that religion lies at the core of the debate of 
legalising same-sex marriage and criminalising same-sex relations. 
The Role of Religion 
One of the strongest and most vocal forms of opposition to homosexuality and same-sex 
marriage that the equality movement has to overcome is the role of religion in the debate. 
Engel (2001: 149) cites religion as one of the major factors through which homophobia 
infiltrates political cultures. Halberstam (2012: 104) goes so far as to argue that one of the 
reasons that the issue of gay marriage has become such a central theme in the movement is 
partly as a reactionary move to opposition, in particular from right-wing Christian 
organisations opposing gay marriage. 
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Christianity, for example, has always been, and still is, against homosexuality and same-sex 
marriage, arguing that it goes against the teachings of the Bible. This argument based on 
religion and belief in God revolves around the issue of morality. According to Hull (2006: 
190), many religious people support their moral opposition to homosexuality by quoting 
biblical scriptures, and they support their opposition to same-sex marriage by citing the Bible 
as defining marriage as fundamentally a union between a man and a woman. According to 
Sherkat, De Vries and Creek (2010: 82), members of Protestant denominations in particular 
tend to believe that homosexuality is morally wrong and are less tolerant of same-sex couples 
acquiring civil liberties.  
Olson, Cadge and Harrison (2006: 342) argue that attitudes around homosexuality and 
religion are measured by an individual’s religious affiliation, their sense of acceptable 
behaviours and their personal beliefs. They point out that an individual’s religious affiliation 
has the strongest impact. For example, on one end of the spectrum those who subscribe to 
Judaism, or who are liberal Protestants or unaffiliated with any religion tend to have more 
liberal views on homosexuality. This has a lot to do with the fact that these groups’ religious 
traditions have not systematically condemned same-sex relations in recent years. In the 
middle of the spectrum Catholics and moderate Protestants tend to have moderately 
oppositional but generally tolerant views on homosexuality. These views can be supported 
given that majority Catholic countries in South America such as Argentina and Uruguay, for 
example, have legalised same-sex marriage. On the other end of the spectrum, as Sherkat, De 
Vries and Creek (2010) also pointed out, Evangelical Protestants hold mostly conservative 
views on homosexuality. Olson, Cadge and Harrison (2006: 342) argue that these views stem 
from their theological beliefs and official denominations as well as their confessional position 
on homosexuality.  
The debate around homosexuality and same-sex marriage tends to revolve around the 
religious attitudes of Judeo-Christian groups. However, Adamczy and Pitt (2009: 339) point 
to studies which found that Muslims tend to have more conservative views on homosexuality 
than Catholics and moderate Protestants. According to Hélie (2004: 122), political authorities 
in Muslim nations tend to point to the Qur’an as being explicitly against homosexuality in its 
text. The interesting point is that the Qur’an is in fact not that clear on Islam’s position on 
homosexuality. Instead, Hélie (2004: 120) argues that it is not so much the scriptures of the 
Qur’an that condemns homosexuality, but rather a culture of homophobia within Islam that 
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has become an internalised social norm. Note that in Islam Sharia law is an integral part in 
the faith. Nmehielle (2004: 737) defines Sharia law as a divine law – an authority that is 
dependent on a relationship between a Muslim individual and Allah (or God). However, 
many political figures or religious extremists have interpreted and exploited the Qur’an and 
Sharia law for political gain and power to such an extent that in some Muslim majority 
countries homosexual acts are punishable by death. Adamczyk and Pitt (2009: 339) argue that 
it is this interpretation and exploitation of Islamic beliefs and customs that allow for social 
norms on homosexuality to be adopted by Muslim citizens – religious or non-religious.  
For some scholars the debates around religion and homosexuality and same-sex marriage are 
murky. Kollman (2013: 38) points to scholars such as Scott Barclay and Shauna Fisher 
(2003) and Miriam Smith (2008), who argue that the role of religion in LGBTQ politics is not 
significant. Barclay and Fisher (2003) argue that prohibition of same-sex marriage, for 
example, is better explained by the legacy of a state’s past policies on marriage and the nature 
of its party politics. However, Adamczyk and Pitt (2009: 340) point out that studies show that 
personal religiosity “tends to have a greater effect on people’s attitudes and behaviours that 
are characterised by normative ambiguity.” They argue further that, given that religious 
principles are not universally shared by all people, personal forms of religiosity “are more 
likely to serve as a guide for attitudes where there are not clear social sanctions or universal 
agreement about their detrimental social costs.” 
Supporters of same-sex marriage tend to frame their argument around the separation of 
church and state, particularly within the American context. According to Hull (2006: 190), 
these arguments are put forward given the fact that religious principles and moral codes are 
not universally shared by all people, which means that they cannot be regarded as a suitable 
basis for law and policy. Right-wing conservative Christian groups tend to argue that 
marriage is a sacred religious institution. Some queer scholars argue that it is precisely 
because of this sacredness that the state should not be involved in the religious institution 
(Kate and Deeg, 2014: 49).  
Queer Theory 
The exploration of queer theory in the debate on marriage equality is an important one. Queer 
theory is a critical theory that is rapidly growing in the field of International Relations. Queer 
theory challenges heteronormative norms and questions the status quo; it examines the 
intersections of gender, sexuality, capitalism and the state through a queer lens. Queer 
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theorists critique activism in favour of same-sex marriage, arguing that those who are in 
favour of same-sex marriage are conforming to the norms of heteronormativity. An in-depth 
exploration of queer theory is undertaken in the next chapter; however, in the context of this 
chapter it is important to note queer perspectives on same-sex marriage.  
Queering Marriage 
Many people are not aware that not all queer people are advocating the legalisation of same-
sex marriage. In fact, for many queer people and scholars, marriage equality is not their main 
political goal (Spade and Willse, 2014: 32). Queer activists are often critical of those 
advocating for marriage equality, arguing that this type of activism conforms to the norms of 
heteronormativity. While some queer theorists believe that same-sex marriage should be legal 
for the financial benefits it offers, others believe that the notion should be rejected altogether. 
Those who believe that it should be rejected argue that the institution of marriage is an 
inherently violent institution (borrowing from a (radical) feminist critique) and that it is based 
on heteronormative and conservative traditional family values (see Garcia-Rodrigo, 2008). 
Perhaps more importantly, some queer theorists warn that the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage does not necessarily mean that the oppressive sexual system will end or that 
society’s attitudes on homosexuality will change. Warner (2000: 90) argues that sexual 
justice should be the ultimate goal of the LGBTQ movement, and not gay marriage. 
Hull (2006: 79) points to Tom Stoddard who argued in his 1992 piece “Why Gay People 
Should Seek the Right to Marry” that legalising same-sex marriage should be advocated for 
its practical, political and philosophical reasons. The practical reasons are more economically 
based – receiving tax benefits, Social Security benefits for one’s spouse, access to health 
insurance through one’s spouse’s healthcare policy and so forth. Political benefits include 
ending discrimination against gay people through the legalisation of same-sex marriage. In 
philosophical terms the right to marry should be available to every citizen, whether they 
choose to marry or not. Many queer people and scholars tend to disagree with these reasons. 
The reality is that there are financial benefits attached to marriage that exclude those who are 
unmarried – gay or straight. For example, in the USA there are over 1,000 financial benefits 
attached to marriage that you can access only if you are married. According to Nair (2014: 
18), extending marriage to gay couples will not address the inequalities that the institution of 
marriage perpetuates. Bouchard (2017) cautions that one should not diminish the importance 
of marriage equality as it is very important to some, but at the same time she points out that 
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gay marriage often leads to the creation of different classes within the queer community. 
Furthermore, she argues that there should be a more complex conversation around how 
marriage legislation in general articulates with other legislation that might seem on the 
surface to recognise individuals, but might exclude certain communities or make themselves 
invisible. For example, she points to the USA’s immigration laws, which can make it very 
difficult for people to immigrate to the USA without some form of state-recognised family 
connection – usually heterosexual marriage by default (Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 
13/07/2017). 
According to Josephson (2005: 274), marriage is directly tied to citizenship, in particular 
sexual citizenship. Kollman (2013: 25) defines ‘sexual citizenship’ as the way in which one’s 
sexual orientation or sexual non-conformity affects one’s ability to participate in society. As 
such, advocates for marriage equality argue that not extending marriage to everyone 
privileges heterosexual people and it essentially makes the LGBTQ community second-class 
citizens in their own country. In the case of marriage and all the benefits attached to this 
institution, it excludes those who do not enter into the institution, mostly women and LGBTQ 
members. Ingraham and Saunders (2016: 3) argue that attaching financial benefits to 
marriage hinders equal access for others, especially keeping in mind that those in historically 
under-represented populations often have a lower socioeconomic status because of their race, 
class or disability.  
According to Halberstam (2012: 107), the legalisation of same-sex marriage only benefits 
affluent white gay couples. For queer people who live in poverty or who are marginalised, 
marriage equality will not change their socioeconomic status in society or bring social justice 
to their lived realities. Queer theorist often put forward the argument that all the money spent 
on marriage equality campaigns could have been used to help queer people living in poverty, 
or who do not have access to health services, or to assist homeless LGBTQ youth (Kate and 
Deeg, 2014: 48). As such, instead of focusing the goal of marriage equality on addressing the 
inequalities that the institution of marriage imposes on the poor and the working class, what 
advocates of marriage equality actually opt for is to reinforce the concept of the nuclear 
family and conform to a heteronormative lifestyle. Ratele (2017) agrees that marriage 
perpetuates inequalities and has become somewhat of an exclusionary institution, particularly 
in capitalist societies, in that it becomes harder for poor men and women – of all genders and 
sexualities – to get married. He also claims that the concept of the nuclear family is a fantasy, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 37 
 
because it comes with all kinds of ideological constraints and demands (Interview, Kopano 
Ratele, 05/07/2017). D’Emilio (2014: 59) goes so far as to say that marriage equality does 
nothing for social justice. Instead, it further privileges those who already benefit from 
privileges related to race, class and/or ability.  
The argument that has also been put forward by some queer scholars is that the legalisation 
on same-sex marriage will not necessarily translate into a shift in people’s attitude towards 
the LGBTQ community. According to Conrad (2014: 62), the legalisation on same-sex 
marriage in Maine, USA, for example, had led to an increase in homophobic violence. The 
safety of queer people and transgender people is linked to a cultural change that still needs to 
take place and not necessarily to legislative changes. This has not been more evident than in 
South Africa and the phenomenon of ‘corrective rape’ of black lesbian women. Corrective 
rape is defined as “the sexual violence perpetrated for the purpose of supposedly ‘curing’ a 
person of their real or perceived sexual orientation and/or gender identity” (Anguita, 2012: 
489). What makes this so troubling is the fact that gay marriage has been legal in South 
Africa since 2006 and gender-based violence protected in its Constitution since 1996. Yet 
homophobia is still widespread, with many black South Africans arguing that homosexuality 
is un-African and their white counterparts arguing that homosexuality goes against their 
religious beliefs. It is perhaps a bit problematic to link the legislation on same-sex marriage 
with sexual violence; however, it is does highlight that laws and policies are not always 
sufficient to change the cultural perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of people, and changing the 
laws on marriage is no different.   
Many queer scholars share the sentiment of some (radical) feminist scholars that the 
institution of marriage and the nuclear family are, at their core, violent institutions/social 
constructions. According to Kate and Deeg (2014: 47), every fifteen seconds a woman in 
these institutions is physically abused and one in every three girls will be sexually abused. 
The institution itself thus serves the interests of the male and leaves the female and/or 
children vulnerable. Many lesbian feminists argue that heteronormative marriage, whether 
different-sex or same-sex, will be difficult to supersede, given the fact that it relies on a sense 
of compulsory heterosexuality (Josephson, 2005: 274). This compulsory heterosexuality – 
also known as the heterosexual imaginary – centres on the romantic and sacred notions of 
heterosexuality without being critically conscious of how heterosexuality operates. Ingraham 
and Saunders (2016: 2) argue that heterosexuality is not so much just about biology or sexual 
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orientation; instead it is a hegemonic social construct that has become highly regulated, 
organised and ritualised with regards to its social processes and practices. It is this 
compulsory heterosexuality that is tied to marriage even though it does not necessarily serve 
the interest of its participants, but instead it serves the economy and the broader interests of 
capitalism. 
Clearly, in the case of same-sex marriage the imperative of heterosexuality is not the issue; 
however, the issue has to do with the conformity of gay and lesbian people to 
heteronormativity. According to Ingraham and Saunders (2016: 2), “heteronormativity sets 
institutionalised heterosexuality as the standard for social arrangements based on the 
asymmetrical division of the sexes.” Many queer theorists argue against this notion, as it 
contributes to constructing heterosexuality as remaining the standard for all social/sexual 
relations. It is through this desire to conform to heteronormativity that gay and lesbian people 
unconsciously perpetuate the idea that essentially heterosexuality is the norm and that 
conforming to this norm is the only way to be recognised as full citizens and enjoy the 
privileges of their heterosexual counterparts. Kate and Deeg (2014: 47) fittingly argue that 
assimilation does not mean liberation. Unfortunately, what this does is erase and marginalise 
the lived experience of so many queer people, and to a large extent it makes the LGBTQ 
movement invisible.  
World War II and the Cold War 
Hidden Holocaust 
It may seem odd to discuss WWII and the Cold War in relation to contemporary LGBTQ 
history, but these two events provide critical insights into views on homosexuality and how 
those views spilled over and have been passed on through generations. The Holocaust during 
WWII is regarded by many as one of the most horrific events in modern history. It is 
primarily understood as the systematic persecution and genocide of approximately six million 
European Jews by the Nazi regime in Germany from 1941 until 1945 (Lautmann, 1998: 345). 
Surprisingly, or perhaps not that surprisingly, many are not aware of the fact that millions of 
other people or ‘undesirables’ (as they were known during that time) were persecuted based 
on their perceived racial inferiority, including the Gypsies (the Roma and Sinti), some Slavic 
peoples and those with mental and/or physical disabilities. Those who differed from the Nazis 
on political, ideological and/or behavioural grounds were also persecuted. These included 
Communists, Socialists, Jehovah’s Witnesses and homosexual men. This section focuses in 
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particular on the persecution of gay men during the Holocaust. These men were targeted 
because of their sexual orientation or preference, and their existence and victimhood are often 
overlooked in the discourse of the Holocaust.  
The persecution of gay men in Europe is not a new phenomenon that is unique to the Nazi 
regime. In fact, in 1871 Germany passed a nation-wide law prohibiting same-sex relations 
between men. According to Grau (1995: 1), this law was known as Paragraph 175 of the 
German Penal Code. Paragraph 175 stated that “[a]n unnatural sex act between persons of 
male sex or by humans with animals is punishable by imprisonment; the loss of civil rights 
may also be imposed” (Grau, 1995: 65). It is important to keep in mind that although the law 
existed, it rarely resulted in imprisonment. This was true to such an extent that many activists, 
most notably Dr Magnus Hirschfield, advocated for the abolition of Paragraph 175.   
Dr Hirschfield was a physician who researched human sexuality. His argument was that 
homosexuality was as natural as heterosexuality and he believed that, through science, 
homosexuality would be understood by society as a normal phenomenon without fear or 
punishment (Setterington, 2013: 13). In 1897 he launched a petition to overturn Paragraph 
175 by obtaining more than 5,000, signatures which included signatures from influential 
Germans such as scientist Albert Einstein and writer Hermann Hesse. Although the petition 
failed, Dr Hirschfield went on to found the ground-breaking Institute for Sexual Research in 
1919 (Heger, 1980: 10). However, the rise of the Nazis was to change and destroy Dr 
Hirschfield’s work on abolishing Paragraph 175 and possibly normalising homosexuality. On 
30 January 1933 Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Nazi Germany. The following month his 
regime banned all homosexual rights organisations – gay and lesbian bars were closed and 
publications catering to homosexuals were banned. In May 1933 Dr Hirschfield’s Institute for 
Sexual Research was destroyed (Setterington, 2013: 17).  
Anything related to homosexuality was seen as a threat to Germany. According to Grau 
(1995: 3), there were four primary reasons why homosexuality was viewed as a threat to the 
German society. Firstly, being gay meant that you would not be producing babies and this 
would lead to a lower birth rate, which would in turn essentially mean a weaker Germany. 
Secondly, homosexuality was seen as having the ability to corrupt the minds of young people, 
a phenomenon that could spread and become an epidemic. What is interesting to note here, 
and perhaps alarming, is that this train of thought – manifested in the 1930s – can be seen in 
21st-century Russia with its Anti-Gay Propaganda Law that was passed in 2013 (Johnson, 
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2015: 44). Russia’s law strengthens the penalties for those who ‘promote’ homosexuality 
among minors. Thirdly, homosexuals were seen as enemies of respectable society and 
suspected of being opportunists, especially given the fact that many believed that 
homosexuals tend to form cliques. Lastly, homosexuals were seen as being a danger to public 
morality – same-sex relations were believed to encourage the decline of social community. 
As such, gay men became targets in Nazi Germany. They became targets not so much 
because homosexuality was a criminal offence, but mostly because being gay was seen as an 
inherent danger to the Aryan race.  
It is important to mention that gay men and lesbian women were prosecuted differently 
during the Nazi period – a phenomenon that is seen in many societies around the world, even 
today. Lesbians were not seen as a social or political danger, unlike gay men, who were seen 
as the “enemies of the state” (Lautmann, 1998: 353). When Paragraph 175 was amended in 
1935, it did not include women. According to Grau (1995: 10), the Nazi regime purposefully 
did this in order to protect fertility and procreation. It was believed that the reproductive 
power in women is never wasted, unlike in homosexual men who could, according to the 
Nazis logic, biologically pass on homosexuality. A call was made to women to adopt a more 
feminine image through their appearance, clothing or their being. This push for feminisation 
in women consolidated traditional gender norms in Nazi German society. Grau (1995: 15) 
argues that it cannot be said with certainty that lesbian women were sent to concentration 
camps because of their sexuality. However, lesbian women who suffered in concentration 
camps were regarded as anti-social members of society (Setterington, 2013: 31).  
Note that the vast majority of research on the persecution of gay men in the Holocaust is 
based on first-hand accounts from survivors. Many of these accounts came in the form of 
memoirs that have been translated from German or French to English. It is important to 
acknowledge that it is possible for meaning to get lost through the translation of books; 
however, these accounts are crucial in understanding the experiences of gay men in the 
Holocaust. Two influential first-hand accounts were those of Josef Kohout, who published his 
book under the pseudonym Heinz Heger (1980), and Pierre Seel (1995). These memoirs were 
written primarily to commemorate the suffering of the forgotten victims as well as to validate 
the experiences of homosexual men in Nazi concentration camps.  
Many gay survivors of the Holocaust did not speak or write about their experiences because 
of the shame and stigma attached to being gay, and also because homosexuality was still a 
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criminal offense in Germany after the fall of the Nazi regime. It was not until Josef Kohout 
published his memoir The Men with the Pink Triangle, that others were inspired to share their 
stories (Setterington, 2013: 107). In his memoir Kohout revealed that everyone in the 
Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where he was imprisoned, was distinguished by different 
coloured triangles: yellow for Jews, black for anti-socials, red for politicals, purple for 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, green for criminals, blue for emigrants, brown for Gypsies, and pink for 
homosexuals (Heger, 1980: 31). Note that in some concentration camps the colour of the 
triangles differed. In Seel’s (1995: 30) account homosexuals in the Schirmeck concentration 
camp in Alsace, France wore blue bars, which was also worn by Catholics and asocials. One 
thing was certain, however, that the men who wore pink triangles (along with the Jews and 
Gypsies) suffered the most (Lautmann, 1998: 349). Kohout recalls a man who had suffered 
twice over: for being a Jew and homosexual – his yellow and pink triangle on top of each 
other formed the Star of David (Heger, 1980: 39).  
One particular recollection in Kohout’s account that is of interest to this study is his night in 
the police prison. Kohout shares the story of being placed in a one-man prison cell along with 
two other men – one arrested for housebreaking and the other one for swindling widows 
looking for new husbands. When they found out Kohout was imprisoned for his 
homosexuality, they insulted him after he rejected their sexual advances. However, during the 
night these two men – both married to women – had sex with each other. They justified their 
actions as an emergency outlet and claimed that there was nothing queer about it – they were 
still ‘normal’ men and not a ‘filthy queer’ like Kohout (Heger, 1980: 23). This shared belief 
of ‘normal’ men being different from queer men was a common and regular occurrence 
throughout Kohout’s account. Today this phenomenon is more accurately known as men who 
have sex with men (MSM). This raises a very important question around the concept of 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. Kohout puts it so eloquently: “Is there a normal hunger and an 
abnormal one? A normal thirst and an abnormal one? Isn’t hunger always hunger, and thirst 
thirst?” (Heger, 1980: 23). According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 904), the third stage 
of the norm life cycle, norm internalisation, refers to the moment when the norm reaches a 
stage where it is no longer challenged and is accepted as a given. In the case of Kohout’s 
incident, the norm had been so internalised that anything other than a heterosexual identity 
had to be rejected and was regarded as abnormal.  
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With the fall of the Nazi regime in 1945, homosexual men along with the other Holocaust 
victims were liberated from the concentration camps. However, as Seel (1995: 88) movingly 
stated in his memoir, “[l]iberation was only for others”. Even as WWII came to an end, 
homosexual men were still regarded as criminals under Paragraph 175 of the Penal Code and 
police records with their names were kept. After the war many gay survivors were tried under 
Paragraph 175. Some committed suicide before the trial or afterwards in prison, while others, 
like Pierre Seel (1995), opted for heterosexual marriage. Heger (1980: 9) points out that 
Paragraph 175 was repealed only in 1969 – the same year the Stonewall riots erupted. Unlike 
other Holocaust survivors, gay men never received recognition for their suffering. In 2001 the 
German government finally recognised gay men as victims of the Holocaust and encouraged 
them to collect compensation for their suffering. Needless to say, by then most gay men who 
had suffered in the Holocaust were either elderly or deceased. In 2011 Rudolf Brazda passed 
away – he was considered to be the last gay Holocaust survivor to have worn the pink 
triangle (Setterington, 2013: 104). At the time of this writing, the pink triangle is still used by 
the LGBTQ movement, not only in commemoration of the men who suffered, but also as a 
symbol of the fight against repression.      
Lavender Scare 
While on the subject of war, it is important to briefly mention the targeting of homosexuals in 
the USA during the Cold War. In 1947 Republicans raised concerns about homosexuals who 
were employed by the US State Department (Charles, 2012: 101). These concerns came from 
a belief that homosexual men and women could easily be blackmailed, which meant that they 
would more readily share confidential information of their country with possible enemies. As 
such, homosexuals were seen as security risks. A public witch hunt followed that removed 
homosexuals or those suspected of homosexuality from the State Department from about 
1947 to 1969, when several US federal courts deemed these policies as unconstitutional. This 
public witch-hunt was known as the Lavender Scare.  
Although the Lavender Scare escalated during the Cold War, the policing of homosexuals 
had already begun in 1937 (Charles, 2012: 102). In 1937 the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) started to systematically collect information on homosexuals. This targeting of 
homosexuals came as a result of a nationwide panic about child kidnappings in the 1930s. 
Many believed that homosexuals preyed on children, which meant that there had to be a 
connection between homosexual men and child kidnapping. This misguided belief and the 
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associated actions would eventually grow and spill over into government. In 1942 the FBI 
created a file on “sex perverts in government” (Charles, 2012: 103). This systematic 
categorisation of homosexuals as sex perverts led to the belief and categorisation of 
homosexuals as undesirable, unfit and even morally depraved (Shibusawa, 2012: 728).  
It was the passing of President Harry Truman’s ‘Executive Order 9835’ (also known as the 
‘Loyalty Order’) in 1947 that allowed government officials to quietly force out homosexuals 
working in government through its loyalty programme. After Senator Joe McCarthy’s 
infamous remarks about Communists working in the State Department in February 1950, the 
situation for homosexuals deteriorated. According to Charles (2012: 103), the majority of the 
American population felt that Communists and homosexuals exhibited similar traits: both 
groups kept their true identities hidden, both operated in secretive underworlds, they shared a 
common sense of loyalty, they recruited members into their ranks, and both groups were 
believed to be mentally abnormal. These common misperceptions had a lot to do with the 
suspicions about the masculinity and loyalty of Communists and homosexuals as constructed 
by government officials (Smith, 1992: 328).  
It is important to note that although homosexuals were forced out of government as security 
risks, these witch-hunts always lacked material evidence. That is essentially what 
McCarthyism is based on – the practice of making accusations of subversion without proper 
regard for evidence (Charles, 2012: 101). Being aware that they did not have actual evidence 
to prosecute homosexuals, President Dwight Eisenhower signed ‘Executive Order 10450’ in 
1953 to prosecute them based on immorality. This meant that criminals, drug addicts and 
homosexuals were grouped together. What is not so obvious about this executive order is that 
it constructed the idea of the ‘normative American man’ – the one who is less likely to 
commit treason, while the other was (Shibusawa, 2012: 733). In this case, because of his 
immorality, the homosexual man was more likely to commit treason than the heterosexual 
man.  
Perhaps more importantly, Shibusawa (2012) posits the interesting argument that the 
Lavender Scare was at its core the fear that the USA would lose its hegemonic power. This 
was revealed in the State Department’s 23 June 1950 memo on homosexuality entitled 
Problem of Homosexuals and Sex Perverts in the State Department (Shibusawa, 2012: 742). 
The memo explains why homosexuals were regarded as security risks and how the ‘problem’ 
should be dealt with. The memo also references the decline of the Egyptian, Greek and 
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Roman Empires as a result of their acceptance of homosexuality. Clearly this suggests that 
societies that accepted or condoned homosexuality would lose their power and the USA did 
not want to risk such a fate. This stands in contrast with many Western European societies 
today, such as the Netherlands, for example, which view the acceptance of homosexuality as 
progressive (Kollman, 2013: 13). Interestingly enough, two years after the memo was written, 
homosexuality was officially classified as a mental illness in the USA – the American 
Psychiatric Association declassified it only in 1973 (Meyer, 2003: 674). Many argue that the 
Lavender Scare strengthened the normalisation of heterosexuality and the nuclear family in 
American society, but many also argue that the Lavender Scare was the real catalyst for the 
gay and lesbian movement and the discourse around LGBTQ rights as a whole.  
LGBTQ Rights as Human Rights 
According to Altman and Symons (2016: 74), the discourse around international human 
rights is a direct consequence of the events of WWII. Article 2 of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states that “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status” (United Nations, 2015). The interesting part is that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights did not explicitly make provision for protection based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity. As discussed in the previous section, this was mainly because homosexual 
men were still criminalised in Germany even after the fall of the Nazi regime. Evidently, this 
was not just a problem in Germany. The view of homosexuals as security risks in the USA 
during the Cold War was arguably a factor in the country’s silence in not advocating the 
inclusion of sexual orientation rights in the conversation around the norms of human rights.   
According to Swiebel (2009: 25), the first time the issue around LGBTQ rights was 
introduced at a formal United Nations (UN) meeting was in 1985. At that year’s UN World 
Conference on Women in Nairobi, Dutch minister Annelien Kappeyne van de Coppello 
advocated for the inclusion of lesbian rights. This activism around lesbian rights is directly 
linked to the discourse around sexual rights and women’s rights as human rights with the rise 
of feminism in the 1970s. According to Altman and Symons (2016: 85), the discourse around 
sexual rights and women’s rights centred on reproductive rights, sexual violence, rape and 
forced sterilisation. These issues affected all women, including lesbian women. As such, 
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feminist women are largely responsible for paving the way for introducing LGBTQ rights 
into the conversation with its advocacy of lesbian rights. 
In November 2006 a set of principles was drafted by international human rights scholars, 
jurists and practitioners in Yogyakarta, Indonesia that would guide the development of 
national and international legal standards regarding the protection of human rights for sexual 
and gender minorities (D’Amico, 2015: 60). This was known as the ‘Yogyakarta Principles 
on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation or 
Gender Identity’ – in short, the Yogyakarta Principles. It highlighted the role of regional 
courts in relation to international law and human rights – it allowed these regional courts to 
address any form of marginalisation or exclusion on the basis of sexual orientation and/or 
gender identity. According to Altman and Symons (2016: 81), this was a deliberate attempt to 
codify and promote international legal norms. However, what they did not take into account 
was that international norms and domestic norms do not always cascade simultaneously. In 
fact, Altman and Symons (2016: 81) go on to argue that in order for international law to catch 
on, a domestic cultural shift around sexual liberty needs to take place first.  
D’Amico (2015: 60) points to the 2008 Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, 
and Gender Identity (SOGI Declaration) as an example of such a domestic cultural shift in 
relation to international law that tends to translate into voting behaviour in the UN on issues 
such as sexual orientation and/or gender identity. At the time of the SOGI Declaration, the 
UN was comprised of 192 member states (it currently has 193 member states). Out of the 192 
member states, 67 supported the SOGI Declaration, 57 opposed it, and 67 abstained. 
D’Amico (2015: 61) argues that such extreme polarisation within the General Assembly is 
rare, especially for such an informal declaration. It is important to note that only 6 out the 54 
African countries supported the declaration and only 4 out of the 53 Asian countries. Yet 45 
Western and Eastern European countries supported the declaration. Although it is clear that 
LGBTQ issues are viewed and supported differently in the majority of the so-called Western 
world compared to the non-Western world, D’Amico (2015: 61) points out that the debates 
around LGBTQ issues indicate that further progress is possible. 
The inclusion of LGBTQ rights on the UN agenda has always been met with firm resistance. 
For years the UN had been unwilling to recognise LGBTQ rights as human rights. Queer 
theorists such as Altman and Symons (2016: 73) and Weber (2016: 121) point to Hillary 
Clinton’s 2011 landmark speech stating that LGBT(Q) rights are human rights as a pivotal 
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moment for the LGBTQ movement and its advocacy of human rights. On 15 December 2011 
the UN released its first-ever report on LGBTQ rights as human rights (Setterington, 2013: 
111).  
In July 2013 the UN launched its year-long ‘Free and Equal’ campaign in Cape Town, South 
Africa (UN News Centre, 2013). The objective of the campaign was to raise awareness and 
respect for LGBT(Q) equality. At the launch of this campaign former High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Navi Pillay, stated that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
and/or gender identity in the workforce, education, health sectors and other areas of society is 
a basic violation of human rights. One year later the UN implemented a marriage policy that 
recognises the same-sex marriages of its staff who married in a country where same-sex 
marriage is legal, regardless of their nationality. Before this policy took effect on 26 June 
2014, the marital status of employees of the UN was determined by the laws of the country 
whose passport they carried (UN News Centre, 2014). Note that this policy was implemented 
by former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon without consulting member states. According 
to Coleman (2014), Ban Ki-Moon said the following of the policy change: 
Human rights are at the core of the mission of the United Nations … I am proud 
to stand for greater equality for all staff, and I call on all members of our UN 
family to unite in rejecting homophobia as discrimination that can never be 
tolerated at our workplace. 
This move by the UN in recent years is an interesting one, given the fact that there is no 
international law that recognises same-sex marriage as a basic human right. Point 1 of Article 
16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “[m]en and women of full age, 
without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to 
found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution” (United Nations, 2015). Clearly, the right to marry and the right to establish a 
family is extended only to heterosexual couples. Coleman (2014) argues that this move by 
Ban Ki-Moon was a way of calling on the UN’s member states to redefine the institution of 
marriage in order for the ‘right to marry’ to be extended to same-sex couples.   
Although it is evident that the UN and those in powerful positions within the organisation 
have positive views on LGBTQ rights as human rights, these views are not shared by the 
majority of its member states. The discourse around LGBTQ rights and the UN raises the 
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very important question: who has the right to tell (compel) a sovereign state to conform to 
international law? It is clear that the UN is promoting international norms that do not 
translate or resonate with the domestic norms of sovereign states. International organisations 
play a big role in the whole phenomenon of norm cascades, given the fact that numerous 
states have accepted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and regard it as the 
universal norm. Yet organisations such as Amnesty International, for example, made many 
(failed) attempts to repeal Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2014. As such, many critics 
of international organisations such as the UN or Amnesty International question their 
effectiveness in protecting LGBTQ people and their basic human rights.  
It is very important to understand the significance of state sovereignty in the debate around 
international law. According to Wendt (1992: 412), sovereignty is an institution. In the case 
of Uganda, its government made it clear that by defending the Anti-Homosexuality Act they 
were in effect defending their state sovereignty. This is supported by Wendt (1992: 413), 
who notes that if states stopped acting in accordance with certain norms, their identity as 
sovereign states would disappear. Thus, the sovereign state is an on-going accomplishment of 
practice, not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that somehow exist apart from practice. 
Taking a state’s sovereignty into account complicates the conversation around universal 
LGBTQ rights. It complicates the conversation given the fact that even though international 
organisations draw up universal laws, sovereign states still draw up their own laws that may 
be in conflict with international laws, and it is possible for these domestic laws to be 
infringements of basic human rights.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has described and explained how and why marriage equality has become such an 
important issue in the LGBTQ discourse and International Relations in recent years. It has 
provided a contemporary historical background to the gay and lesbian movement since the 
1970s and discussed how the single-issue stance in the movement has changed over the years, 
with especially the legalisation of same-sex marriage being the single issue in recent years 
championed by advocates. It is clear that the issue of same-sex marriage is closely tied to 
citizenship, in particular sexual citizenship. Advocates of same-sex marriage argue that the 
LGBTQ community is regarded as being made up of second-class citizens, given that they do 
not receive the privileges that heterosexual couples receive through marriage. This argument 
opened the door for many queer theorists to point out that the institution of marriage creates 
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inequalities for those who do not enter into this institution – same-sex or different-sex – and 
add that extending marriage rights to gay couples will not address the inequalities that the 
institution of marriage perpetuates (Nair, 2014: 18). This chapter also examined the role of 
queer theory in the debate on marriage equality. Queer theory emphasises that not all queer 
people are advocates of the legalisation of same-sex marriage. For many queer people, 
especially those whose socioeconomic status in society is affected by race, class and/or 
disability, the legalisation of same-sex marriage will not change their condition, nor will it 
bring social justice to their lives (Ingraham and Saunders, 2016: 3). 
This chapter also briefly examined historical events such as the Holocaust and the Lavender 
Scare, which impacted severely on the lives of homosexual people. The treatment of 
homosexuals during these times – which were not that long ago – and the attitudes and norms 
that emerged still linger on today. The chapter explored the discourse around LGBTQ rights 
as human rights, and in particular the role of the UN. The UN’s changing and vocal position 
on marriage equality is a step in the right direction for the equality movement. Whether the 
UN’s stance will influence other nations is still unclear, especially considering that in many 
countries homosexual acts are still criminalised. Evidently, international norms do not always 
– or immediately – translate to domestic norms. In order for international norms to be 
internalised, a cultural shift around sexual liberty within domestic borders needs to take place 
first (Altman and Symons, 2016: 81). 
The legalisation of same-sex marriage remains at the forefront of the mainstream LGBT(Q) 
agenda. At the same time, there has been a rise in anti-homosexuality rhetoric as well as an 
increase in policies re-criminalising same-sex relations. This creates an interesting 
phenomenon of a norm-cascading process going in opposite directions. In order to examine 
this phenomenon, this study draws on constructivist perspectives in IR. The following chapter 
evaluates international norm dynamics regarding ideas, values and norms of the ideational 
and how they influence the realities of global LGBTQ politics. Chapter 3 specifically 
examines Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model, as it proves useful to apply 
it to the Marriage Equality and Marriage Reactionary Movements.  
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 49 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Constructivist Perspectives in IR 
Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a recent history of homosexuality and the evolution of 
marriage equality. This foundational framework proves useful in addressing the research 
problem and answering the research questions, the primary research question being: How and 
why has marriage equality emerged as an important issue in contemporary global policy and 
practice as described and explained by IR? This is done by applying constructivist 
perspectives in International Relations (IR). Constructivists in IR are interested in the ideas, 
values and norms associated with the ideational dimension and how they influence the 
realities of global politics. For the purpose of this study, these ideas, values and norms 
specifically pertain to the realities of LGBTQ politics. This chapter explores the utility of 
constructivist perspectives and whether or not these perspectives are able to describe and 
explain the emergence of norms related to same-sex marriage in IR, how these norms cascade 
and diffuse into legal frameworks, and how they become internalised. 
This chapter provides a very brief overview of the history of IR with reference to the 
discipline’s two core (conservative) theories – realism and idealism. This is followed by an 
account of the emergence of constructivism, which occurred as the Soviet Union was on the 
verge of collapse – the time when neorealism and neoliberalism were still dominating the 
field of IR. An exploration of constructivist theory in IR is provided, examining perspectives 
from influential constructivist scholars as well as from the various academic disciplines that 
analyse political events through a constructivist lens. 
Queer theory and queer contributions within IR are important aspects of this chapter. An 
exploration of queer theory as a discipline is provided in order to show its influence in global 
LGBTQ politics. Perhaps more importantly, this chapter examines the role of queer 
perspectives and the work of queer scholars in the discipline of IR. This is done primarily by 
exploring the work of Cynthia Weber (2014, 2015, 2016), who argues that there is, or rather 
appears to be, no queer international theory.  
Finally, the remainder of the chapter focuses extensively on Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) 
norm life-cycle model. Finnemore and Sikkink’s work on international norm dynamics has 
been particularly influential in the field of constructivism and IR. An explanation of the three 
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stages of the norm life-cycle model is provided. These stages are (1) norm emergence, (2) 
norm cascading, and (3) norm internalisation. An in-depth exploration of this model prove to 
be useful for this study as it is used to illustrate the phenomenon of the Marriage Equality 
Movement (the cascading of marriage equality in one direction) and the Marriage 
Reactionary Movement (the cascading of anti-homosexuality in the opposite direction) in the 
next two chapters. As such, this chapter tries to make sense of and examine the utility of 
constructivist perspectives in global LGBTQ politics in IR. 
Primary Narratives in IR 
The history of IR has been told predominantly through the Great Debates, but specifically 
through the dominance of realism and idealism. According to Smith (2000: 376), the 
discipline of IR is believed to have started with the dominance of idealism during the 
interwar years. Proponents of idealism – particularly Woodrow Wilson – argued for nations 
to adopt liberal democratic systems. For idealists, the adoption of liberal democracy would 
prevent war through negotiations and international structures. Within IR, idealism is based on 
the belief that the good intentions of other nations can be relied upon. Not surprisingly, 
realists are major critics of idealism, arguing that this mode of thinking is naïve (Brown, 
2005: 24). Smith (2000) goes on to argue that realism went on to dominate the discipline of 
IR after WWII. The argument put forth by realists is that material forces shape the 
international system, and that a state’s national interests are emphasised over ethical and 
moral considerations. 
Realism and idealism have dominated the discipline of IR for decades. Realism, in particular, 
is still regarded as the theory of International Relations (Smith, 2000: 39). Despite the 
dominance of realism and idealism, over the years the discipline has seen different positions 
emerge – some of these positions include traditionalism and behaviouralism; state-centric and 
transnationalist approaches; neorealism, neoliberalism and Marxism; and rationalism and 
reflectivism. Although realism is regarded as the dominant theory in IR and is seen as a fully 
justified and universally accepted approach, it is not an approach that fits all circumstances. 
Realists emphasise notions of peace and conflict, balance of power/system, and human 
imperfection; however, they place too much emphasis on the importance of the state and tend 
to ignore the (queer) individual. Yes, idealists emphasise individual freedom, which includes 
sexual freedom; however, the idealist approach does not prove to be useful in addressing the 
research problem, seeing that it does not provide the theoretical framework to analyse the 
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complexities around sexuality/gender identity and norms. Therefore, this study turns to 
constructivism to address the research problem and answer the research questions.  
The Emergence of Constructivism 
Constructivism started to emerge in the late 1980s, when the Soviet Union was on the verge 
of collapse. The abrupt end of the Cold War took the international community by surprise. 
What was so astonishing about this event was the peaceful nature of the Soviet Union’s 
dissolution, and the subsequent peaceful end to the Cold War (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 
265). Although Adler (1997: 342) argues that the way the Cold War ended is still an intricate 
process to comprehend, Kratochwil (1993) pointed out that the end of the Cold War was 
essentially a test of neorealism’s capacity to explain international change – a test neorealists 
failed.  
Perhaps more importantly, the end of the Cold War allowed a constructivist perspective – a 
perspective often ignored by realists and idealists – to gain a foothold in IR in order to 
explain the behaviour of actors in the international arena. Constructivism, along with other 
critical theories, challenged the discipline’s conservative theories. It is important, however, to 
keep in mind that constructivism is not anti-realist, nor is it anti-idealist by ideological 
conviction. Adler (1997: 323) points out that constructivism challenges only the ontological 
and epistemological grounds of realism and idealism. The goal of constructivism, therefore, 
is to provide theoretical as well as empirical accounts of social institutions and social change 
– with the help of the mutual effects of actors and social structures on one another. 
Constructivism in IR 
The position of constructivism in IR is explored in the following section through its three 
ontological propositions about social life and their impact of global politics as explained by 
Price and Reus-Smit (1998). 
The first proposition of constructivism is the belief that reality is constructed through the 
combination and consolidation of both the ideational and material facets of existence (Price 
and Reus-Smit, 1998: 267). Adler (1997: 322) defines constructivism as “the manner in 
which the material world shapes and is shaped by human actions and interactions depends on 
dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.” For constructivists, 
the material dimension is not dismissed as irrelevant, but the ideational is emphasised. 
Constructivism links the ideational to the issue of human consciousness in international life 
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(Ruggie, 1998: 878). Ruggie (1998: 879) goes on to state that the ideational has normative 
and also instrumental dimensions; the ideational expresses individual as well as collective 
intentionality; and the ideational – its meaning and significance – is not independent of time 
and place. Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 266) point out that the ideational is emphasised in 
constructivism because institutionalised meaning systems are thought to define the social 
identities of actors, which are based on their interests and actions.  
According to Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 267), the second proposition of constructivism 
stresses that identities constitute interests and actions. According to Wendt (1992: 398) 
“identities are the basis of interests” and these interests are defined in the process of defining 
situations. Constructivists believe that understanding how interests are constituted will allow 
them to explain a wide range of international phenomena that rationalists have either 
misunderstood or ignored (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 267). Adler (1997: 324) argues that 
the identities, interests and actions of actors are socially constructed by collective meanings, 
interpretations and assumptions about the world. Ruggie (1998: 879) takes this a bit further to 
explain the role of constructivism with regard to interests and identities on an individual level 
as well as an international level. Ruggie (1998) argues that on an individual level 
constructivism problematises the identities and interests of states, and posits that they have 
been socially constructed (see also Adler, 1997). What constructivists then do on an 
international level is map out the ideational factors of an actor’s actions – these could range 
from ideology and culture to principled beliefs and aspirations. Constructivists point out that, 
on an international level, structure is immersed within ideational factors. Constructivists 
therefore argue that the international structure is a social structure that is made up of socially 
knowledgeable and informally competent actors who are subject to limitations that are in part 
material and in part institutional (Ruggie, 1998: 879).  
The final ontological proposition taken by constructivists is the claim that actors and 
structures are mutually constituted (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 267). This reflects the 
argument by Ruggie (1998) that (the international) structure is socially constructed and gives 
meaning to actors’ identities and interests. Price and Reus-Smit (1998) point out that 
constructivists believe that structure and the ideas and knowledge of actors cannot exist 
independently of one another. Ruggie (1998: 879) stressed that in order for mutually 
understandable conduct to exist in IR, there have to be mutually recognised constitutive rules 
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that rest on shared intentionality. This emphasises that structure is a social construct 
immersed within ideational factors.  
Adler (1997: 320) argues that the core debate in constructivism is about the nature of social 
science and IR – the conception of the discipline that is in fact social (see also Waldrop, 
1992: 232). Adler uses the following metaphor to illustrate this point: 
Suppose you toss a rock into the air. It can make only a simple response to the 
external physical forces that act on it. But if you throw a bird into the air, it may 
fly off into a tree… Finally, take a group of people, a nation or various nations and 
metaphorically toss them in the air. Where they go, how, when and why, is not 
entirely determined by physical forces and constraints; but neither does it depend 
solely on individual preference and rational choices. It is also a matter of their 
shared knowledge, the collective meaning they attach to their situation, their 
authority and legitimacy, the rules, institutions and material resources they use to 
find their way, and their practices, or even, sometimes, their joint creativity (1997: 
320).   
The point Adler (1997) tries to convey is that constructivism is not about science versus 
literary interpretations. Instead, the debate is about the nature of social science itself, and 
essentially about the discipline of IR. Adler (1997: 320) argues that “the issue pits a naturalist 
conception of science, almost entirely based on contested philosophies of science and on 
physical concepts and theories that physics has long since abandoned, against a conception of 
social science that is – social.”  
Constructivism in Other Disciplines 
It is important to note that constructivism is not so much regarded as a political theory as 
realism and idealism would be. Adler (1997: 323) argues that it should rather be seen as a 
social theory on which constructivists base their theories of international politics, given that it 
focuses on the social nature of cognition. This view is supported by Ruggie (1998: 879) as 
well as Onuf (1998: 58), who argue that constructivism makes it realistic to theorise about 
matters that seem to be unrelated. As such, given the interdisciplinary nature of 
constructivism, it has and is still being used in various other disciplines. These disciplines 
include sociology, philosophy, law, history and anthropology. This interdisciplinary 
component is not only limited to scholarly work, but also practical application. For example, 
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in terms of the law, Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 402) argue that “[l]awyers have been 
shown to do extensive social construction again, often in conjunction with international 
institutions that consolidate and formalise the new social facts lawyers create.” In other 
words, in the professional arena a group’s own shared ideational understanding can translate 
into formalised organisations and legal structures.   
Ruggie (1998: 862) argues that, although constructivism has been utilised by other 
disciplines, constructivists in IR have been particularly influenced by the work of sociology 
scholars such as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Even though constructivists in IR have 
strong theoretical roots in sociology as well as philosophy, constructivism has also managed 
to cross over into the fields of feminist studies, gender studies and queer studies. For 
example, constructivism is applied by interpreting the objective reality of sexual politics in 
order to fashion gender politics – sex being a physical reality and gender a social construct. 
The use of social constructivism in the arguments put forward by queer scholars is 
particularly important in queer theory and queer IR. The following section explores queer 
theory as well as its position and contributions in IR. 
Queer Theory 
The exploration of queer theory in the debate around marriage equality and in IR is an 
important one. Queer theory is rapidly growing in the field of International Relations. Queer 
theory challenges heteronormative norms and questions the status quo, and it examines the 
intersections of gender, sexuality, capitalism and the state through a queer lens. Queer 
theorists critique the activism in favour of same-sex marriage, arguing that those who are in 
favour of same-sex marriage are conforming to heteronormative ideals (Picq and Thiel, 2015: 
5). The queering of same-sex marriage and the arguments by some queer scholars around 
marriage equality were extensively covered in the previous chapter. Thus, the following 
section focuses on queer theory as an academic discipline and its important contribution in 
IR.  
Queering Theory 
According to Halperin (2003), there is a difference between making theory queer and to 
queer theory. Making theory queer is to “challenge the heterosexist underpinnings and 
assumptions of what conventionally passed for ‘theory’ in academic circles”, while queering 
theory is “to call attention to everything that is perverse about the project of theorising sexual 
desire and sexual pleasure” (Halperin, 2003: 340). According to Stein and Plummer (1994: 
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181), the emergence of queer theory as an academic move is indirectly related to the 
emergence of confrontational queer politics in the early stages of the gay and lesbian 
movement. Many scholars became critical of the exclusiveness of the gay and lesbian 
movement, as discussed in the previous chapter, as well as with the discourse of gay and 
lesbian studies. Queer theorists argued for a new way of thinking and theorising.  
In their work Stein and Plummer (1994: 182) identify four hallmarks of queer theory. First, 
queer theory conceptualises sexuality in such a way that sexual power is seen as being 
embodied through different levels of social life and enforced through fixed categories – sex, 
gender and sexuality. Second, queer theory problematises these categories as well as identity 
politics. Third, queer theory rejects civil rights strategies adopted by gay and lesbian studies, 
instead advocating for anti-assimilationist politics. Last, queer theory is willing to interrogate 
areas that would typically not be seen as the terrain of sexuality, and to analyse presumably 
heterosexual (or non-sexualised) texts through a queer lens. Halperin (2003: 341) argues that 
what queer theory has managed to do is effectively re-open the conversation around sexuality 
and gender; it has also managed to provide solid theoretical critiques of heteropatriarchy and 
homophobia, and it has successfully managed to create a platform for other scholars to 
further transgender studies.  
Many queer theorists, as Weber (2016) notes, often use Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s (1993) 
formulation of ‘queer’ as the first point of departure into the discipline. According to 
Sedgwick (1993: 8), ‘queer’ describes “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, 
dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements 
of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify 
monolithically.” In other words, looking at categories like gender or sexuality through a 
queer lens recognises that these categories are not fixed or binary identities.  
The notion that gender and sexuality are social constructs is not a new phenomenon. Michel 
Foucault (1976: 3) points to the Victorian era as a pivotal moment in history determining how 
sexuality and sex are seen today. During that era, sex (the act, not biological sex) was 
regarded as private and a topic that was not talked about. This discourse around sex and 
sexuality was seen as being limited to husband and wife, which means that it was essentially 
confined to marriage. The belief that sex and sexuality are a private matter and something 
that ‘just is’ has been passed on through generations as the norm. Instead, Foucault (1976: 
157) argues that sexuality is a social construct that has its roots in history and in social and 
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cultural norms. It is important to note that Foucault (1976) was less concerned with what 
sexuality is; instead, he focused on how sexuality functioned within society, specifically in 
relation to power.  
Halperin (2003: 341) argues that, along with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Judith Butler is 
equally regarded as one of the founders of queer theory, which is essentially an extension of 
Michel Foucault’s work. It is through Foucault’s (1976) work on sexuality that Butler (1990) 
extends the same argument to that of gender – the argument that gender, like sexuality, is a 
socially constructed category. It is on the basis of this social construction of gender that 
Butler (1993: 20) argues that gender is performative. This gender performativity refers to the 
way people actively construct their gender as they act it out. This gender performativity 
should not be confused with gender being a performance. Acting out gender as a performance 
has an end – all performances have a beginning and an end; however, gender performativity 
is an active construction with no end. This active construction usually occurs through 
repetitive bodily acts, gestures and movements that are seen as normative actions. This means 
that gender identity is directly related to behavioural patterns that sustain societal gender 
norms (see also Butler, 2009). Interestingly, Ratele (2017) links the entering of marriage to 
Butler’s (1993) concept of performativity. Ratele (2017) argues that when someone gets 
married, they are essentially doing something: they are declaring a public commitment 
(Interview, Kopano Ratele, 05/07/2017). Butler’s (1993: 17) argument is that the words “I 
pronounce you…” put into effect the relations that it names. In other words, it is a ‘speech 
act’.   
It is important to keep in mind that queer theory is not just limited to LGBTQ studies. The 
success of queer theory in academia has much to do with the attachment of ‘theory’ to 
‘queer’. Halperin (2003: 342) argues that in the beginning academics accepted queer theory 
being a theory and not a discipline seeing that it did not pose any threat to established 
disciplines. This meant that queer contributions have also allowed other scholars in different 
disciplines to use queer theory as a way to address various issues by examining them through 
a queer lens – these issues range from family and religion, to race and even the economy. For 
example, Smith (2010: 42) points to queer politics as a way of addressing the way that 
heteropatriarchy structures white supremacy, capitalism and settler colonialism. For many 
queer theorists and feminist scholars, it is important to critique this heteropatriarchy as they 
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argue that it is inherently built on a gender binary system that presumes heterosexuality as a 
social norm.  
Smith (2010: 43) goes on to state that what queer perspectives have managed to do is expand 
the understanding of identity politics for many people. Instead of assuming that bodies fit 
perfectly into fixed categories of sex, gender and sexuality, what queer theory allows is an 
exploration of how these fixed categories normalise what – or who – society regards as 
acceptable or appropriate. It is through this kind of identity politics that queer theory 
recognises and acknowledges those bodies who deviate from the norm (Valocchi, 2005: 751). 
Queering International Relations (IR) 
The issue of queering IR is important. Cynthia Weber has been influential in this debate. 
Many queer scholars (for instance, Sedgwick and Butler) tend to position queer theory 
primarily in the discourse around feminist studies, gender studies and poststructuralist 
studies. In “From Queer to Queer” Weber (2014: 596) argues that queer studies cannot be 
reducible only to the three aforementioned disciplines. Weber (2014) goes on to point to 
Teresa de Lauretis, who argues that queer studies as an academic practice is an attempt “to 
rethink the sexual in new ways, elsewhere and otherwise” which transcend traditional gay 
and lesbian studies, feminist studies, gender studies and poststructuralist studies.  
Weber (2014) points out that the “elsewhere” De Lauretis referred to tended to function in 
order to locate queer international theories outside of the discipline of IR. This means that 
“queer” has always been regarded as “otherwise” in relation to what most IR scholars have 
been taught to understand as International Relations theory and practice. Weber (2014: 597) 
argues that there is no real distinction between what is called IR and what is called queer IR. 
She goes on to state that queer IR has managed to seep into the three core areas in which 
most IR scholars claim expertise – war and peace, international political economy, and state 
and nation formation. 
In Weber’s (2015) article “Why is there no Queer International Theory?” she continues to 
challenge IR discourse in its reluctance to (somewhat) queer the discipline, arguing that queer 
studies have managed to transform itself into global queer studies (2015: 28). As mentioned 
earlier, (global) queer studies have made valuable contributions to the three core areas in IR. 
The interesting aspect of this, however, is that these contributions are frequently featured in 
top-ranked journals and books, but not within the field of IR itself. She argues that the 
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contributions made by (global) queer studies are largely bypassed by IR. For example, in the 
last decade “only six journal articles and no special issues on GQS (Global Queer Studies) 
themes have been published in the top 20 impact-rated IR journals, and only one GQS-
themed book has been published or commissioned by a top IR book series” (Weber, 2015: 
28). 
As a result, Weber (2015) asks the question why IR has not gone somewhat queer. She goes 
further by paraphrasing Martin Wight’s (1960) question “Why is there no International 
Theory?” as “Why is there no Queer International Theory?” She proposes three possible 
answers. Firstly, many arguments are put forward that “IR scholars are not interested in 
queer-themed work” (Weber, 2015: 28). However, Weber (2015) contests this view. She 
points to the fact that membership in the International Studies Association (ISA) LGBTQA 
Caucus is steadily on the rise. She also points to the fact that the first interdisciplinary 
conference that focused on queer IR managed to receive over 100 submissions as well as 
attract 200 participants. Evidently, there is not a lack of interest in queer-themed work. 
Secondly, Weber (2015: 28) challenges the claim that “interest in GQS has not (yet) led IR 
scholars to produce any Queer International Theory.” She argues that this ignores the fact that 
there is an expanding body of queer-themed work by IR scholars that stretches over 20 years 
– she names authors such as Dennis Altman, Kelly Kollman and herself as examples. The 
problem is that most of these works are not published in IR outlets. This creates the 
impression that there is no queer international theory.  
Lastly, it has been argued that “[a]ll of the GQS-themed work produced by IR scholars is so 
interdisciplinary that it lacks primary focus on core IR concerns, which is why IR scholars are 
not interested in it and why it is not published in IR outlets” (Weber, 2015: 28). Weber 
(2015) has consistently contended that GQS-themed work by IR scholars does in fact focus 
primarily on key IR themes such as war, sovereignty, hegemony, empire, security, 
intervention, nationalism, colonialism and foreign policy. She argues that IR-themes are 
central to queer work. She provides numerous examples to illustrate this point by citing the 
work of several IR scholars. She first points to her own work on how failing hegemonic states 
and wars perform queerness through their conduct of intervention and wars to solidify their 
hegemonic status (see Weber, 1999). She then points out that Puar (2007) investigated how 
states produce themselves and their citizens as pro-LGBT(Q) subjects in part to constitute 
other states, civilisations or peoples as national and global threats. Weber (2015) goes further 
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to acknowledge Agathangelou’s (2013) and Scott’s (2013) work on how the articulation and 
circulation of global (economic) value through queer and racialized bodies supports the 
practice of empires. In essence, this shows that there are in fact multiple queer international 
theories in the discourse. Consequently, Weber (2015: 29) poses a different question: “Why 
does there appear to be no Queer International Theory?” 
Weber (2015: 29) points to ‘Disciplinary IR’ as the mechanism that codes certain theories 
(whether consciously or unconsciously) as failures. Again, Weber (2015) cites Martin Wight, 
who argued that in order for “international theorising to succeed, it must accumulate 
knowledge about interstate relations.” As such, Weber (2015: 29) makes the claim that 
according to Disciplinary IR, perspective theories fail because they are judged not to be 
making progress towards this goal. According to Weber (2015: 30), Disciplinary IR uses 
homologisation, figuration and gentrification as strategies to make it appear as if there is no 
queer international theory. Essentially, Disciplinary IR ‘forces’ the IR discipline to dismiss 
queer international theories as nothing other than International Theory. This does not only 
negatively affect queer IR scholars, but it also impacts on the IR discipline as a whole.  
In Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality, and the Will to Knowledge, Weber 
(2016) continues to position queer studies within the IR discipline. She continues to argue 
that queer-themed work by IR scholars is important in the discourse around sovereignty and 
sexuality, and highlights the impact queer contributions have had on the international 
political practices of development, immigration, terrorism, human rights, and, of course, the 
continued incorporation by queer studies of IR’s three core areas.  
Weber (2016: 2) argues that the relationship between IR scholars and queer scholars in how 
they view (regard) one another’s work can perhaps explain why there is no (need for) queer 
theory in IR, and no (need for) IR theory in queer studies. Note that many queer scholars 
work on issues pertaining to political sovereignty, and many IR scholars work on issues 
pertaining to sexualities. According to Weber (2016), on the one hand, many IR scholars fail 
to “take on board the insights of their queer studies colleagues about the possibility and 
impossibility of producing and deploying sexualised subjectivities.” This results in most IR 
scholars’ regular under-theorising of how the will to knowledge about sexualities is part of 
what makes international games of power possible and impossible. On the other hand, many 
queer scholars tend to ignore the insights of their IR colleagues about how sovereignties are 
deployed to produce identities that are intended to legitimise national and international 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 60 
 
orders. As a result, most queer studies scholars tend to under-theorise how the will to 
knowledge about sexualities is a specifically sovereign will that makes possible and 
presupposes specifically sexualised sovereign subjectivities.  
Borrowing Cynthia Enloe’s take on a feminist scholar’s take on feminism, Weber (2016: 16) 
applies it to her work on queer studies within IR: 
I cannot claim to be doing queer work if I have no genuine interest in those who 
refuse/fail to signify monolithically in terms of sexes, genders, and sexualities. I 
cannot claim to be doing queer work if I neglect to analyse how power circulates 
in and through sexes, gender, and sexualities to attempt to normalise and/or 
prevent them. I cannot claim to be doing queer work if my evocation of the term 
queer closes down possibilities for critical thinking and practice in relation to 
nonmonolithic sexes, gender, and sexualities. I cannot claim to be doing queer 
work if I do not analyse how any evocation of the term queer is itself always made 
through a particular expression of power on behalf of some kind of intimate, 
national, and/or international politics.  
There are, of course, also arguments put forward by some feminist scholars (see Sjoberg, 
2015) who question the uniqueness of queer perspectives. These scholars argue that queer 
perspectives are essentially only an extension of feminist perspectives as well as other critical 
perspectives. However, Weber (2016: 17) argues that “[t]here is nothing inherently feminist 
about queer or queer IR.” She goes on to argue that many queer scholars as well as IR 
scholars strive towards a queer IR that is also a feminist IR. Thiel and Picq (2015: 7) 
similarly argue that feminist and queer engagements are critically important to understand 
and develop LGBTQ perspectives in IR.  
Incidentally, constructivist perspectives in IR have been used to observe international norm 
dynamics regarding ideas, values and norms around (homo)sexual and queer governance. For 
example, Kollman (2013) uses a constructivist lens to examine the legal recognition of same-
sex unions in liberal democratic states, and Symons and Altman (2015) utilise constructivism 
to illustrate the international polarisation of contesting norms. These scholars have 
acknowledged the importance of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) contribution to better 
understand norms and international norm changes. This study specifically applies Finnemore 
and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model to demonstrate the normalisation of marriage 
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equality and anti-homosexuality. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter is an exploration of 
the norm life-cycle model. 
Defining Norms and Institutions  
Constructivists in IR are particularly interested in the role norms play in political change. 
This change refers to the way in which norms emerge and evolve, and the ways in which they 
influence other features of the political landscape (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 888). Thus, 
norms are central to the field of political science and to the study of international relations. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891), a norm can be defined as a “standard of 
appropriate behaviour for actors within a given identity.” Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) 
point out that it is important to note that the language used by constructivists to refer to 
behavioural rules are different within the fields of IR and sociology. In IR constructivists use 
a language of norms to refer to behavioural rules; constructivists in sociology use the 
language of institutions to refer to the same behavioural rules. According to March and Olsen 
(1998: 948), an institution can be defined as a “relatively stable collection of practices and 
rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations.” 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) argue that by using a language of norms, IR scholars tend 
to isolate a single standard of behaviour, whereas sociologists use the language of institutions 
in order to emphasise behavioural rules and how they are structured together and 
interconnected.  
In effect, norms are the agreed-upon expectations and rules by which a culture guides the 
behaviour of its members in any given situation. It is important to note that norms vary 
widely across cultural groups. Many of these norms turn into laws, as seen in several laws 
passed in countries such as the Netherlands, South Africa, the USA and Germany legalising 
same-sex marriage, for example. Such laws are formal bodies of rules enacted by the state 
and backed by the power of the state. Members of a culture must conform to the culture’s 
norms for the culture to exist and function. Hence, members must want to conform and obey 
the rules. They must first internalise the social norms and values that dictate what is regarded 
as normal for the culture; then they must implement, or teach, the norms and values to the 
society. If internalisation and socialisation fail to produce conformity, some form of social 
control is ultimately needed. Social control may take the form of ostracism, fines, 
punishments and even imprisonment. This is especially evident in countries such as Uganda, 
Nigeria and Iran, for example, where homosexuality can result in imprisonment or execution.  
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Constructivists argue that there are different categories within which to place norms. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) highlight three categories, namely regulative norms, 
constitutive norms, and evaluative or prescriptive norms. Firstly, regulative norms maintain 
order and constrain behaviour. For example, LGBTQ activists try to change and call attention 
to rules and ‘appropriate’ behaviour that maintains a global system that marginalises queer 
bodies. Secondly, constitutive norms create new actors, interests and/or categories of action. 
For example, both the LGBTQ activist as well as the reactionist are engaged in a process in 
which they aim to emphasise and fortify the role that new actors play in championing their 
particular interests. Lastly, evaluative or prescriptive norms propose what behaviour is 
deemed appropriate. For example, the reactionist can propose legislation that re-criminalises 
same-sex acts, because these acts are seen as inappropriate and only heterosexual behaviour 
is deemed appropriate. Note that evaluative or prescriptive norms are often omitted from the 
analysis and have not received the necessary attention they should. In fact, Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998: 891) suggest that it is precisely the prescriptive quality of what ‘ought to be’ 
that distinguishes norms from other kinds of rules.   
Whether a norm is regarded as good or bad is highly subjective, given the fact that it is 
determined by the perceptions, beliefs and identity of those who are promoting the particular 
norm. What is important to know is the fact that there are no accurate instruments to measure 
norms. Thus, the challenge for researchers is to determine at which point a norm could be 
classified as an accepted (internationalised) norm.  According to Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998: 891), in order to study norms one must study the “extensive trail of communication 
among actors”. This approach clearly points to the process of persuasion. The process of 
persuasion is central to determine the level of progress that occurs within the norm life cycle, 
as illustrated below: 
 
Figure 1. Norm Life Cycle 
(Source: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896) 
Norm Emergence Norm Cascade Internalisation 
   
Stage 1 
Tipping 
Point 
   Stage 2 Stage 3 
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The Norm Life Cycle 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life cycle explains how norms shape and guide 
behaviour. In the next two chapters of this study the norm life cycle is used to explain the 
contemporary governance of homosexuals and queers (in particular the norm-alisation of 
marriage equality, and the norm-affirmation of anti-homosexuality). This model describes 
three stages, namely (1) norm emergence, (2) norm cascading and (3) norm internalisation. 
This model has proved to be useful for this study as it identifies, describes and explains 
norms when they are first presented by norm entrepreneurs, how these norms then cascade 
into legal frameworks and finally how they then become internalised. The utility of the model 
is that it explains the legalisation of same-sex marriage in liberal democratic states as well as 
the legalisation of anti-homosexuality policies, which allowed this study to address the 
research problem and research questions. 
The first stage in the norm life cycle, norm emergence, involves the process of persuasion by 
norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 985). They aim to persuade a large group 
of actors or individuals to accept a proposed norm. Stage two of the norm life cycle, norm 
cascading, consists of a socialisation process during which individuals and actors in the 
global system conform to a particular norm. The third stage, norm internalisation, refers to 
the moment when the norm reaches a stage where it is no longer challenged and is accepted 
as a given. Before attempting to describe and explain the norm life cycle, the following 
section points back to women’s suffrage movement, as highlighted in Chapter 1, as an 
example that illustrates the utility of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) model.  
In the 19th century the issue of women’s voting rights gained increasing prominence. There 
was a particularly strong movement in countries such as the USA and the UK, even though 
they were not the first to allow women to vote. Countries such as New Zealand (1893), 
Australia (1903) and Finland (1906) paved the way for the cascading of this new norm 
(Markoff, 2003: 91). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 893) point out that women’s suffrage 
started as a call for domestic change in a few countries which essentially spread and 
ultimately led to the internationalisation of a universally accepted norm. Article I of the 
United Nations’ (1953) Convention on Political Rights of Women, states that “[w]omen shall 
be entitled to vote in all elections on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.” 
Keep in mind that these rights (privileges) mostly pertained to white women. In the case of 
the USA, Native American women were allowed to vote only in 1924 (Indian Citizenship 
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Act), Asian women in 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act) and African-American women in 1964 
(Voting Rights Act). This is in contrast with white women, who were granted voting rights in 
1920. Similarly, in the case of South Africa, women of colour were allowed to vote only in 
1994. White South African women had been granted voting rights in 1930. Needless to say, 
in these cases the construct and normalisation of the superiority of the white race is evident. 
However, in the broader construction and normalisation the issue of women’s suffrage serves 
as a worthy example of a transnational norm becoming internalised.  
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 896), stage 1 of the norm life cycle, norm 
emergence, lasted for more than 80 years in the case of women’s suffrage. They argue that it 
started with the Seneca Falls Conference in 1848 and lasted until 1930, when 20 states 
allowed women to vote. The 20 years that followed, moving into the second stage of the 
norm life cycle, norm cascading, saw an additional 48 countries adopting women’s suffrage. 
Over the years women’s suffrage has become a powerful internalised norm (the final stage of 
the norm life cycle), which is supported by the fact that as of this writing, in 2017 Vatican 
City remains the only country in the world which has not granted women voting rights. 
Stage 1: Norm Emergence  
The constructivists Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) identify three concepts that are important 
in the first stage of the norm life cycle: norm entrepreneurs, organisational platforms and the 
tipping point. Norm entrepreneurs are critical in this stage given the fact that they “call 
attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that names, interprets, and 
dramatises them” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). Norm entrepreneurs are actors who 
introduce and actively build norms that individuals within their community will regard as 
appropriate or desirable behaviour. The norm entrepreneur will follow the process of 
persuasion in order to convince the individuals within their community or state actors to 
accept the proposed norm. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 897) cite Lawrence Lessig (1995), 
who refers to norm entrepreneurs as “meaning managers” or “meaning architects.”  
Elgstrom (2000: 460) points to John Kingdon, who argues that norm entrepreneurs have the 
very important task of making sure that their proposed norms get on the agenda of major 
actors. These actors are usually the decision-makers. The norm entrepreneurs must therefore 
convince the major actors that adopting the proposed norms will serve in their own interests, 
or persuade them to believe that the proposed norms are morally superior. If successful, the 
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proposed norm will eventually become internalised (the final stage of the norm life cycle) and 
in turn the major actor will not only become a norm follower but also a norm entrepreneur.  
As mentioned earlier, in constructivism language plays a very important role when norm 
entrepreneurs call attention to or ‘create’ issues. This is often referred to as ‘framing’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897).  It is the framing of the issue (proposed norm) that is 
crucial to the norm entrepreneur’s political strategy, which will allow it to resonate with the 
broader public and be adopted in new ways of discussing and/or understanding an issue. It is 
important to keep in mind that, although norm entrepreneurs use a specific language to frame 
an (existing) issue or create a new one, the proposed norm/frame will still compete against 
alternative norms/frames that are already firmly embedded within a community and which 
create alternative perceptions of appropriateness and interest. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 
897) argue that norms “emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must 
compete with other norms and perceptions of interest.” For example, in this study, emerging 
norms are challenging the existing normative system of global queer and (homo)sexual 
governance.  
Elgstrom (2000: 460) argues that the process of persuasion used by norm entrepreneurs is 
usually in the form of appropriateness. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 897) refer to this as the 
‘logic of appropriateness’. This means that the emerging norm has to meet the standard of 
‘appropriateness’ as already defined by prior norms. According to Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998: 908), norm entrepreneurs actively frame their issues (or proposed norms) in such a 
way that make persuasive connections between existing norms and new emerging norms. The 
challenge of promoting new norms is, therefore, not only to meet the already defined 
standards of appropriateness, but also not to deviate too far from existing norms. It is also 
possible, of course, that in order to challenge the existing norms, norm entrepreneurs may 
need to be ‘inappropriate’. It is through this ‘inappropriate’ approach that the norm 
entrepreneur may be able to successfully frame their issue and send a clear message to the 
broader public. For example, one could argue that many African-Americans used the 
‘inappropriate’ approach during the Civil Rights movement to protest Jim Crow laws by 
sitting at lunch counters reserved for white Americans, or by sitting in the front of the bus 
when they were restricted to sitting in the back of the bus.  
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 898) list empathy, altruism and ideational commitment as 
factors that could motivate norm entrepreneurs to believe in and advocate a particular norm. 
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Empathy refers to the norm entrepreneur’s interest in the welfare of others regardless of 
whether or not this will have an effect on the norm entrepreneur’s own wellbeing; altruism 
refers to the action the norm entrepreneur takes that will benefit others even at the risk of 
significant harm to the norm entrepreneur’s own well-being; ideational commitment – 
perhaps the most important of the three – is regarded as the main motivation behind the 
actions of the norm entrepreneur, given that the actions reflect the norm entrepreneur’s own 
ideals and values. Note that for a norm entrepreneur to frame a particular norm, it has to also 
take into account the motivations and interests of the other (possible) norm followers. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 899) point to the women’s suffrage movement as an example 
of women having to be persuaded that it was indeed in their own interests to pursue the right 
to vote.  
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 899), for norms to be successful the norm 
entrepreneur needs to have access to adequate organisational platforms in order to promote 
their norms. Norm entrepreneurs may choose platforms such as NGOs specifically designed 
for promoting particular norms (for example, Greenpeace, the Red Cross or Transafrica), or 
they may use the platforms of established international institutions (for example, the World 
Bank, the UN or the International Labour Organisation). International institutions are helpful 
in the sense that norm entrepreneurs have access to their information, audience and expertise. 
Elgstrom (2000: 460) argues that the organisational platform allows the norm entrepreneur to 
persuade more individuals within the organisation itself. The expertise of the organisation 
helps the emerging norm to establish a bureaucratic presence, which can allow the new norm 
to be promoted further.  
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 900) argue that no matter which organisational platform a 
norm entrepreneur decides to make use of, both the norm entrepreneur and the organisation 
should obtain the support of state actors in order to promote their norms. This will lead to 
norm socialisation on the agenda of state actors. Note that international organisations such as 
the UN and the World Bank are often able to convince weak states (often developing states) 
to conform to certain norms through their resources and the leverage they have over weak 
states. NGOs, on the other hand, are rarely able to convince powerful states to conform to 
certain norms – they often have to use persuasion. More often than not, they have to use the 
‘inappropriate’ approach, mentioned earlier, to coerce powerful states to add norm 
socialisation to their agenda. For emerging norms to reach a tipping point and move toward 
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stage two of the norm life cycle, norm cascade, they must become institutionalised in specific 
sets of international rules and organisations. It is this institutionalisation that often leads to a 
norm cascade. However, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 900) go further to argue that 
although institutionalisation of a particular norm may not be a necessary condition for norm 
cascading, it may even follow – and not precede – the initiation of a norm cascade.  
Emerging norms reach a tipping point when the norm entrepreneur has successfully 
persuaded a ‘critical mass’ of state and non-state actors to become norm entrepreneurs 
themselves and adopt the new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 901). It is important to 
keep in mind that, although it is not entirely clear when exactly a ‘critical mass’ has been 
reached, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) propose two tentative hypotheses on what constitutes 
a ‘critical mass’, and when and where to expect emerging norms to reach a tipping point. 
Firstly, they refer to empirical studies that suggest that in order for an emerging norm to 
reach a tipping point, at least one third of the total states in the system have to adopt the 
particular norm. For example, by May 1997 one third of the total number of states (60 UN 
states at the time) in the system supported the ban on anti-personnel land mines.  
Secondly, they argue that it does in fact matter which states adopt emerging norms 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 901). In the adoption of a particular norm, the participation of 
some states is more critical than others.  Although being considered a ‘critical state’ will vary 
from issue to issue, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) agree on one criteria that critical states 
have to meet: “critical states are those without which the achievement of the substantive norm 
goal is compromised.” They use the example of land mines, illustrating that a state that did 
not produce or use land mines would not be considered a critical state, but that states which 
did in fact produce or use land mines may well have contributed to the norm cascading on the 
ban of anti-personnel land mines. In constructivism it is also important to note that not all 
emerging norms will reach a tipping point or even become internalised (i.e. successfully 
complete the norm life cycle). This might depend on the quality of the particular norm, or on 
the effectiveness of the norm entrepreneur advocating the particular norm.            
Stage 2: Norm Cascading 
After the tipping point has been reached, norm cascading occurs. Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998: 902) argue that norm cascading is an active process of socialisation, where the new 
(conforming) norm entrepreneurs (state or non-state actors) persuade (often coerce) others to 
become norm followers. In IR norm entrepreneurs often use different methods to ‘enhance’ 
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the socialisation process that will – hopefully – convince state or non-state actors. Some of 
these methods include emulation of heroes, diplomatic praise for behaviours that ‘conform to 
group norms’, and ridicule or censure of those who do not conform. This can often come in 
the form of material sanctions and incentives (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902). For 
example, in 2014 Uganda was ridiculed by many Western countries and international 
institutions for the passing of their Anti-Homosexuality Act. According to Biryaberema 
(2014), the World Bank froze $90 million in aid directed at boosting health care in Uganda, 
and the USA issued aid, police, travel, and military sanctions against Uganda (Keene, 2014).  
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902) argue that the process of socialisation is the dominant 
tool of a norm cascade – it is the way that norm entrepreneurs persuade other actors to 
conform to certain norms. Furthermore, they contend that actors often conform to the norms 
in this stage of the norm life cycle, given the fact that the norms might relate to their own 
identities as members within the international community. They allude to James Fearson, 
who argues that “one’s identity is as a member of a particular social category, and part of the 
definition of that category is that all members follow certain norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998: 902). Arguably, actors are essentially giving in to ‘peer pressure’ that is rooted in 
issues of legitimation, conformity and esteem (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 903). 
The legitimacy of a norm, domestically, is important as it is the belief that existing political 
institutions are better than other alternatives. This means that its citizens will comply with 
government rules and laws. It is through this domestic legitimacy that states care about 
international legitimation, seeing that it will be a reflection on a state’s domestic legitimacy. 
This legitimacy will, essentially, reflect back on a government’s ability to remain in power. 
Conformity and esteem have a lot to do with the evaluative relationship between states and 
their peers. In the case of conformity, states conform to certain norms in order to demonstrate 
that they have adapted to the social environment. This is also known as ‘social proof’ – 
fulfilling a psychological need to belong or to be part of a group (Axelrod, 1986: 1105). In 
the case of esteem, actors often conform to norms in order to be thought of highly by other 
actors, and even by themselves (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 903).  
This desire to conform is particularly evident in the case of Western European countries in 
terms of tolerance and/or human rights innovation. As pointed out earlier in this study, 
Kollman (2013: 13) argues that Western European countries are particularly influenced by 
newly emerging norms and how their international reputation will be affected if they conform 
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to those norms (or not), and whether or not they will be regarded as progressive by their 
international counterparts. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 904) argue that states’ leaders will 
conform to norms in order to avoid disapproval or ridicule that might follow in the event that 
they might violate a particular norm. Essentially, this conformity will enhance their national 
esteem as well as the self-esteem of state leaders.      
Stage 3: Norm Internalisation  
In the final stage of the norm life cycle, norm internalisation, the norm becomes so widely 
accepted that the norm is widely internalised. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 904) refer to this 
internalisation as the norm achieving a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality. They go further to argue 
that internalised norms can be both extremely powerful and hard to discern – extremely 
powerful in the sense that the norm is no longer questioned; hard to discern given that actors 
no longer consider or discuss whether to conform or not.  
Institutionalists in sociology have done what political scientists tended to ignore – they made 
internalised norms the centrepiece of the debate by problematizing and ‘denaturalising’ 
norms (mostly prominent Western norms) that have acquired that ‘taken-for-granted’ quality 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904). It is through this approach that IR scholars, in particular 
constructivists, tend to examine norms that shape the global community. For example, many 
in the Western world would argue that freedom (of expression, among others) is expressed 
through one’s attire, in particular for women. This refers to the freedom to decide what to 
wear without objections from men and (to some extent) from religious bodies. This is a norm 
that has become internalised and part of Western culture. Of course, this is not a universal 
norm for women. Many Arab women might argue that the wearing of the hijab is a symbol of 
freedom and religious expression for them. However, seeing how powerful the (Western) 
norm has become over the years (and in particular the 21st century), those in the Western 
world might regard the wearing of the hijab by Arab women as a symbol of their oppression. 
Also, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 905) argue that one’s profession and professional 
training have a powerful effect on internalised norms among its members. Professional 
training, they argue, actively socialises people to value certain things above others. For 
example, a doctor values life above all else, while soldiers are trained to sacrifice life for 
certain strategic goals. Essentially, professional training leads to normative biases among its 
members regarding the norm in question. If we take human rights discourse as an example, it 
is possible to see that an individual working (advocating) in the field of human rights in the 
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Western world, who have also received professional training from a Western institution, 
might have a strong normative bias towards human rights as defined or constructed by 
Western actors. This means that this individual in question will regard states that do not 
practice this ‘Western’ model of human rights as problematic or backward. Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998: 905) go on to state that the internalisation of norms occurs as a result of 
repeated behaviour and habit. In other words, the norm in question is repeated continually by 
actors to the point where it is done out of habit and accepted as a given. In effect, the norm 
has been internalised.  
Conclusion 
This chapter described and explained the utility of constructivist perspectives in relation to 
how norms in IR emerge, how these norms then diffuse into legal frameworks, and how they 
become internalised. It has done so by providing a brief overview of the history of IR, which 
touched on the dominance of realism and idealism. This chapter also highlighted how the 
peaceful end of the Cold War opened up space for constructivism to emerge as a challenge to 
conservative theories by examining the different ways to study important political changes in 
the global system. 
This chapter also discussed the importance of queer theory and queer IR perspectives, 
showing that contributions by queer studies scholars have been an intricate part of the IR 
discipline. These contributions in IR have been particularly evident in the three core areas of 
IR – war and peace, international political economy, and state and nation formation – through 
a queer lens. This chapter also provided detailed definitions of norms and institutions. It 
discussed extensively the utility of the three stages of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm 
life-cycle model: (1) norm emergence, (2) norm cascading, and (3) norm internalisation. The 
women’s suffrage movement was used as an example to illustrate the strength of this model.  
The following chapter applies Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model to the 
Marriage Equality Movement. The model is used to illustrate the emergence, cascading and 
internalisation of norms in the debate on marriage equality, i.e. the legalisation of gay 
marriage. It identifies important norm entrepreneurs who championed the norm of marriage 
equality, how the legislation regarding same-sex marriage became diffused to other countries, 
and whether or not the norm of marriage equality has been internalised. It is important to 
analyse this in order to see how institutions influence decision-making and policy-making of 
(homo)sexual and queer governance in contemporary global politics.    
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CHAPTER 4 
Global Championing of Same-Sex Marriage: Equality Movement 
Introduction 
This chapter attempts to explain the diffusion of marriage equality by applying a 
constructivist lens. It starts by examining the first stage of the norm life cycle – norm 
emergence. This section identifies norm entrepreneurs who were influential in getting the 
norm of marriage equality onto the agenda of the state and its elites. This chapter specifically 
identifies Axel and Eigil Axgil as well as Jack Baker and Matthew McConnell as champions 
of marriage equality. It also discusses the curious connection between the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and same-sex marriage. The chapter then turns to the second stage of the norm life 
cycle – norm cascading. This section examines the Netherlands as a pioneer state for 
marriage equality and looks at the way that other countries draw inspiration from pioneering 
countries. It also discusses the impact that the framing of same-sex marriage as a human right 
had on the marriage equality debate, as well as the ‘peer pressure’ that countries conform to 
in order to construct their identity in the international community around (homo)sexual and 
queer governance. The final section of this chapter evaluates marriage equality moving 
towards norm internalisation – the third stage of the norm life cycle – and whether or not 
same-sex marriage has achieved a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality.  
As such, the structure of this chapter is based on Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-
cycle model as illustrated in the previous chapter. Their model is utilised in order to identify, 
explain and describe the evolution of marriage, specifically same-sex marriage. The model is 
useful for this chapter as it helps to explain how the shift in states’ and state elites’ normative 
behaviour led to the materialisation and diffusion of marriage equality in the respective legal 
frameworks. This links back to the study’s primary research question, as outlined in Chapter 
1, asking how and why marriage equality emerged as an important issue in contemporary 
global policy and practice. It is important to keep in mind that this chapter does not focus on 
all the individual countries that legalised gay marriage as individual case studies. Instead, the 
focus is on the movement towards marriage equality, with selected countries used for 
illustrative purposes. 
Norm Identification 
It can be said that 1 October 1989 is the single most important date that changed the 
conversation around the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships. Denmark’s Registered 
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Partnership Act came into effect on that October day allowing same-sex couples to enter into 
legal civil ceremonies for the first time as recognised by the state (Nielson, 1990: 298). This 
civil institution was called a Registered Partnership and was not the same as an official 
marriage. Kollman (2013: 67) lists four differences between a registered partnership and an 
official marriage in Denmark: (1) the word ‘marriage’ and its symbolism did not include 
same-sex couples; (2) same-sex couples could not participate in religious ceremonies as 
orchestrated by the state-sponsored Lutheran churches – the religious affiliation of 90% of 
the Danish population; (3) same-sex couples could not adopt children – this was prohibited 
even in the case of one of the partner’s biological children; (4) lesbian couples were barred 
from accessing fertilisation technology – a privilege that was extended only to heterosexual 
married women at the time. Aside from those differences, same-sex couples in registered 
partnerships were entitled to most tax benefits and inheritance rights as with traditional 
marriage. Inevitably, Denmark’s unprecedented move allowed for other Nordic countries to 
follow suit. However, it was not until the start of the new millennium that the norm of 
marriage equality was first established in the legal structures.  
The Netherlands is known as the first country in the world to legalise gay marriage. 
According to Waaldijk (2001: 437), marriage was first opened up to gay and lesbian couples 
in the Netherlands when its same-sex marriage bill was signed into law on 21 December 
2000, and came into effect on 1 April 2001. Since 2001 more than 20 countries have legalised 
gay marriage. From a constructivist perspective, major changes have taken place in legal 
structures over the past three decades in various countries, specifically in relation to 
contemporary queer politics. The norm of marriage equality put (homo)sexual and queer 
governance at the centre of the political debate – a debate that is robust, intricate and on-
going.   
Stage 1: Norm Emergence 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:896) “norms do not appear out of thin air.” It is 
the norm entrepreneurs who introduce and actively build norms that individuals within their 
community will regard as representing appropriate or desirable behaviour. Of course, it is 
impossible to pinpoint an exact date and time as to when the idea of gay marriage first 
emerged. This is not only due to the fact that same-sex relationships and cohabitation date 
back centuries, but also because many of the same-sex couples who lived together as 
‘married’ couples never advocated for traditional marriage to include same-sex couples, and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 73 
 
as such they remain nameless and faceless. However, there are a few gay marriage pioneers 
who were instrumental in putting the issue of marriage equality on the political agenda. The 
following section focuses on the norm entrepreneurs and the emergence of the marriage 
equality norm, as well as the role these norm entrepreneurs played in getting the norm onto 
the political agenda of the state and state elites. 
Axel and Eigil Axgil 
According to Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “[e]veryone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, natural or social 
origin, property, birth or other status” (United Nations, 2015: 6). Notable exclusions from the 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 are provisions for protection around sexual orientation 
and gender identity. In the light of this notable omission of gay rights, Axel Lundahl-Madsen 
founded the League of 1948 (or Forbundet af 1948), Denmark’s first gay rights organisation. 
The League of 1948 is now known as LGBT Denmark – The Danish National Organization 
for Gay Men, Lesbians, Bisexuals and Transgender persons (LGBT Denmark, 2017). 
According to LGBT Denmark (2017), the objectives of the organisation were stipulated as: 
“[t]hrough personal connections and correspondence to create a free association of people 
who feel solidarity with other people with the same approach to homosexual and bisexual 
problems, as well as giving support and help with any difficulties.” 
In 1949 Axel met his partner, Eigil Eskildsen, at one of the League’s meetings (Williamson, 
2011). The following year they got engaged and started to live together as a ‘married’ couple. 
It was in 1957 that they legally changed their last name to Axgil (a combination of Axel and 
Eigil) to show their commitment to one another (Eskridge and Spedale, 2007: 44). The union 
between Axel and Eigil, although not legally recognised at the time, was a way of showing to 
the public that lifelong commitment and romance were not exclusively reserved for 
heterosexual relationships. As mentioned earlier, norm entrepreneurs are those who introduce 
and actively build norms that individuals within their community will regard as representing 
appropriate or desirable behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). With Axel and 
Eigil’s engagement in 1950, they became norm entrepreneurs in the fight for marriage 
equality. 
Both Axel and Eigil were very active in the League. According to Edelberg (2014: 62), the 
League started as a social club and was not regarded as a political organisation. For example, 
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the League was popular for organising special events for its members that included dance 
nights, art and literature evenings as well as women’s evenings. The League also ran a very 
popular gay magazine called Vennen that focused on “homosexuals in society, poems, short 
stories, scientific articles on sexuality, contact adverts, international homosexual news, 
literature reviews, letters to the editor, erotic and romantic drawings, photographs and much 
more” (Edelberg, 2014: 62). One could argue that the magazine was in fact political – 
although not overtly so – given that it conveyed the message that queer people were just like 
everyone else who deserved the same civil rights. In other words, being gay and being in gay 
relationships are the norm. According to Edelberg (2014: 63), one specific way in which the 
magazine portrayed this message was by replacing the term ‘homosexual’ with ‘homophile’. 
This showed that homophilia was about emotion and not just sex. 
In the first stage of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life cycle, organisational platforms 
play a very important role in advancing a particular norm. It is often this organisational 
platform that allows the norm entrepreneur to be successful in promoting the norm. In the 
case of Axel and Eigil, over the years the League began to shift its focus more towards civil 
rights and political activism for the LGBTQ community in Denmark. It was in the 1960s that 
the League started to focus more on the issue of marriage equality. In 1966 the League and its 
members started to target established institutions such as universities, demanding that gay 
and lesbian couples had access to the same student housing opportunities that straight married 
couples had (Eskridge and Spedale, 2007: 45). With the reach and resources of the 
organisation, the issue of marriage equality was exposed to a wider audience. As highlighted 
in the previous chapter, Elgstrom (2000: 460) argued that by having an organisational 
platform, the norm entrepreneur will be able to persuade more individuals within the 
organisation itself – existing and new members. This will allow the emerging norm, in this 
case marriage equality, to establish a bureaucratic presence that will lead to further promotion 
of the norm.  
What was so crucial in Denmark’s case is that Axel and Eigil, along with the League, 
managed to get the norm onto the agenda of the Danish Parliament. Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998: 900) argue that when the norm entrepreneur and the organisation get the support of 
state actors, the process will lead to norm socialisation. It was in 1968 that the Socialist 
People’s Party (SF) introduced Denmark’s first bill in Parliament to recognise different forms 
of cohabitation. According to Eskridge and Spedale (2007: 46), the bill aimed to recognise 
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couples (heterosexual and homosexual) as married if they lived together for at least three 
years. The bill was rejected by Parliament on the basis that it would create ‘forced’ 
marriages. The following year the Danish Parliament created a special parliamentary 
committee, the Marriage Committee, that focused solely on legislation pertaining to marriage. 
Throughout the late 1960s, the 1970s and 1980s the Marriage Committee worked on 
numerous proposals and recommendations on the issue of marriage equality. It was only in 
1989 that Denmark allowed legal unions for same-sex couples through its Registered 
Partnerships Act (Rydström, 2011: 53). 
It is important to briefly acknowledge that Sweden’s national gay and lesbian organisation 
(the National Organisation for Sexual Equality (RFSL)), which was founded after drawing 
inspiration from Denmark’s League of 1948, sent a letter to the Swedish Parliament in 1953 
to call for the legalisation of gay marriage. This letter was ignored. However, in subsequent 
years the Swedish Parliament created a similar committee to Denmark’s Marriage 
Committee, and in 1973 the Swedish Parliament stated that “cohabitation between two 
partners of the same-sex is, in society’s opinion, a fully acceptable lifeform” (Eskridge and 
Spedale (2007: 69). Eskridge and Spedale (2007) argue that this statement by the Swedish 
Parliament can be regarded as the earliest form of a government endorsing same-sex 
relationships in contemporary politics.  
Nonetheless, Denmark’s Registered Partnership Act led to a string of other European 
countries adopting similar laws to recognise RPs between same-sex couples – Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998) would call this process norm cascading, the second stage of the norm life 
cycle. It was only in 2012 that Denmark legalised gay marriage. The impact of Axel and Eigil 
Axgil and the League of 1948 is undeniable in the successful achievement of marriage 
equality not only in Denmark but across Western Europe.  
Jack Baker and Michael McConnell 
Jack Baker and Michael McConnell are two norm entrepreneurs who are very important in 
the marriage equality debate, particularly in the American context. In the USA they are 
known as the first same-sex couple to apply for a marriage license (Mumford, 2015). In 
American society, just as in Scandinavian countries, same-sex couples had been living in 
committed relationships since the 1950s, if not earlier than that. These same-sex couples got 
engaged as a heterosexual couple would, and the vast majority of them married in private 
ceremonies without legal recognition from the state. Some scholars and activists would argue 
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that the on-going same-sex marriage license debates in Hawaii during the 1990s, and a 
Massachusetts court ruling in 2003 that denying gay and lesbian couples to marry was 
unconstitutional, were the earliest times that the issue of same-sex marriage burst upon the 
political scene (see Hull, 2001: 207; Brewer and Wilcox, 2005: 599). However, it was Jack 
and Michael’s application for a marriage license that made marriage equality a public issue in 
the USA. 
In 1967 Jack proposed to Michael. This was the same year the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that banning interracial couples from marrying was unconstitutional. Michael agreed to 
Jack’s proposal under one condition: that Jack find a way for them to marry legally. During 
an interview with Lavender Magazine, Jack said he decided to go to the University of 
Minneapolis to study law in order to research ways in which he and Michael could become a 
legally married couple (Lueck, 2015). At the University Jack joined and subsequently became 
president of its gay student group called FREE (Fight Repression of Erotic Expression). It 
was this organisational platform that allowed Jack to promote the norm of marriage equality. 
Through his studies Jack found that Minnesota’s marriage statute did not specifically state 
that marriage was reserved only for unions between a man and a woman. Jack recalled that 
“[u]nder the rule of law, what’s not forbidden is permitted” (Raphael, 2015). According to 
Chenier (2017: 37), FREE sent out a press release announcing Jack and Michael’s intention 
to obtain a marriage license at Minnesota’s Hennepin County courthouse. On 18 May 1970 
Jack and Michael went to the courthouse and filled out their marriage application in front of 
reporters and a photographer. Chenier (2017: 38) states that the event was favourably covered 
at the time in the following media outlets: the Advocate, the Minneapolis Star, the 
Minneapolis Tribute, the Minnesota Daily, the New Republic, the New York Mattachine 
Times, and Time. Two months later Jack and Michael’s marriage license application was 
denied by the clerk, Gerald Nelson.  
It is important to be aware of the fact that Jack and Michael applied for a marriage license at 
a time in America’s history when sexual acts between consenting men were against the law, 
and being gay was regarded as a mental illness (Meyer, 2003: 674). What this explicitly 
shows is that being gay was frowned upon (to put it mildly) in a society that regarded a 
heterosexual identity as the norm. As such, traditional marriage was seen (and is arguably 
still seen) as a deeply embedded norm in the American society – a norm Jack and Michael 
challenged.  
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As indicated in the previous chapter, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) list empathy, altruism 
and ideational commitment as possible motives for norm entrepreneurs in their pursuit of 
promoting their particular norm. One could argue that at the onset of the fight for marriage 
equality Jack, in particular, was motivated by altruism, defined by Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998: 898) as an actor taking “action designed to benefit another even at the risk of 
significant harm to the actor’s own well-being.”  Gay rights activist and member of FREE at 
the time, Jean Tretter, said that gay students were not so much afraid that they would be 
discriminated against based on their sexual identity, but rather that they would be targeted 
with a shotgun. With that in mind, when asked during an interview with Minnesota Public 
Radio why he pursued their gay marriage case, Jack Baker replied “the love of my life 
insisted on it” (Condon, 2012). Of course, as the years went on Jack and Michael were 
mainly motivated by ideational commitment, given that they genuinely believed in the ideals 
and values embodied in the norm of marriage equality (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898). 
In the interview with Lavender Magazine, Michael said:  
We began to talk about those things that were really important that we felt were 
for the bigger change that would come to society. And we knew that marriage 
would be the thing that would do that because it is the bedrock of society. It 
defines relationships, it determines what rights and privileges are passed down in 
society through the law, it works in distribution or conservation of wealth, it deals 
with children — a whole host of things. We knew this would have a huge impact. 
But more importantly for us, personally, it was an important part of our 
commitment that this was something that we wanted for ourselves. We wanted to 
have the same respect and the same kind of relationship that members of the rest 
of our family did (Lueck, 2015). 
Even though their marriage license application was rejected, they successfully managed their 
proposed norm to get the attention of a state actor.  
After a failed appeal to the Supreme Court, Jack and Michael tried a different tactic to have 
the marriage validated – adoption. According to Case (2005: 1762), Judge Lindsay Arthur 
granted the legal adoption of Jack by Michael in August 1971. Judge Arthur argued that legal 
adoption was not only limited to children. This allowed Jack to legally change his name on 
paper from Richard John Baker to Pat Lyn McConnell, which was more gender-neutral (Jack 
continued to use the name Jack Baker). Michael was the one who went down to the 
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courthouse with the adoption certificate to apply for a marriage license. There was no inquiry 
into the genders of the two parties. As a result, the clerk issued a marriage license, and Jack 
and Michael’s wedding was performed by a Methodist pastor a month later (Raphael, 2015).  
Case (2005: 1763) points out that Blue Earth’s County Attorney later “declared the license 
void on statutory grounds” after Judge Arthur made the adoption public. Jack and Michael 
took the case to the Supreme Court. This time Jack and Michael had a bigger organisational 
platform behind them, ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) (ACLU, 2017). On 10 
October 1972 the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to hear arguments by Jack and Michael 
and dismissed their appeal “for want of a substantial federal question” (Case, 2005: 1763). 
Jack stated that the reason provided by the Supreme Court essentially translated to “now is 
not the time; we will answer that question but not now” (Lueck, 2015). The interesting aspect 
about the now-famous Baker v Nelson case is that, although all their subsequent appeals to 
the Supreme Court throughout the 1970s failed, the marriage license that they were granted in 
1971 was never challenged in a court. During an interview with Public Radio International, 
Jack emphasised that “[o]nly a court can invalidate a lawful contract, so it [their marriage 
license] has remained legal until this day” (Raphael, 2015). This means that Jack and Michael 
were the first same-sex couple to legally marry. It is Jack and Michael’s norm entrepreneurial 
efforts with the Baker v Nelson case that paved the way for marriage equality and that had a 
long-lasting impact that eventually led to the legalisation of gay marriage in the USA in 2015.    
The Importance of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic on Marriage Equality 
Although HIV/AIDS was not a norm entrepreneur in itself, the epidemic of the 1980s had a 
very significant impact on the marriage equality movement – an impact that is not so obvious. 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic was covered in Chapter 2 of this study; however, it is useful to 
briefly turn back to the account of the epidemic in order to illustrate its significance.  
In 1981 the New York Times reported the first cases of HIV/AIDS in gay men (Engel, 2001: 
47). It has been estimated that between 1981 and 1998 as many as 200,000 out of the 300,000 
HIV/AIDS-related deaths in the USA were those of gay men. In Western countries today 
HIV affects predominantly MSM (Avert, 2017). As pointed out in Chapter 2, in non-Western 
countries today HIV affects predominantly heterosexual women. However, it started out as a 
disease that primarily affected gay men. Many gay men living with HIV during the 1980s 
were faced with regular and different forms of discrimination. According to Bronksi (2011), 
gay relationships were often disregarded by hospitals, doctors, family members and even 
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social work organisations. Given that same-sex relationships were not legally recognised, 
many gay men were refused visitation rights for their HIV-positive partners. Some were not 
allowed to make medical decisions for their dying partner and most were denied inheritance 
rights.  
What AIDS did across Western countries is that it gave the gay community a more public and 
a more humane image. On the one hand, many only saw the AIDS crisis as nature’s way of 
punishing the gay community for their promiscuity and their lifestyle. On the other hand, 
others were able to see gay couples love and lose their partners – the loss of a partner (or 
possibility thereof) was something straight couples could relate to. Although the issue of 
marriage was not a priority during a time when thousands of gay men were losing their lives, 
the epidemic forced gay people to point out the inequalities and discrimination they faced as 
a result of their relationships not being recognised. Denmark, for example, was known as the 
country in Europe with the highest HIV infections per inhabitant during the early 1980s 
(Edelberg, 2014: 68). According to Eskridge and Spedale (2007: 49), after many months of 
activism from its queer community, Denmark’s Homo-Commission adopted legislation in 
1987 that allowed both straight and gay couples to be taxed the same – even if the gay couple 
was not legally married. The condition was, however, that the gay couple had shared a 
residence upon the death of the one partner. Two years later Denmark legalised RPs for gay 
and lesbian couples. Whatever significance the HIV/AIDS epidemic had for the fight for gay 
marriage, Caldwell (2004) argues the following: “Acknowledging that gay marriage had its 
beginnings in the Aids crisis, if gay marriage advocates are capable of doing so, will 
strengthen the endurance of the institution they have just won.” 
Stage 2: Norm Cascading 
The Netherlands: The Pioneer for Same-Sex Marriage 
In 2001 the Netherlands became the first country to allow same-sex couples to enter into 
marriage. Since then the norm of marriage equality has cascaded across 25 other countries 
that have opened the institution of marriage to same-sex couples. Why and how did the 
Netherlands become the pioneer for marriage equality? The following section discusses the 
success of gay marriage in the Netherlands and how the championing of gay marriage in the 
Netherlands influenced other countries to follow suit.  
Waaldijk (2001: 439) argues that there are three standard sequences in the legislative 
recognition pertaining to (homo)sexual governance that need to take place that will inevitably 
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lead to the legalisation of same-sex marriage. First, homosexuality and homosexual acts need 
to be decriminalised – this is sometimes followed or accompanied by setting the same age of 
consent for heterosexual and homosexual individuals. Secondly, anti-discrimination policies 
around sexual orientation are often introduced. Lastly, some form of legal partnerships and 
parenting are introduced for same-sex couples. With that in mind, the Netherlands 
decriminalised homosexual acts in 1811 and the equal age of consent was recognised in 1971; 
the Netherlands introduced anti-discrimination legislation that included sexual orientation in 
1983;3 and registered partnerships were legal in 1998. Note that same-sex couples in the 
Netherlands could adopt children only when same-sex marriage became legal on 1 April 
2001 (Waaldijk, 2001: 438). 
Kollman (2013: 105) credits the Netherlands’ well established LGBTQ organisations and 
prominent figures as important factors in the push towards same-sex marriage. Similarly, 
Ratele (2017) credits well-organised LGBTQ lobbying globally as one of the reasons why 
marriage equality has emerged as an important issue in contemporary global politics and 
practice (Interview, Kopano Ratele, 05/07/2017). In the late 1980s Gay Krant – a high-profile 
Dutch gay and lesbian newspaper – took on a prominent role in promoting the gay marriage 
norm. The newspaper’s editor, Henk Krol, can be regarded as one of the most important norm 
champions in the Netherlands. According to Kollman (2013: 109), the newspaper started to 
focus a significant portion of its reporting on the legal trouble that gay couples faced. A 
subsequent policy advisory group, the Friends of the Gay Krant Foundation, was set up by 
Krol in order to study legislation pertaining to state relationship recognition. What is 
important to note about Gay Krant and Krol is that from the outset the focus was on opening 
the institution of marriage to gay couples and not just to have a registered partnership law. 
According to Waaldijk (2001: 447), many Dutch advocates for gay marriage argued that 
having a registered partnership for gay couples and marriage for straight couples rested upon 
the ‘separate but equal’ status and was therefore unacceptable.  
According to Kollman (2017: 105), Krol was instrumental in organising a campaign calling 
for gay couples to register for marriage licenses arguing that the Dutch statute did not 
differentiate on the basis of gender. With the help of prominent Dutch lawyers, they managed 
                                                 
3 Article 1 of the Netherlands’ 2008 constitution states that “[d]iscrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, 
political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted” (Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, 2008: 5). Waaldijk (2001: 438) argues that “on any other ground whatsoever shall not be 
permitted” is interpreted to include discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
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to get the issue of gay marriage onto the agenda of the Supreme Court in 1990. The Court 
ruled that marriage was a union between a man and a woman. However, it is often argued 
that the so-called ‘Purple’ coalition in the Netherlands had a significant impact on the 
marriage equality debate (Waaldijk, 2001: 447; Kollman, 2013: 109; Kollman, 2017: 106).   
The so-called ‘Purple’ coalition that came into power in 1994 and again in 1998 consisted of 
Social Democrats, and right-of-centre Liberals and Social-Liberal Democrats. Waaldijk 
(2001: 447) points out that this was the first time in 80 years in the Netherlands that a 
coalition government did not include Christian Democrats. This allowed the issue of gay 
marriage to be placed high on the political agenda (Kollman, 2013: 109). What the new 
coalition managed to do was to create an advisory commission with the sole purpose of 
“opening up of civil marriage to persons of the same sex” (Waaldijk, 2001: 447). This 
commission was known as the Kortmann Commission. The Commission recommended that 
gay couples be allowed to marry and be able to adopt children. However, the Dutch 
government focused on creating a law for registered partnerships with almost all rights 
extended to gay couples. Waaldijk (2001: 449) goes on to argue that the reason the Dutch 
government did not opt to open marriage to gay couples was because there was no precedent 
anywhere in the world, and same-sex marriages would not be recognised in other countries. 
This argument came particularly in the wake of the USA’s Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which stated that marriage is a union between a man and a woman (Adam, 2003: 
259).  
According to Kollman (2017: 110), marriage equality supporters in the Netherlands framed 
their argument around the issue of human rights and equality. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 
897) argue that this framing of the issue is more likely to resonate successfully with the 
broader public’s understanding. Gay marriage supporters argued that having different 
legislation for gay couples means that gay citizens are not fully equal to straight citizens. 
Kollman (2013: 105) claims that marriage equality in the Netherlands benefitted greatly from 
this argument and so did the norm entrepreneurs with their ability to distinguish clearly 
between a registered partnership and marriage. This type of framing of the issue was 
something activists in other countries failed to achieve. Kollman (2013) goes on to highlight 
a few reasons as to why the equality argument succeeded in the Netherlands. First, the 
strength of the norm of registered partnerships in Europe, championed by Nordic countries in 
particular, was growing. Secondly, international norms enjoyed legitimacy in the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 82 
 
Netherlands. Thirdly, the Netherlands had a good reputation recognising the rights of 
minorities. Lastly, the public and political elites took pride in the country’s international 
reputation for policy innovation.   
The possibility of the Netherlands becoming the first country to potentially open up marriage 
to same-sex couples was important for its international image. Kollman (2017: 112) points to 
a Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) official who said that the Netherlands wanted to be 
modern, progressive and the first country to legalise gay marriage. Maxwell (2001: 154) 
points to the Kortmann Commission, which emphasised that by legally recognising same-sex 
relationships the Netherlands might inspire other countries to do the same. Kollman (2017: 
113) quotes the following extract published by the Gay Krant’s Henk Krol: 
Some countries will recognise the Dutch marriage, others will wait. In those cases, 
couples can challenge discriminatory laws and force new rights by going to court. 
The more couples do so, the quicker the rest of the world will follow the Dutch 
example of recognising equality. 
What this shows is that by legalising gay marriage, the Netherlands prided itself on its 
progressive reputation. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) point out that, in the second stage of 
the norm life cycle, enhancing esteem is one of the main reasons that states and state officials 
follow certain norms. This is particularly the case in Western democracies. Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998: 903) go on to state that the need for esteem “suggests that leaders of states 
sometimes follow norms because they want others to think well of them, and they want to 
think well of themselves.” This is evident in the Netherlands and in many European 
countries. Kollman (2013: 136) argues that by extending marriage rights to gay couples, the 
Netherlands would serve as an inspiration for other European countries and the rest of the 
world. Gay marriage proponents, for example, emphasised that the Netherlands’ liberal 
prostitution and drug policies would allow its elites to further cement their international 
reputation for social policy innovation. The idea of being considered a norm innovator 
resonated with the Dutch policy elites. One could argue that with the legalisation of gay 
marriage, the Netherlands became a norm entrepreneur that allowed the cascading of 
marriage equality to diffuse to other countries.            
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Framing Same-Sex Marriage as a Human Right 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 904), “some state leaders care deeply about their 
international image as human rights violators and make significant policy changes in order to 
change that image.” This is an argument that marriage proponents took advantage of. 
Kollman (2013: 80) points out that LGBTQ activists in Western democracies realised that 
framing the issue of marriage equality as a fundamental human right would make it resonate 
more effectively with political elites. This move became particularly popular in Western 
Europe after all the groundwork had been laid by Europe’s ILGA during the 1990s. This 
period in Europe manifested increasing support for (neo-)liberal democratic states and human 
rights activism (Kollman, 2013: 74). It is interesting to note, however, that even though the 
ILGA was founded in 1978, the association and LGBTQ movement at large gained access to 
the European Union (EU) only in the 1990s. According to Swiebel (2009: 22), the European 
Commission granted small subsidies to the ILGA for research projects. In 1993, for example, 
the European Commission funded a book, Homosexuality: A European Community Issue, 
which was edited by Kees Waaldijk and Andrew Clapham (Waaldijk and Clapham, 1993). 
This publication focused on the situation of Europe’s LGBTQ community within the 
European Community at the time and how they would be affected by the evolution of the 
European Community into the EU. This created a gateway for Europe’s LGBTQ movement 
to gain access to the European Commission as well as the European Parliament.  
Similar to the situation in the Netherlands, gay marriage proponents in Germany also used a 
rights-based argument to push for marriage equality in the country. Given Germany’s history 
during WWII, as discussed in Chapter 2, advocates framed their argument around the 
treatment of homosexuals under the Nazi regime. Kollman (2013) refers to Herta Daeubler-
Gmelin, Germany’s justice minister, who sponsored its original Registered Partnership bill in 
2000; she said that legally recognising same-sex couples would help to dismantle 
discrimination towards LGBTQ people in Germany. Daeubler-Gmelin is quoted in The Same-
Sex Unions Revolution in Western Democracies by saying “[i]t’s not just about the Nazis… 
This discrimination continued in the cultural and legal traditions of the Federal Republic of 
Germany until the 1970s. For some it is still practiced” (Kollman, 2013: 120). This argument 
was very important in framing same-sex marriage as a human right in Germany, even though 
Germany only legalised same-sex marriage almost two decades later. 
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The idea of framing same-sex marriage as a human right spread across different European 
countries. In “Pioneering Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in the Netherlands”, Kollman 
(2017: 108) points out that it was easier in countries such as Canada and South Africa to 
utilise the human rights argument, given that these two countries had already built up 
international human rights reputations. For example, Canada adopted its Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms in 1982 and South Africa held its first national democratic election in 1994 
after dismantling its apartheid regime. South Africa presents a particularly interesting study 
given that to date it remains the only African country to have legalised same-sex marriage.  
In 1996 South Africa became the first country in the world to explicitly prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in its constitution (Newstrom, 2007: 781). This 
constitutional foundation allowed marriage equality proponents in South Africa to 
successfully challenge its Constitutional Court to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples. 
What is important to note here is that before apartheid ended, South Africa’s LGBTQ rights 
leaders had formed coalitions with the African National Congress (ANC) and the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), despite the fact that these groups were relatively powerless at the 
time and open to unlikely alliances for political support. Thus, when these two groups gained 
power in post-apartheid South Africa, LGBTQ rights leaders were able to ensure that the new 
constitution prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Newstrom (2007: 
786) argues that the coalition with the ANC and UDF before South Africa became a 
democracy was a clever move by LGBTQ leaders, especially given the fact that South Africa 
had very high levels of homophobia. Fransch (2017) points out that the role of South Africa’s 
queer activism was instrumental in the championing of rights around sexual orientation, 
because they highlighted to the government that it would in no way be able to justify any 
forms of discrimination, given the country’s oppressive history (Interview, Chet Fransch, 
09/06/2017).  
Keep in mind that before South Africa legalised same-sex marriage, it had already bestowed 
various rights on same-sex couples. For example, in 2002 the Constitutional Court ruled to 
extend the right of gays and lesbians to have their partners immigrate and/or receive a portion 
of certain government pensions due to legal spouses (Satchell v President of the Republic of 
South Africa). Also in 2002 the Constitutional Court ruled that same-sex couples have the 
right to adopt children and raise children as co-parents (Du Toit v Minister for Welfare and 
Population Development). Four years later South Africa legalised same-sex marriage. This 
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shows a similar pattern to the one in Waaldijk’s (2001: 439) argument on the sequences that 
need to occur in the legislative recognition of (homo)sexual governance in a country that will 
inevitably lead to the legalisation of same-sex marriage. 
The Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie case of 2005 can be regarded as the entrepreneurial 
moment that allowed marriage equality to reach its tipping point in South Africa. A lesbian 
couple, Marié Adriaana Fourie and Cecelia Johanna Bonthuys, challenged the Constitutional 
Court to address the couple’s exclusion from the common law definition, which states that 
marriage is “a union of one man with one woman, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all 
others” (Goldblatt, 2006: 261). The Constitutional Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to 
deny same-sex couples legal recognition and gave Parliament one year to formulate 
legislation that would legally recognise same-sex relationships. Given that human rights 
played an integral role in the South African context, the Constitutional Court made it 
explicitly clear to Parliament that it was not allowed to formulate legislation that is based on 
the ‘separate but equal’ argument (De Vos, 2008). In the decision the Constitutional Court 
stated: 
Historically the concept of ‘separate but equal’ served as a threadbare cloak for 
covering distaste for or repudiation by those in power of the group subjected to 
segregation.          
Given South Africa’s history and its embracing of a human rights regime, the successful 
framing of marriage equality as a human right was embraced by its state actors. South Africa 
also took a more holistic human rights approach to marriage. According to Newstrom (2007: 
793), the court acknowledged that what is regarded as ‘traditional’ marriage or family is a 
construct that is constantly evolving, and that the state has no right to establish one form of 
marriage or family that everyone has to conform to.  
Needless to say, opponents of marriage equality argued against the re-defining of marriage – 
not only in South Africa but also in countries where same-sex marriage was being debated or 
legalised. For example, before the Netherlands legalised same-sex marriage, its conservative 
MPs argued that the re-definition of marriage will devalue Dutch marriage in the eyes of 
foreign governments and societies (Kollman, 2013: 118). De Vos (2008; 165) points to 
opponents in South Africa who argued that marriage is fundamentally a religious institution 
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and re-defining marriage would inevitably violate the freedom of those who base their 
religious identity on a heterosexual definition of marriage.  
Similar arguments were proffered in the USA. Two arguments in particular that stand out in 
the American context which involves the human rights discourse were put forward by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey and the Court of Appeals of New York. Same-sex couples 
challenged these two states by arguing that denying same-sex couples marriage is an 
infringement of their human right as citizens. Newstrom (2007: 783) points out that the 
reason American courts tended to struggle with the framing of marriage equality is because 
the American constitution does not address discrimination based on sexual orientation as 
clearly as it does discrimination based on race or religion, for example. In the case of Lewis v 
Harris the Supreme Court of New Jersey argued that same-sex marriage has no deep roots in 
America’s history, which means that there was no fundamental right at stake. In the case of 
Hernandez v Robles the argument was that the rights of gays and lesbians were not violated, 
given that the marriage statute at the time allowed them to marry – it just meant that they had 
to marry members of the opposite sex (Newstrom, 2007: 793).        
Legitimation, Conformity and Esteem   
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902), states and state elites construct their 
political self or political identity in relation to the international community. The degree to 
which this construction takes place with regards to norm adoption can be ascribed to ‘peer 
pressure’ among different countries. This type of ‘peer pressure’ is not explicit, but rather 
implicit, especially with regards to marriage equality. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 903) list 
legitimation, conformity and esteem as possible motivations for responding to such ‘peer 
pressure’.  
Some academics claim that legitimation is important for states and that it influences a state’s 
normative behaviour. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that when a state does not 
conform to certain international normative behaviour, it risks the chance of being labelled a 
‘rogue state’. This means that a state can lose its reputation trust, and/or its credibility. Given 
how young the norm of marriage equality is, and that it continues to cascade and diffuse into 
different frameworks, a ‘rogue’ status is not really applicable to states in this regard. It is 
important to acknowledge this, given that there is no international law in place that 
recognises same-sex marriage as a universal human right, which means that states are not 
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legally required (in terms of international law) to legalise same-sex marriage (Kollman, 2007: 
342). Nevertheless, same-sex marriage is fully legal in 26 countries around the world.  
International legitimation is important for states, because it reflects perceptions of its 
domestic legitimacy among its citizens. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 903) define domestic 
legitimation as “the belief that existing political institutions are better than other alternatives 
and therefore deserve obedience.” Political and policy elites in Western democracies are very 
aware of other countries’ status regarding same-marriage legislation and they often learn 
from these developments. For example, after the Netherlands and Belgium became the first 
two countries to legalise same-sex marriage, Canada’s policy elites justified the re-definition 
of marriage in 2003, arguing that this would address “fundamental concerns of equality and 
fairness” (Kollman, 2013: 82; National Liberal Caucus Research Bureau, 2003). In their 
policy paper, Canada’s policy elites made clear reference to the Netherlands and Belgium. 
This type of international interaction and learning between states influences their domestic 
legitimation. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 903) argue that a state’s citizens tend to take note 
of international alternatives and make judgements about whether or not their government’s 
policies are better than those alternatives. They go on to argue that citizens are aware of what 
other people and other states say about their country. 
In the light of the marriage equality debate, these observations tend to come from LGBTQ 
activists and organisations. For example, when Canada and Spain legalised same-sex 
marriage, the Lesbian and Gay Federation (LSVD) in Germany issued a press release with 
the headline “Canada and Spain are in the Passing Lane: Equality in Germany is Long 
Overdue” (Kollman, 2007: 341). Also, in 2016 LGBTQ campaign groups in Australia invited 
Tiernan Brady to assist in Australia’s referendum on gay marriage at the time. Brady was the 
director of the ‘Yes’ campaign and was very influential in Ireland’s historic legalisation of 
gay marriage in a referendum (Gartland, 2016). Australians citizens are very critical of its 
government having not yet legalised gay marriage, pointing to countries such as Ireland that 
have legalised gay marriage by a national vote. Australia’s 2016 referendum was 
subsequently blocked by its senate (BBC News, 2016). In September 2017 Australian citizens 
participated in a national Australian Marriage Law Postal Survey in which citizens said 
whether or not they believe the law should be changed to allow same-sex couples to marry 
(Browne, 2017). These results will be made available on 15 November 2017, after which a 
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‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote will take place in its parliament.4 According to News Corp Australia 
Network (2017), a recent Newspoll found that 67% of respondents will vote yes in the postal 
survey. 
The second motivation Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) talk about when states respond to ‘peer 
pressure’ is conformity. They refer to Robert Axelrod (1986: 1105), who claims that 
conformity involves ‘social proof’, which means that states comply with norms to illustrate 
that they have adapted to the social environment and that they belong. With the on-going 
marriage equality debate in Australia, it became clear that some felt Australia was somewhat 
of an outsider in the international community. In 2016 MP Adam Bandt of the Australian 
Greens party told Parliament that “we are now the only developed, English-speaking country 
to not have equal marriage laws” (Smith, 2017). Smith (2017) points out that this statement 
by Bandt is factually incorrect, given that Singapore, an advanced English-speaking country, 
has not legalised gay marriage and neither has Northern Ireland, which forms part of the UK. 
This shows that citizens and political elites define part of Australia’s identity in terms of its 
shared identity with other Western countries. A year prior to this a similar argument was put 
forward by Australia’s then Marriage Equality director, Rodney Croome. In 2017 Nick 
Greiner, Australia’s Liberal Party Federal President stated:  
Today, more than a billion people live in countries that have embraced the 
freedom to marry for all their citizens. Britain, the US, New Zealand and Canada 
are often compared to Australia. Each of these nations in the “Anglosphere” now 
permits same-sex marriage. In these countries, as well as Catholic Spain, Ireland 
and Argentina, the religious celebration of marriage has also been protected. The 
experience in these countries has been that no one has become more gay, or less 
married, and the achievement of the reform has been a unifying moment for 
people across the political spectrum (quoted in Bickers, 2017). 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 903) point back to Axelrod (1968), who argues that states who 
conform to the actions of other states, or who want to conform, fulfil a psychological need to 
be part of a group. Before legalising same-sex marriage, many citizens and advocates for 
marriage equality in countries such as Belgium, Canada, and Germany pointed to the 
Netherlands as a pioneer and urged their political elites to follow suit. As seen in Australia, 
                                                 
4 The announcement of the results will take place on 15 November 2017, after this study has been completed.  
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the state feels pressured to follow normative behaviour as expressed by other countries and 
consequently to adapt to the current social and political environment.  
The third and final possible motivation for a state to respond to ‘peer pressure’ indicated by 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 903) is esteem. Although esteem is closely linked to 
legitimacy and conformity, it implies that states tend to follow international norms not only 
so that others might think well of them, but also because they want to think well of 
themselves. For example, two years before Canada opened marriage to gay couples Egale 
Canada Human Rights Trust, its national charity promoting lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans 
human rights, argued for the legalisation of gay marriage during a parliamentary committee 
hearing. Egale argued that “Canada prides itself on being a world leader when it comes to 
international human rights. The longer we drag our feet domestically, however, the further we 
fall from our leadership position” (Kollman, 2013: 161; Egale, 2017).  
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) point out that norm following can often be explained by a 
state’s desire to build or defend its esteem or pride, and this was illustrated in the case of 
Canada. This attitude is particularly prevalent in Western democracies, where states often 
care deeply about the norms associated with liberalism, given that being regarded as a ‘liberal 
state’ forms part of a state’s identity and something they take pride in. Kollman (2013: 83) 
argues that gay marriage proponents – policy elites and activists – in the Western world had 
internalised the idea that not allowing same-sex couples to enter into legal marriage is no 
longer appropriate in a Western democracy. This is also evident in state leaders. For example, 
when Barack Obama was the USA presidential candidate in 2008, he opposed gay marriage 
but was in favour of civil unions for gay couples. In 2011, however, President Obama 
informed members of Congress in a letter that prohibiting gay couples from marrying is 
unconstitutional (Gorman, 2015). According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 904), “state 
leaders conform to norms in order to avoid the disapproval aroused by norm violation and 
thus enhance national esteem.” What is interesting to note here is that Obama’s support for 
gay marriage came at a time when he was running for re-election. One year after his new-
found support for gay marriage, he was elected to serve as president for a second term.       
The Issue of Coercion  
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), the dominant mechanism of a norm cascade is 
socialisation. They define socialisation as “the mechanism through which norm leaders 
persuade others to adhere” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902). In international politics this 
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mechanism often involves diplomatic praise or censure from states, which is often reinforced 
by material sanctions and/or incentives. What is evident in the debate around marriage 
equality is that there is virtually no evidence that point to states trying to coerce other states 
to legalise gay marriage (Kollman, 2013: 85). In fact, a state gains no obvious material 
benefits by legalising gay marriage or pressuring other states to do so. This is particularly 
evident in that the USA and Germany, two of the most powerful nations in the world, have 
been late to legalise gay marriage compared to other countries where gay marriage is legal. 
The USA legalised gay marriage only in 2015 and Germany in 2017.  
Kollman (2013: 88) argues that a national government tends to be influenced by a prominent 
international norm if it ‘fits’ well within its domestic political system. The growing 
international norm of marriage equality in the last two decades had for the longest time not 
resonated with the US electorate, especially the argument that same-sex marriage is a 
fundamental human right. Newstrom (2007: 783) and Kollman (2013: 88) link this to the 
intricacies of the US political system. Kollman (2013) refers to Deborah Pearlstein (2005), 
who argues that many political elites in the USA as well as its public citizens tend to be 
reluctant to have international legal principles and precedents influence their own political 
decisions. This stands in contrast with Canada and Western European countries. There are, of 
course, Western European states such as Italy, Switzerland and Northern Ireland that have not 
legalised same-sex marriage and have not been pressured by other states to do so. 
As mentioned earlier, socialisation often involves diplomatic praise or censure, which is 
reinforced by material sanctions and/or incentives. There is no precedent for a Western 
country to pressurise another Western country to conform to the norm of marriage equality.  
Stage 3: Norm Internalisation 
A norm achieves a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality that deems it so widely accepted that it is 
internalised by actors (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904). The following section examines 
to what extent the norm of marriage equality achieved a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality. In other 
words, it asks whether marriage equality has been internalised by the state as well as the 
broader public.  
 
‘Separate but Equal’ 
As discussed earlier, many gay marriage proponents argued against the ‘separate but equal’ 
argument. This was seen in Nordic countries and especially in the Netherlands. Gay marriage 
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proponents argued that by having separate legislation for gay couples and straight couples 
regarding marriage, i.e. registered partnerships vs. traditional marriage, would defeat the 
purpose of true equality. Even South Africa’s Constitutional Court explicitly instructed 
Parliament not to formulate ‘separate but equal’ legislation. However, respecting the 
symbolism of traditional marriage and its significance as a religious institution, South Africa 
currently has two official pieces of marriage legislation. One is exclusively reserved for 
straight couples, while the other legalisation allows straight and gay couples to legally 
recognise their relationships as either a marriage or a civil partnership. The latter legislation 
is known as the Civil Union Act, while the former is known as the Marriage Act. So with that 
in mind, it is difficult to argue that the norm of marriage equality has been internalised in the 
South African context – a country where gay marriage has been legal for the past 11 years. 
According to Bonthuys (2008: 727), civil servants or religious officials can conduct 
marriages or civil partnerships between same-sex couples under South Africa’s Civil Union 
Act. As mentioned above, heterosexual couples are also able to marry under the Civil Union 
Act. Those marrying under the Civil Union Act will be afforded the same rights as 
heterosexual couples who opt to marry under the Marriage Act. De Vos (2008: 171) points 
out one very important criticism of the difference between the two pieces of legislation. With 
regard to the Marriage Act, certain civil servants such as magistrates and commissioners are 
automatically qualified to be marriage officers. Other diplomatic officers or state officials can 
also be appointed as marriage officers by the relevant Minister. Furthermore, Section 3(1) of 
the Marriage Act states that “a marriage officer for the purpose of solemnizing marriages 
according to Christian, Jewish or Mohammedan rites or the rites of any Indian religion” may 
be appointed in order to accommodate religious practices and beliefs (Union Gazette 
Extraordinary, 1961: 50). What is important to note here is that Section 31 of the Marriage 
Act clearly states that religious marriage officers are not compelled to marry any couple in 
the event that the marriage does not conform to the “rites, formularies, tenets, doctrines or 
discipline of his religious denomination or organization” (Union Gazette Extraordinary, 
1961: 62). Keep in mind that marriage officers who are civil servants are not exempt from 
this – they are obliged to marry couples even if they disagree with their religious beliefs.  
De Vos (2008: 172) points out that “the Civil Union Act deals with this matter in an entirely 
different – and constitutionally problematic – way.” The Civil Union Act does not state that 
religious officers may refuse to marry couples based on religious beliefs. This is largely 
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attributed to the fact that religious denominations or organisations must apply in order to get 
approval to conduct a marriage or civil partnerships under the Civil Union Act. Of course, for 
a religious denomination to apply to conduct marriages under the Civil Union Act one can 
infer that the issue of religious objection would not arise. However, Section 6 of the Civil 
Union Act states that civil servants who are marriage officers may refuse to marry same-sex 
couples in the event “that he or she objects on the ground of conscience, religion and belief to 
solemnising a civil union between persons of the same sex, whereupon that marriage officer 
shall not be compelled to solemnise such civil union” (Republic of South Africa, 2006: 6). De 
Vos (2008) makes the very important point that civil servants may refuse to solemnise civil 
marriages or partnerships for religious reasons, which essentially allows state officials to 
discriminate against couples based on sexual orientation, whereas these civil servants are 
obliged to solemnise marriages under the Marriage Act. For example, a Christian civil 
servant cannot refuse to marry an atheist or Muslim couple based on religious grounds.  
According to Haden (2017), given the Section 6 clause in the Civil Union Act, many same-
sex couples are often turned away by many Home Affairs branches in South Africa. Collison 
(2017) points out that South African Minister of Home Affairs, Hlengiwe Mkhize, said that 
out of its 1,130 marriage officers, 421 were exempt from conducting same-sex marriages or 
civil partnerships after having “objected on the grounds of conscience, religion or belief.” 
This provision of the Civil Union Act is problematic in one very important way. According to 
De Vos (2008: 173), same-sex couples in small South African towns are often less wealthy 
and less educated, and in order to get married they would typically have to go their local 
magistrate courts where the local magistrate would then act as an official marriage officer. 
These local magistrates can refuse to marry these same-sex couples according to Section 6 of 
the Civil Union Act. When this happens, these same-sex couples would more often than not 
accept the refusal by the local magistrate and not pursue the matter further out of ignorance or 
lack of resources. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 905) argue that iterated behaviour and debates contribute to 
the consolidation and universalisation of norms during the third stage of the norm life cycle. 
It is clear that the norm of marriage equality has not yet been internalised in the South 
African context. Not only are there two separate laws for marriage. On the one hand, the 
Marriage Act is solely applicable to heterosexual couples. This clearly illustrates how deeply 
embedded the norm of traditional marriage is in society. On the other hand, the Civil Union 
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Act makes it legal for civil servants working for the state to refuse to conduct marriages for 
same-sex couples based on religious beliefs. What this translates into is that civil servants 
who believe that homosexuality is wrong (whether that belief is truly based on religion or 
not) and that homosexual couples do not deserve to marry are essentially – legally –  
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and practising a form of homophobia. 
Similarly, Clayton (2017) argues that section 6 of the Civil Union Act is deeply problematic 
insofar that it emboldens people to be homophobic, which is a clear violation of the South 
African Constitution (Interview, Matthew Clayton, 11/07/2017). What makes this particularly 
troubling is that South Africa has a reputation as a human rights champion.  
A Queer Critique of Marriage 
Over the past three decades marriage equality has been at the forefront of policy reform in 
many countries. For many, legalising gay marriage would mean the ultimate liberation for 
lesbian and gay citizens. However, even though gay marriage has become the dominant issue 
in contemporary queer politics, there are many queer scholars and activists who actively 
argue against marriage and who are opposing the normalisation of marriage equality. 
Marriage critics in the LGBTQ movement see the fight for marriage equality as a way for 
gays and lesbians to conform to heteronormativity. Warner (2000: 143) argues that the 
framing of gay marriage as the ultimate goal has created further divisions between national 
gay and lesbian movements and queers. Warner (2000) admits that the marriage equality 
debate has contributed towards the increasing normalisation of the LGBTQ movement as a 
whole as well as the context in which marriage can become a meaningful option for gays and 
lesbians; however, gay marriage has not yet been normalised. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, gay marriage proponents often frame their argument 
around the issue of full equality, which can also be interpreted as full citizenship. These 
arguments are based on the notion that by not extending marriage to gay and lesbian couples, 
the state automatically sees them as second-class citizens. Before Massachusetts became the 
first state in the USA to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 2004, its Supreme 
Judicial Court linked marriage and citizenship by stating: 
The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. 
It forbids the creation of second-class citizens… The dissimilitude between the 
terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous.... It is a considered 
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choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely 
homosexual, couples to second-class status (Josephson, 2005: 270). 
The question then arises as to whether or not marriage equality will end second-class 
citizenship for queer people. How will marriage equality end second-class citizenship for 
queer people, when the USA does not have a federal law prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation in the work place? For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) said that it is illegal for employers to discriminate against LGBTQ 
workers as it will violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Under Title VII employment 
discrimination is prohibited on the grounds of race, colour, religion, sex and national origin 
(Alter, 2015). However, the Department of Justice pointed out the loophole, i.e. that it is not 
illegal under federal law to fire an employee based on sexual orientation, given that ‘sex’ be 
interpreted to refer to one’s biological sex – male or female (Berry, 2017). These are the 
types of arguments that queer theorists as well as feminist scholars make – that marriage 
equality does not address the inequalities the institution itself creates. 
Some queer theorists draw from some feminist scholars who are critical of the institution of 
marriage. Feminist scholarship shows that marriage still produces a different social status for 
women and for men. Gender roles in marriage affect women at home as well as in the 
workplace (Josephson, 2005: 275). For example, at home women are expected to do 
housework and care work; at work women still earn less than men. Feminist scholars also 
argue than marriage perpetuates a gender hierarchy and in many cases violence against 
women. Of course, gay marriage disrupts the institution itself. For example, gay marriage 
does not reinforce gender hierarchy as two people of the same gender would share the 
institution of marriage. However, some queer scholars argue that, although the legalisation 
makes the institution of marriage somewhat queer, queer individuals tend to conform to 
heteronormative traditions. Clayton (2017) makes a very interesting argument around the 
queer community and heteronormativity:  
I think that LGBTQ people do a fair enough job by emulating the worst bit of 
heteronormativity without same-sex marriage. For example, some still have very 
static ideas around gender roles. Where you see that some of the same drivers of 
intimate partner violence of different-sex couples – unequal power relations – 
come into play with same-sex partnerships as well. However, I don’t think it’s our 
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business to tell people how their decisions perpetuate heteronormativity 
(Interview, Matthew Clayton, 11/07/2017). 
Furthermore, some queer scholars maintain that gay marriage should not be the ultimate goal 
for liberation – sexual justice should be (Warner, 2000: 90). Similar to Warner (2000), Judge 
(2017) argues that activism regarding (homo)sexual and queer governance should be focused 
on full equality – economic and social justice – not just marriage. She points out that 
“marriage is a small piece of a much more complex and much more interconnected puzzle of 
human relations and their relationship to social justice” (Interview, Melanie Judge, 
11/07/2017). This raises the question around the inequalities that marriage sustains: why 
should benefits that are reserved for married couples, such as health care or tax equality, not 
be extended to couples who choose not to marry, or single people? Queer scholars are very 
critical of gay and lesbian organisations’ silence on the consequences that marriage will have 
for queer people who choose not to marry, or those who are single.  
Those who argue against marriage equality from a conservative and religious point of view 
base their arguments on marriage being reserved for procreation purposes as well as being a 
private institution with religious symbolism. Josephson (2005: 270) points out the irony in 
this argument, stating that “marriage is a public institution that creates a right to private 
sexual relations, and yet is defined by public policy.” Judge (2017) went on to argue that 
marriage has become deeply politicised. Marriage has become a way of disciplining queers so 
that they do not become too radical. It is a way to make sure that queers do not have sex in 
public, or have multiple partners, and that they marry and settle down with their long-term 
partners. Judge (2017) points out that these ideas should be critiqued, because queers can also 
become complacent people who are apolitical (Interview, Melanie Judge, 11/07/2017).  
Kollman (2013: 28) maintains that marriage as well as family life are heavily regulated by the 
state. This regulation usually takes place on the assumption that marriage and family are 
based on a heterosexual identity – an identity that is a deeply embedded norm in society and 
the legal framework. For example, Article 6(1) of Germany’s constitution states that 
“[m]arriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state” (Federal Republic 
of Germany, 2014: 16). The problem that gay marriage proponents in Germany faced is that 
even though its constitution does not explicitly define marriage or family as institutions 
comprised of one man, one woman, and their biological children, Kollman (2013: 138) points 
out that German courts and policy elites interpreted it that way. Although Article 6 was never 
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used and is still not used to discriminate against same-sex couples; it did, however, weaken 
the arguments by marriage equality proponents.  
Same-sex marriage is legal in Germany as of 2017; however, it is important to note that 
Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, voted against opening up marriage to gay and lesbian 
couples. She stated that “[f]or me, marriage in the Basic Law is marriage between a man and 
a woman and that is why I did not vote in favour of this bill today” (Reuters, 2017). This 
clearly shows how deeply embedded traditional marriage is when even the state leader votes 
against marriage equality, especially in light of the fact that Germany’s constitution (or Basic 
Law as it is known) does not define marriage as an institution solely reserved for 
heterosexual couples as maintained by Merkel. In reference to Merkel’s position, Clayton 
(2017) argues that anyone who denies others their rights based on sexual orientation is de 
facto homophobic (Interview, Matthew Clayton, 11/07/2017). Nevertheless, it is evident that 
marriage in itself is assume to be based on an inherently heterosexual identity. 
Warner (2000: 82) provides one critical reason as to why many straight people tend to have 
reactionary outbursts of homophobia in relation to the legalisation of gay marriage. Warner 
(2000) argues that straight people want the privilege and symbolism of marriage to be solely 
reserved for them as this would continue to reinforce the idea that heterosexuality is 
something special. This is often to the extent that a state can legalise gay marriages, but the 
word ‘marriage’ can still be claimed exclusively by straight couples. This is evident in the 
case of South Africa. As discussed earlier, gay and lesbian couples who marry under the Civil 
Union Act can opt to have their union defined as either marriage or civil partnership. Straight 
couples in South Africa can marry under the Marriage Act and their union will automatically 
be defined as a marriage. Newstrom (2007: 803) argues that by withholding the word 
‘marriage’ from gay and lesbian couples, or even having it as an option, does nothing to fight 
the isolation of queer people from the existing legal structures. Certainly, having the option of 
marriage or civil partnership will allow queer people who do not want the word ‘marriage’ to 
be associated with their legal union to opt for a civil partnership. At the same time, the fact 
that the option exists in the legal framework indicates that the norm of marriage equality still 
has a long way to go in order to reach the point of internalisation.  
Moving Towards Normalisation 
It is impossible to say or predict whether or not marriage equality will reach a ‘taken-for-
granted’ quality and become internalised. Gay marriage has materialised and diffused across 
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many countries over the past two decades, but at the same time there has also been a backlash 
in recent years, even in many Western societies such as the USA and Europe with the rise of 
neo-fascist movements. This type of backlash is troubling for LGBTQ rights. For example, in 
2017 the USA, under leadership of Donald Trump, announced a ban on transgender citizens 
serving in the military (Bruno, 2017). Despite these troubling developments in the West, 
Judge (2017) is hopeful that perhaps a new kind of politics can emerge in Latin America or 
post-colonial Africa that will dispel the myth that the direction the West is going is the best 
way to go (Interview, Melanie Judge, 11/07/2017). Bouchard (2017) believes that gay 
marriage – at least on a surface level – is moving towards normalisation and that the backlash 
against gay marriage is indicative that it is becoming more real and more normalised 
(Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 13/07/2017). Even so, Kollman (2013: 197) points out that 
countries are still measuring their progressivity on international human rights on how 
progressive they are on LGBTQ rights (see also Corrales and Pechney, 2010b).  
The legalisation for gay marriage has for the most part been decided either by a country’s 
parliament or through court rulings. This has been the case in all but one country. In May 
2015 Ireland became the first country to legalise gay marriage through a public referendum. 
More than 62% of Irish citizens voted in favour of amending the country’s constitution in 
order for gay and lesbian couples to marry (BBC News, 2015). In most countries the legal 
framework often moves forward faster than the social attitudes of its citizens. Ireland is 
different in that Ireland’s popular vote on gay marriage shifts the conversation of 
normalisation as the legalisation of gay marriage was decided by the majority of its citizens. 
Fransch (2017) argues that Ireland’s successful referendum and election of its first openly 
gay prime minster might be an example of a society that is progressing along with its law 
(Interview, Chet Fransch, 09/06/2017). Clayton (2017) shares Fransch’s (2017) sentiments; 
however, he makes the very important argument that it is inherently problematic to put 
people’s fundamental rights to a vote (Interview, Matthew Clayton, 11/07/2017). 
One very important factor to take into account when assessing the move towards 
normalisation is the social attitudes of citizens. It is often the case that marriage equality has 
been achieved in a country within its legal framework; however, the social attitudes of its 
citizens towards LGBTQ rights and gay marriage might be completely different. This trend is 
changing in certain countries. For example, in South Africa 48% of citizens ‘strongly 
disagree’ with same-sex marriage in 2012, compared to 23% of citizens who said they 
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‘strongly disagree’ in 2015. Note that 14% did not take a definite position on same-sex 
marriage. There is a clear change in attitudes among South Africans on same-sex marriage; 
however, at the same time the study conducted by Progressive Prudes found that 72% of 
South Africans believe that same-sex activity is “morally wrong” (The Other Foundation, 
2016).  
Similarly, in 2015 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) found that 
between January 2013 and March 2014 770 acts of violence were committed against the 
LGBTQ community in Latin America – nearly 600 of those violent acts resulted in death 
(IACHR, 2015; Eulich, 2016). It is important to highlight this, given that by 2014 three Latin 
American countries had fully legalised gay marriage (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay). This 
study acknowledges that it might be a bit problematic to link the normalisation of same-sex 
marriage to violence against LGBTQ people, especially given that traditional marriage is a 
deeply embedded norm globally, yet 1 in 3 women still experiences physical or sexual 
violence, mostly by an intimate partner (UN Women, 2016). However, it is still important to 
highlight this connection given that violence against LGBTQ people more often than not 
stems from the belief that homosexuality, for example, is wrong and that it deviates from the 
norm, and that violence against LGBTQ people would rectify this deviation. So, the argument 
is then that if homosexuality is wrong, then gay marriage would also be seen as wrong. 
Bouchard (2017) presents a very interesting argument that can possibly explain the gap 
between the legal norms and social attitudes of people in countries where gay marriage is 
legal, particularly in the USA. She cites Chandan Reddy’s (2011) work, Freedom with 
Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the US State, where Reddy argues that in 2010 the USA’s 
Shepard-Byrd Hate Crimes Prevention Act – an expansion of the federal definition of hate 
crimes to include those motivated by the perception of one’s sexual orientation or gender 
identity – was attached to the National Defense Authorization Act that increased the military 
budget to $680 billion. The argument here then is that in the USA freedom for queer-
identified individuals is often regulated by violence. Bouchard (2017) points out that 
sometimes legislation for queer protection is often used, or at least in this case, to justify 
military dominance. She continues to argue that this might be a possible reason as to why, 
socially speaking, American society might be less on board with queerness in general, 
because it is not so much about the acceptance of queer people but rather about the 
instrumentalisation of American exceptionalism (Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 13/07/2017).  
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Nevertheless, the norm of marriage equality has definitely grown and strengthened over the 
past few years.  The social attitudes of people are changing and gay marriage continues to be 
high on the priority list for policy reform. The USA is another example. Josephson (2005: 
296) points out that in the USA polling data have consistently indicated that the American 
public shows more support for non-discrimination policies in employment, for example, for 
gay and lesbians than they do for gays and lesbians to get married. In 2007 only 32% of 
Americans supported gay marriage (Baunach, 2011: 347). In a recent 2017 poll by Pew 
Research Center 62% of Americans support gay marriage (Pew Research Center, 2017). In 
Western Europe attitudes towards same-sex marriage are significantly more favourable 
compared to the rest of the world. For example, in a 2017 survey on same-sex marriage 91% 
of Dutch respondents believe that same-sex marriage should be legal across Europe. Swedish 
respondents were 90% in agreement, and Spanish respondents 84% (Debating Europe, 2017). 
Ratele (2017) points out that social normalisation is much more significant than legislation. 
Although same-sex marriage might be legal in a country, it is then the social arrangements 
that still need to be changed, which is much harder to do. Ratele (2017) puts forward the 
following argument regarding the normalisation of same-sex marriage: 
When you start to think about marriage and your first thought is not about a 
female-bodied person getting married to a male-bodied person. If this thing has 
happened, then you have done this psycho-social normalisation (Interview, 
Kopano Ratele, 05/07/2017). 
Eastern European countries show a different trend, however. In Latvia 76% of respondents 
believe that same-sex marriage should not be legal in across Europe. For Lithuania it is 71% 
and 69% for Slovakia (Debating Europe, 2017). The resistance to the legalisation of gay 
marriage in Eastern Europe as well as in African states, Asian nations and Middle Eastern 
countries draws attention to a different kind of norm – a reactionary norm to marriage 
equality, the norm of anti-homosexuality, that is discussed in the following chapter.  
Conclusion 
Ever since the Netherlands became the first country to legalise same-sex marriage in 2001, 25 
other countries have changed their legislation to allow same-sex couples to marry in all 
jurisdictions. The usefulness of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model was 
demonstrated in this chapter to illustrate the different stages the norm of marriage equality 
has to go through before it can achieve a (possible) ‘taken-for-granted’ quality. Marriage 
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equality continues to be at the forefront of the policy agendas of many countries, which can 
largely be attributed to the advocacy work of gay marriage proponents. Many of these 
marriage proponents served as norm entrepreneurs. The identification of norm entrepreneurs 
such as Axel and Eigil Axgil as well as Jack Baker and Matthew McConnell in this chapter 
described the ways in which these norm champions allowed marriage equality to get onto the 
agenda of the state and its elites. The norm cascade phase illustrated the role pioneering 
countries play in shaping norm behaviour in the international community, as well as how 
important framing the issue or the norm is in its success. The norm cascade process also 
demonstrated how countries respond to international ‘peer pressure’ to the norm of marriage 
equality in order to construct their own identity. The move towards normalisation and 
internalisation of marriage equality was discussed in the context of the final stage of the norm 
life cycle. It is clear that even though marriage equality has been established in the legal 
frameworks of these countries, the social attitudes of its citizens are not always in agreement. 
However, these attitudes are shown to be changing over time – a change that can be 
interpreted as a step in the right direction. Given that the norm of marriage equality is still 
relatively new, only time will tell whether marriage equality will endure and achieve a 
‘taken-for-granted’ quality.  
Nevertheless, it is evident that marriage equality continues to cascade across different 
countries. Note that Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 906) argue that Western norms are more 
likely to diffuse internationally than non-Western norms. Therefore, the next chapter applies 
the norm life-cycle model in order to investigate the norm of anti-homosexuality (or 
homophobia) in the legal frameworks of non-Western countries and how anti-homosexuality 
policies have grown and strengthened in these countries. This is done in order to illustrate the 
useful of the life-cycle model when applied to the Reactionary Movement.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Global Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage: Reactionary Movement 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model was applied 
to the norm of marriage equality in order to determine whether or not the norm has achieved 
a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality. Although the norm of marriage equality is still moving towards 
normalisation, the norm life-cycle model was useful in illustrating the different stages the 
norm has to go through before it becomes internalised. This chapter attempts to explain the 
diffusion of the norm of anti-homosexuality by applying a constructivist lens. Before one can 
discuss the Reactionary Movement, it is important to note that, apart from their fundamental 
opposition, there is a critical difference between the Equality Movement and the Reactionary 
Movement. The main difference is that the Equality Movement is focused on the legalisation 
of same-sex marriage, whereas the Reactionary Movement is focused on the criminalisation 
of same-sex relations. 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the legacies of colonialism and more specifically its 
effects on contemporary (homo)sexual and queer governance. Then the first stage of the norm 
life cycle – norm re-emergence – is discussed. This section identifies the norm entrepreneurs 
who played key roles in the passing of various anti-homosexuality policies. This chapter 
identifies Haruna Sebi, Jennifer Nabafu and David Bahati of Uganda as well as Vitaly 
Milonov and Yelena Mizulina of Russia as norm entrepreneurs who were integral in 
advocating for the norm of anti-homosexuality. This chapter then turns to norm cascading, 
which is the second stage of the norm life cycle. What is critical to note here is that the 
second stage of the life-cycle model provides a theoretically interesting and challenging 
phenomenon in the Reactionary Movement: norm cascading does not occur. As such, this 
chapter evaluates this stage of the life-cycle model through the lens of norm affirmation, 
given that Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) model proves difficult to apply here. In order to 
explain norm affirmation, this section provides a critique of marriage from a feminist and 
queer perspective to illustrate how the institution of marriage and the nuclear family is used 
to justify anti-homosexuality. It also discusses the role that religion plays in preventing norm 
cascading as well as the arguments around the notion that same-sex relations are a Western 
import. The final section evaluates norm re-internationalisation – the third stage of the norm 
life cycle – and assesses whether or not the norm of anti-homosexuality has been internalised 
and achieved a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality. It examines the resistance to and protests within 
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various countries against governments with draconian laws, as well as the impact the norm of 
anti-homosexuality has on the HIV/AIDS epidemic; this is an important point to highlight, 
because the criminalisation and stigmatisation of queer men or MSM hinders HIV/AIDS 
research and treatment. This chapter concludes by providing a critique of the norm life-cycle 
model.  
The structure of this chapter is based on Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle 
model. Their model is used here to identify, explain and describe the contemporary evolution 
of anti-homosexuality. This chapter utilises the life-cycle model to see whether or not it is 
useful to explain the normative behaviour of the state and state elites with respect to anti-
homosexuality rhetoric and legislation, given that same-sex behaviour has always been 
criminalised. Some of these countries have legally prohibited same-sex marriage, and many 
of the state leaders in the Reactionary Movement have denounced same-sex marriage and 
Western tolerance of the LGBTQ community. It is, therefore, important to examine the 
Reactionary Movement to see if and how it links to the study’s primary research question: 
How and why marriage equality emerged as an important issue in contemporary global policy 
and practice. It is important to keep in mind that this chapter does not highlight all individual 
countries with anti-homosexuality policies in their legal structures. Instead, the focus is on 
the movement towards the acceptance of anti-homosexuality, with selected countries used for 
illustrative purposes.         
Norm Identification 
Anti-homosexuality, or beliefs that being queer deviates from what is supposed to be normal 
or natural, has its roots in ideas around marriage, the nuclear family, sexuality and patriarchy. 
Rhetoric around anti-homosexuality has become increasingy evident and is shared by many 
countries around the world, primarily non-Western countries. In recent years the world 
witnessed various countries implement or strengthen laws that criminalise, among other 
things, homosexual propaganda, same-sex sexual acts, and/or same-sex marriage. For 
example, in 2013 Russia passed its Gay Propaganda Bill; in 2014 Nigeria signed its Same-
Sex Marriage Prohibition Act into law; that same year Uganda passed its Anti-Homosexuality 
Act, which was later nullified. Fransch (2017) argues that the irony, especially in Africa, is 
that these laws have been inherited from its colonial past and re-interpreted as authentic 
African traditions and values, while in contemporary politics even these former colonial 
powers have rejected these laws in their own countries as discriminatory (Interview, Chet 
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Fransch, 09/06/2017). In the previous chapter it was possible to pinpoint who introduced the 
norm of same-sex marriage into the legal framework, and when and how this was done. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to do the same for the norm of anti-homosexuality, because 
legislation that outlaws same-sex relations existed in the legal structure before and after these 
countries gained independence from their colonisers. For this reason, this chapter uses 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model to follow the (re-)emerging norm of 
anti-homosexuality in the discourse of contemporary (homo)sexual and queer governance, 
where homosexuality and homosexual acts are still criminalised. Re-emerging is the key term 
here, given that anti-homosexuality policies had already existed in the legal framework, yet in 
recent years there has been an intensification of these policies. This is in stark contrast to 
countries that have legalised same-sex marriages.    
It is perhaps not too farfetched to argue that the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 
countries with anti-homosexuality laws is not even an idea for LGBTQ citizens or activists to 
advocate for, because their queer existence in itself is illegal. As was mentioned in Chapter 4, 
Waaldijk (2001) lists three legislative processes that need to take place before the legalisation 
of same-sex marriage can be achieved. He calls these standard sequences, which he applies 
to European countries. According to Waaldijk (2001: 440), in order for marriage equality to 
be attained, the following standard sequence has to occur: (1) the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality and same-sex sexual relations needs to materialise, which is often followed or 
accompanied by an equal age of consent; (2) anti-discrimination policies based on sexual 
orientation are introduced into the legal framework; (3) some form of legal partnerships and 
parenting is introduced for same-sex couples.  
One could argue that the standard sequence process has a norm cascading or domino effect in 
the recognition of homosexuality. This means that step (2) can only happen once step (1) has 
been completed, and in order to get to step (3), both step (1) and step (2) must have been 
realised. For example, Waaldjik (2001: 440) argues that logically it would be difficult to 
outlaw discrimination based on sexual orientation in the workplace – step (2) – while 
legislation exists in the legal framework that punishes same-sex sexual acts, i.e. step (1). This 
chapter regards Waaldijk’s (2001) standard sequence as providing proxy norms in the 
contemporary politics of (homo)sexual and queer governance. These proxy norms are 
identified as the norm of (homo)sexual decriminalisation, the norm of (homo)sexual anti-
discrimination, and the norm of (homo)sexual partnerships and parenting. Step (4) of the 
process would then be the norm of marriage equality. Evidently, in many non-Western 
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countries step (1) has not even materialised yet, which makes reaching step (4) incredibly 
difficult. The fact that so few of these steps, or in many instances none of these steps, have 
been achieved in so many countries clearly indicates a deeply embedded anti-homosexuality 
rhetoric in the legal structures of these states.              
Homophobic Legacies of Colonialism 
As pointed out earlier, it is beyond the scope of this study to trace the exact origins of anti-
homosexuality. Bouchard (2017) cautions against making blanket statements about other 
nations and their cultures regarding their beliefs on homosexuality. She argues that doing so 
would be a legacy of colonialism in itself, and that it is important to look at a country’s 
history first (Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 13/07/2017). As such, the following section 
briefly explores the impact of colonialism on colonised nations, and how the rhetoric of anti-
homosexuality and the associated legislation that came into effect as a result of colonial rule 
still linger actively to this day.  
According to Braun (2013: 24), almost 80% of Commonwealth countries criminalise same-
sex sexual acts, which is a direct result of their colonial past. It is believed that as early as 
1533 England imposed the death penalty on men who engaged in sodomy with another man. 
In 1861 the UK implemented its Offences Against the Person Act, which meant that sodomy 
was no longer punishable by death; instead, men found guilty of sodomy were imprisoned for 
up to 10 years. Braun (2013) further points out that English lawmakers used the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act of 1885 to add a more generic offence – gross indecency – applicable 
only to men who engage in sexual intimacy with other men. This was punishable by one year 
in prison – with or without hard labour. Han and O’Mahoney (2014: 273) point out that the 
1860 Indian Penal Code (IPC) was the first comprehensively codiﬁed criminal law of its kind 
in the British Empire. Section 377 of the IPC states the following: 
377. Buggery. – Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of 
nature with any man or woman shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;  
and where such an offence is committed by a person over 18 years of age with a 
person under that age, the imprisonment may extend to over seven years.  
Explanation:– Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse 
necessary to the offence described in this section (Law Commission of India, 
1971: 282).  
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According to Han and O’Mahoney (2014: 273), the IPC was drafted by the lawyers of the 
British Empire in order to protect Christians from corruption, and also to correct and 
Christianise what was regarded as ‘native’ custom. There was also a fear among the 
colonisers that their own soldiers and colonial officers would engage in sodomy in their new 
‘immoral’ surroundings, especially those who were not married. As such, the 1860 IPC and 
the subsequent Queensland Penal Code of 1899 (QPC) served as models for the British 
Empire to export and impose similar legislation in other colonised nations throughout Africa, 
Asia and Oceania (Han and O’Mahoney, 2014; Morris, 1974). Human Rights Watch (2013: 
86) highlights that these anti-homosexuality laws were introduced – forcibly imposed – onto 
these nations without any ‘cultural consultations’ with the natives. The colonisers felt that the 
native population did not punish ‘perverse’ sexual relations harshly enough and these penal 
codes would do exactly that. These laws allowed the colonisers to impose European standards 
of morality, and essentially re-educate the natives on ‘proper’ sexual values and customs. The 
effect of these laws was that they allowed the coloniser to be praised and protected, while the 
colonised were policed and subjected.  
What is interesting to note is that France – the other big colonial power – decriminalised 
same-sex sexual acts between consenting adults in its French Penal Code in 1791 (Han and 
O’Mahoney, 2014: 273). According to Waaldijk (2001: 438), France became the first country 
to do so. This subsequently led to other countries following suit. For example, Belgium and 
Luxembourg decriminalised same-sex relations in 1792, and the Netherlands in 1811. There 
are, however, a few former French colonies that still criminalise same-sex relations, but the 
colonial legacies of anti-homosexuality had not been so clearly established as in former 
British colonies. As mentioned earlier, Braun (2013: 24) claimed that almost 80% of former 
British colonies still criminalise same-sex sexual acts between consenting adults – 42 out of 
the 54 Commonwealth countries in 2013. Since then, three more countries decriminalised 
same-sex relations, which means that in 2017, 39 out of the 54 (72%) Commonwealth 
countries still have laws in place against same-sex relations (Schlatter, 2016; Smith, 2015; 
Uranaie, Athanase and Vannier, 2016). The year 2017 also marks the 50th anniversary of the 
decriminalisation of homosexual acts in England and Wales. Even though the UK has 
decriminalised homosexual acts, the legacies of colonialism are still present in many of its 
former colonies, in particular African countries, where many African leaders regard 
homosexuality as ‘un-African’.  
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Stage 1: Norm Re-Emergence 
As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 896) argue: “norms do not appear out of thin air.” Norms 
are introduced and actively built by actors known as norm entrepreneurs. The norm 
entrepreneur constructs a norm in such a way that individuals within their community will 
regard it as appropriate or desirable behaviour. The norm of anti-homosexuality, as it is 
known today, was introduced predominantly by European colonial powers. While all of these 
former colonial powers have decriminalised consensual same-sex acts in their respective 
legal structures, and most of them have even gone as far as legalising same-sex marriage, in 
recent years there has been an increase in the strengthening of anti-homosexuality policies 
that criminalise same-sex relations or propaganda. As such, the following section identifies 
norm entrepreneurs who have been key in the construction of anti-homosexuality policies in 
the legal framework in recent years.  
Haruna Sebi and Jennifer Nabafu 
According to Mujuzi (2009: 278), Uganda adopted a new Constitution in 1995. It is through 
the drafting of this new Constitution that the issue of same-sex marriage in Uganda first 
arose. Section 145 of Uganda’s 1950 Penal Code clearly states that “any person who permits 
a male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature, commits an 
offence and is liable to imprisonment for life” (Republic of Uganda, 1950). As such, no one 
was advocating for the legalisation of same-sex marriage, given that the country already 
criminalised homosexual acts. However, during the process of drafting the new document it 
was proposed that the provision relating to marriage should state: “marriage shall be entered 
into with free consent of the intending parties” (Mujuzi, 2009: 278). Ugandan delegates, in 
particular Haruna Sebi and Jennifer Nabafu, argued that the aforementioned provision was 
too broad and open to various interpretations. According to Mujuzi (2009: 281), Sebi, the 
Koboko County representative, said during the Constituent Assembly proceedings: 
I support the motion ... for the simple reason that we should specify who these 
intending parties are because [the draft clause] ... simply says “marriage shall be 
entered into with free consent of the intending parties” without specifying who 
these intending parties are. In fact, I was about to move an Amendment ... because 
you may find that there are cases where men would want to marry each other 
(Laughter) ... [W]e have to be very careful where we shall give freedom for men to 
marry each other or women to do the same. So why I am supporting this Article ... 
is that, it categorizes very clearly men marrying women and not – (Laughter). 
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Women representative for the Mbale district, Nabafu, echoed Sebi’s remarks by stating 
during the same Constituent Assembly: 
I would like also to agree ... that, to avoid homosexual and lesbian marriages 
creeping into our society, we need to say “the man and woman intending to 
marry” ... Let us be specific and say the man and the woman to avoid Sodom and 
Gomorrah coming in our society – (Applause) (quoted in Mujuzi, 2009: 281).  
It is clear from Sebi’s and Nabafu’s remarks, as well as from the laughter and applause from 
the other delegates, that everyone in the Assembly shared their sentiments that marriage is an 
institution exclusive to heterosexual individuals. The result was section 31(3) of the 
Constitution which stated “Marriage shall be entered into with the free consent of the man 
and woman intending to marry” (Republic of Uganda, 1995). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 
897) argue that norm entrepreneurs play a crucial role in the first stage of the life cycle seeing 
that they call attention to issues through the language they use. The language a norm 
entrepreneur uses specifically names, interprets and dramatizes these issues. Nabafu’s 
reference to the biblical Sodom and Gomorrah is an example of how language can be used to 
frame the issue in such a way that it resonates with a broader audience. According to Mujuzi 
(2009: 281), the possibility of allowing same-sex marriage would lead to the destruction of 
Ugandan society similar to the way the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed by 
God. This rhetoric can be linked to one of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) possible motives 
for a norm entrepreneur to promote a norm – ideational commitment. Ideational commitment 
suggests that a norm entrepreneur “believes in the ideals and values embodied in the norms, 
even though the pursuit of the norms may have no effect on their well-being” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998: 898). Sebi and Nabafu believed that prohibiting the possibility of same-sex 
marriages would protect the broader Ugandan society, as well as preserve and protect the 
deeply embedded norm that a marriage is between a man and a woman. In other words, the 
prohibition would protect its heterosexist ideology. 
Interestingly, with the start of the new millennium Uganda’s gay and lesbian movement 
became increasingly visible and vocal – many of these activists were advocating for the 
Ugandan government to decriminalise homosexual acts, i.e. the norm of (homo)sexual 
decriminalisation. Evidently government officials were not happy about this.  For example, in 
2004 one Uganda radio station was fined by Uganda’s Broadcasting Council for having a gay 
activist on its show talking about gay rights, discrimination, same-sex relationships and the 
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need for HIV/AIDS services (DeBarros, 2006). Mujuzi (2009: 282) argues that the 
government saw the rise of the gay and lesbian movement as a threat to the institution of 
marriage. As a result, during the amendment process of its Constitution in 2005, the 
government added a new marriage clause, section 31(2a), which states explicitly that 
“Marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited” (Republic of Uganda, 2005: 32).  
David Bahati 
One particular Ugandan who has gained notoriety in the discourse around anti-homosexuality 
is David Bahati. On 14 October 2009 Bahati, an Evangelical lawmaker, introduced the Anti-
Homosexuality Bill into the Ugandan Parliament. This move was largely seen as a reaction to 
Uganda’s increasingly visible and vocal gay and lesbian movement. As mentioned earlier, 
Uganda’s Penal Code of 1950 already outlaws same-sex sexual acts. Bahati’s proposed Anti-
Homosexuality Bill sought to apply the death penalty to those convicted of “aggravated 
homosexuality”, as stipulated in the Bill, which included serial sexual offenders, people 
living with HIV, and those who use drugs or alcohol to facilitate gay sex (Alessi, 2013: 77). 
The Anti-Homosexuality Bill was subsequently labelled by the media as the ‘Kill the Gays 
Bill’. Furthermore, anyone who witnessed a homosexual act being committed can face up to 
three years in jail if they do not report the incident to police within 24 hours. During an 
interview with MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow in 2010, Bahati said the following about his 
intentions in introducing the Bill: 
I have a passion for children, and it’s what is really motivating me. I’m a God-
fearing person. I want to make sure that this law is consistent with God’s law… It 
hurts my family when my child goes to school and is converted into gay... It hurts 
my family, it hurts the family of Uganda when the purpose of procreation is 
undermined (quoted in Mirkinson, 2011).  
Bahati clearly expresses that his reason for the Bill is to protect children and family, and to 
protect the purpose of procreation (most likely within the institution of marriage). Turning 
back to Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) three possible motivations for a norm entrepreneur 
to advocate for their norm – empathy, altruism and ideational commitment – it is clear that 
Bahati was – theoretically, at least – motivated by altruism. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 
898) argue that “altruism exists when actors take action designed to benefit another even at 
the risk of significant harm to the actor’s own well-being.” Bahati’s altruistic efforts are 
particularly evident given that a petition was started in order for the International Criminal 
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Court to investigate him for committing a crime against humanity in the persecution of gays 
in Uganda (Norman, 2013).    
As expected, there was major backlash from the international community against the Bill. 
The Bill was called out for its Nazi overtones – witnesses not reporting homosexuals to the 
police can be jailed – and over the absurd double standards –  gay and lesbian Ugandans 
abroad can be arrested and deported back home for trial and execution, yet murderers abroad 
are protected from deportation under Ugandan law (Ssebaggala, 2011: 46). Many Western 
countries also threatened Uganda with aid cuts. Unsurprisingly, shortly after the international 
outcry the government issued a statement declaring that the Bill did not have any official 
backing and it was subsequently shelved, temporarily (BBC News, 2012).  However, on 20 
December 2013 the Anti-Homosexuality Bill was passed and on 24 February 2014 President 
Yoweri Museveni signed it into law (Nyanzi and Karamagi, 2015: 26). It was now known as 
the Anti-Homosexuality Act. Needless to say, the passing of the law drew heavy criticism 
from the international community. However, after a petition was filed in the Constitutional 
Court the Anti-Homosexuality Act was nullified on the grounds that it was passed without the 
proper quorum (Gettlemen, 2014; Nyanzi and Karamagi, 2015: 26).   
What is interesting about Bahati’s norm entrepreneurial efforts is that he did not need to do 
much to actively promote his norm of re-criminalisation. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) 
argue that norm entrepreneurs will follow the process of persuasion in order to convince the 
individuals within their community or state actors to accept the proposed norm. Bahati did 
not have to do any lobbying to get his norm on to the agenda of the state as he was already an 
MP. Also, the Ugandan community already believed homosexuality was wrong. According to 
Pew Research Center (2013), 96% of Ugandan citizens believe that homosexuality should not 
be accepted by society. During a talk – a talk not specially aimed at promoting his norm – to 
a packed crowd of students at Uganda’s Makerere University, Bahati declared that “there are 
studies showing that if you are a homosexual, you are more likely to contract AIDS”, which 
received rousing applause from the audience (Alsop, 2009: 2043). Even though studies have 
shown that heterosexual women in Africa are most affected with HIV/AIDS, it is clear that 
the norm of anti-homosexuality is an established and internalised norm in Ugandan society. 
Vitaly Milonov and Yelena Mizulina 
The norm of anti-homosexuality is not only evident in Africa. Russia is also known for its 
anti-homosexuality rhetoric, and this became increasingly evident with the passing of its Gay 
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Propaganda Law in 2013. In contemporary Russia homosexuality is not regarded as criminal. 
Homosexual relations were decriminalised in 1993 and homosexuality was delisted as a 
mental illness in 1999 (Kondakov, 2011: 11; Williams, 2017). It is thus clear that Russia has 
adopted the norm of (homo)sexual decriminalisation – step (1). Although Russia has adopted 
step (1) of Waaldijk’s (2001) standard sequences, it has not yet moved towards step (2) or 
(3). In fact, the country has remained hostile to LGBTQ rights. For example, in 2012 
Moscow’s city and district courts ruled that gay pride parades in Moscow will be banned for 
100 years, i.e. from 2012 to 2112 (BBC News, 2012; Clemons, 2012).  
According to Wilkinson (2014: 365), the Russian state Ryazan Oblast passed Russia’s ﬁrst 
gay propaganda law in 2006, which was applicable only to its local districts. It was on 30 
June 2013 that President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, signed its nation-wide 
Gay Propaganda Law. The law is officially known as “For the Purpose of Protecting Children 
from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values” (Bennetts, 2015). 
Some authors refer to Vitaly Milonov as the architect of the Gay Propaganda law, while 
others refer to Yelena Mizulina as the one to have introduced the law. For the purpose of this 
section, the study regards both Milonov and Mizulina as norm entrepreneurs.  
According to TV-Novosti (2013) the Gay Propaganda Law states that any individual who 
propagates non-traditional sex relations to minors shall be fined – this includes via the media, 
adverts and the internet. This law prohibits the LBGTQ community of distributing any pro-
homosexual information to minors, and they are also prohibited from holding rallies in 
support of homosexuality. According to Bennetts (2015), Milonov first introduced the 
legislation in his hometown of St Petersburg in 2011. Similar to Bahati, Milonov argues that 
the Gay Propaganda Law is designed to protect the children of Russia from an early exposure 
to ‘dangerous’ information. He links this ‘dangerous’ exposure of homosexuality to Tabasco 
sauce: 
Look, I love Tabasco, but it is harmful, that’s why I don’t give it to my three-year-
old son on sausages. But, who knows, when he grows up, maybe he’ll love 
Tabasco even more than me. But, right now, he doesn’t need it. This can wait 
(quoted in Bennetts, 2015). 
Milonov says his political moves regarding legislation opposing LGBTQ rights stems from a 
belief in traditional attitudes toward homosexuality and the traditional family unit. He 
attributes this to conservative European political traditions. In 2013 Pew Research Center 
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released a poll showing that 74% of Russians do not believe homosexuality should be 
accepted by society (Pew Research Center, 2013). It is clear that the majority of Russians 
share Milonov’s sentiments. The same can be said for Mizulina, who has also been influential 
in promoting Russia’s Gay Propaganda Law. Mizulina, the chairperson of the Russian 
Duma’s Committee on Family, Women and Children, is known in Russia as the “champion 
of high moral standards” (Lipman, 2013). According to Flintoff (2013), Mizulina justified the 
legislation by arguing that it will give the public what they want. She pointed to surveys that 
indicated that 88% of Russians were in favour of the anti-homosexuality legislation, although 
critics argued against this figure. Nevertheless, Mizulina said about the passing of the Gay 
Propaganda Law: 
Traditional sexual relations are relations between a man and a woman, which ... 
are a condition for the preservation and development of the multi-ethnic Russian 
people. It is precisely these relations that need special protection by the state 
(quoted in Grove, 2013).  
It is clear that Russia’s norm entrepreneurs are using the norm of anti-homosexuality to 
preserve the country’s heterosexual identity. What is so interesting about norm entrepreneurs 
advocating for anti-homosexuality legislation is that all of them have direct access to their 
respective parliaments and other state actors – unlike the norm entrepreneurs in the Equality 
Movement. Norm entrepreneurs in the Reactionary Movement do not need an organisational 
platform to promote their norm. More often than not, when the norm is introduced to 
parliament, it is strongly supported as the rest of the house usually shares the sentiments of 
the norm. For example, Russia’s Gay Propaganda Law passed with a 436 – 0 majority 
(Grove, 2013).  
Stage 2: Norm Affirmation 
As the world becomes more interconnected and complex, both the assertion of homosexuality 
and opposition to any claim for sexual rights are on the rise. According to Altman (2013: 
182), there has been a significant divide between those who claim that diverse sexual 
identities and behaviours are fundamental to human rights and those who argue that they 
represent degeneracy and a threat to the moral order. This has been evident in the divide 
between the Western world and the non-Western world, which has become a clear reference 
point in terms of religion, freedom and human rights. 
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According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 901), a norm reaches a tipping point after the 
norm entrepreneurs manage to persuade “a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and 
adopt new norms.” They argue that once this tipping point is reached, the norm will be 
adopted by more countries and it will inevitably diffuse or cascade through the international 
community. In terms of the norm of anti-homosexuality, this diffusion or cascading process 
has not yet transpired, which stands in contrast to the norm of marriage equality. Symons and 
Altman (2015: 62) calls this clash between two groups – in this case, the Marriage Equality 
and Reactionary Movements – international polarisation, where two groups of states adopt 
contradictory norms. In the previous chapter it was more straightforward to utilise the norm 
life-cycle model to explain the cascading of same-sex marriage. The utility of the model, 
specifically the second stage, proves difficult to apply to the Reactionary Movement, because 
norm change does not occur – the norm of anti-homosexuality has always been a deeply 
embedded norm in these societies. Given this theoretical challenge, this chapter uses ‘norm 
affirmation’ instead of ‘norm cascading’. The reason for is that the norm of anti-
homosexuality is not a new norm that reactionary states use to define appropriate behaviour; 
instead, anti-homosexuality is an existing norm that is used to re-affirm states’ religious, 
national, cultural and/or traditional identities.  
Reactionary norm entrepreneurs tend to form their arguments around religious, national, 
cultural, and/or traditional identities and regard marriage as an institution exclusively 
reserved for heterosexual people. It is therefore important to provide a critique of marriage in 
order to illustrate how it contributes toward norm affirmation. Marriage equality is not 
resisted only by reactionary states. In fact, some feminist and queer scholars reject marriage 
as an oppressive and/or heteronormative institution. A feminist perspective is useful, because 
struggles around sexuality and same-sex relations come directly out of feminist teachings and 
feminist struggles. Ratele (2017) argues that feminist scholars and activists put sexuality and 
sexuality (and queer) studies into circulation, which is part of the reason why the issue of 
marriage equality was able to achieve global recognition (Interview, Kopano Ratele, 
05/07/2017). Judge (2017) takes it one step further arguing that marriage is a product of the 
development of modern capitalism: 
[Marriage] was ultimately designed to produce certain forms of gender relations in 
the home and to assign certain roles and expectation to men and to women, 
respectively, in the context of the rise of capitalism. So the idea of marriage is 
being the site in which the women figure raises the children and is involved in 
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social reproduction, whereas the male is involved in economic reproduction 
(Interview, Melanie Judge, 11/07/2017).  
The following section therefore examines marriage from a feminist and queer perspective. 
These perspectives prove useful to explain reactionary norm champions’ use of marriage not 
only to re-affirm existing morals and values, but also to maintain a heterosexist ideology that 
is rooted in traditional gender relations.  
A Feminist and Queer Critique of Marriage  
According to Peel and Harding (2004: 591), marriage has always been and continues to be “a 
vehicle for securing men’s power and status, and women as property” (see also Rubin, 1975). 
Some feminist scholars, particularly radical feminists, have argued that the institution of 
marriage is rooted in patriarchy, and that it exploits and oppresses women (Garcia-Rodrigo, 
2001: 113). Marxist feminists have taken this one step further by arguing that marriage has 
created gender roles and entrenched domination over women that are socially constructed in 
order to serve not only the interests of men but also the interests of a capitalist system, where 
the role of the wife/mother is to guarantee the system provide a consistent supply of labour 
power (through housework and care work as well as biological reproduction).  
For many people there seems to be a shared belief that marriage functions as a universal 
institution. Ingraham (1994) argues that this assumption is rooted in heteronormative views 
on marriage and romance. These heteronormative views are shared by citizens of both the 
Western world and the non-Western world. Ingraham (1994: 11) points out that this implies 
that one’s “identity in relation to marriage is universal and not in need of explanation.” Of 
course, these assumptions are embedded in heteronormative understandings of marriage in 
order to naturalise the institution as exclusively heterosexual. According to Symons and 
Altman (2015: 75), marriage has always been understood as “unproblematically 
heterosexual.” Ingraham (1994: 203) refers to these heteronormative assumptions as the 
‘heterosexual imaginary’, defined as a “way of thinking which conceals how heterosexuality 
structures gender and closes off any critical analysis of heterosexuality as an institution” (see 
also Ingraham and Saunders, 2016).  
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 913), “[w]hen norms become internalised by 
actors, actors are no longer choosing to conform to them in any meaningful way.” In other 
words, norms have become so deeply embedded that alternative behaviours are no longer 
viable options. In terms of the institution of marriage in the non-Western world, actors no 
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longer think seriously about whether marriage laws are the best form of legislation to govern 
the institution. They just promulgate more and more legislation to exclude other forms of 
relationships. These actions have prohibited normative change to occur. Judge (2017) argues 
that the idea that marriage should be regarded as the most significant form of relationship 
should be critiqued, because this idea marginalises other forms of relationships – for 
example, couples who choose not to marry or those who are in polyamorous relationships – 
which sets up a system where these forms of relationships are not seen as equal and they do 
not enjoy the same privileges, benefits or protection married couples enjoy (Interview, 
Melanie Judge, 11/07/2017).  
Peel and Harding (2004: 591) claim that traditional notions of romance – love and intimacy – 
have been socially constructed in superficial and consumerist terms. This has often been 
enforced through celebrating relationships or marriage anniversaries, Valentine’s Day, or 
planning the perfect wedding. Fransch (2017) argues that marriage has moved beyond an 
institution based on religious symbolism – marriage has in fact become a lucrative business 
(Interview, Chet Fransch, 09/06/2017). BusinessTech (2016) revealed that the global 
wedding industry rakes in approximately $300 billion, annually. According to Ingraham 
(1994: 212), weddings serve as a type of “ideological control” to indicate that “the bride and 
groom are normal, moral, productive, family-centered, good citizens, and, most importantly, 
appropriately (hetero)gendered.” It is important to note that some queer theorists argue that 
gays and lesbians who choose to marry tend to conform to these heteronormative traditions 
(Picq and Thiel, 2015: 5). Ratele (2017) is critical of the fact that queer people who choose to 
marry are not inventing new ways of getting married; instead, they continue to borrow from 
heteronormative traditions, i.e. having the traditional white wedding (Interview, Kopano 
Ratele, 05/07/2017). Judge (2017) posits the view that in some instances the idea of marriage 
tends to have a negative effect on a more radical sexual and gender political agenda, mostly 
because marriage is historically a conservative institution. She claims that although the 
legalisation of same-sex marriage has allowed the institution to become somewhat queered, it 
remains a conservative institution that revolves around monogamy and the nuclear family 
(Interview, Melanie Judge, 11/07/2017).  
Riddiough (1981: 77) argues that heterosexual marriage is not only oppressive for women, 
but it also allows for the oppression of gays and lesbians. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
nuclear family is the bedrock of heterosexual marriage. The nuclear family and heterosexual 
marriage entrench the idea that the bond between sexuality and reproduction is natural. It 
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passes on views on culture, religion, as well as sex/gender roles. Reactionary norm 
entrepreneurs try to solidify these views by claiming that anything that does not fit into the 
framework of the nuclear family and heterosexual marriage is regarded as abnormal and 
unnatural. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 892) refer to this phenomenon as “norm-breaking 
behaviour.” They argue that norm-breaking behaviour creates disapproval or stigma. Ratele 
(2017) insists that arguments around what is considered natural are problematic, because 
everyone’s sexual life is embedded in politics. It is politics that determines who is recognised 
and who is denied access to rights (Interview, Kopano Ratele, 05/07/2017). Part of the reason 
why the cascading of the norm of anti-homosexuality is not applicable, is because ideas 
around what is considered a ‘normal’ family and/or marriage have always been a widely 
internalised norm, and politics have always been used to govern sexuality rights in such a 
way that the norm of anti-homosexuality continues to be a deeply embedded norm.  
Riddiough (1981: 81) provides three ways in which the notion of family, in particular, 
oppresses gays and lesbians. Firstly, the act of coming out as gay or lesbian. Riddiough 
(1981) argues that the process of coming out is often experienced in isolation. What makes 
the process of coming out so hard for gays and lesbians is that the act of coming out goes 
against a fundamentally heteronormative society as well as the heteronormative values of 
one’s family and friends. As mentioned in Chapter 2, after Stonewall the act of coming out 
was encouraged within the queer community. It was not only politically motivated, but for 
many it symbolised personal liberation (see Cruikshank, 1992; Engel, 2001). Needless to say, 
the act of coming out is not as easy, or even possible, for queer individuals who live in 
countries with anti-homosexuality legislation, as this would be a form of punishable norm-
breaking behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 892).  
Secondly, other forms of oppression faced by gays and lesbians are rejection, discrimination 
and violence after coming out. For example, in 2006 – the year same-sex marriage was 
legalised in South Africa – the current president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, was quoted as 
saying about gay men: 
When I was growing up, ungqingili (gay man) would not have stood in front of 
me. I would knock him out (quoted in Mathibe, 2015: 81).  
Mathibe (2015) links homophobic rhetoric by many African leaders to a dominant 
heterosexist ideology that exists in most African countries. It is a heterosexist ideology that is 
rooted in their cultural norms as well as their religious beliefs on how society should 
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function, i.e. through family and marriage. These normative views tend to be extremely 
difficult to change.  Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model is focused on 
normative change; however, the norm of anti-homosexuality clashes with the model’s second 
stage, norm cascading. Instead of diffusing through international structures, the norm of anti-
homosexuality is re-affirmed as a way of resisting other (Western) forms of relationships. 
Symons and Altman (2015: 68) argue that “when a norm is challenged, its most ardent 
adherents usually respond by clarifying, rearticulating, and sometimes deepening their 
commitment to the established norm.” This can take the form of the ‘corrective rape’ of black 
lesbians, the criminalisation of endorsing same-sex relations, or the criminalisation or 
execution of homosexual men.  
According to Riddiough (1981: 82), the third way in which the nuclear family and 
heterosexual marriage oppress gays and lesbians is through the ‘closet’. The closet serves as a 
mechanism for queer individuals to protect themselves. It also represents hiding aspects of 
their lives from loved ones as well as society. The closet serves as a way to keep gay men and 
lesbian women invisible. Riddiough (1981: 82) argues that this invisibility is important, 
because a visible queer body challenges heteronormative ideas around sex and gender roles, 
and sexuality. Thus, what this invisibility inevitably does is allow the dominant heterosexist 
ideology to remain through the nuclear family, (hetero)sexuality and women. Over the years 
many Western countries have completed Waaldijk’s (2001) standard sequence of same-sex 
recognition by accepting (1) the norm of (homo)sexual decriminalisation, (2) the norm of 
(homo)sexual anti-discrimination, (3) the norm of (homo)sexual partnerships and parenting, 
and (4) the norm of marriage equality. In these societies the homosexual or queer is able to 
live openly and visibly in a homosexual or queer way. In contrast, in many non-Western 
countries same-sex relations are criminalised and in some cases even punishable by death. 
Mbisi (2011: 57) suggests that draconian laws are ways in which the state uses its power to 
silence those who engage in same-sex relations. Mbisi (2011) refers to Tamale (2007: 18), 
who said in response to the oppression of queer individuals in many African countries: 
… by maintaining a tight grip on certain activities, and silencing the voices of 
those individuals and groups that engage in them, the patriarchal state makes it 
extremely difficult for these individuals to organise and fight for their human 
rights. 
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As such, the silencing and legal oppression of queer individuals by the state allows for the 
norm of anti-homosexuality to be re-affirmed and to remain normalised in the legal structure 
and social attitudes of its citizens. It also hinders the process of norm cascading.  
The Role of the Religion in Preventing Norm Cascading 
Religion in particular has been the basis for many to justify their anti-homosexuality rhetoric, 
beliefs and legislation. This has been evident in the Christian faith as well as in Islam. In 
Christianity the Bible denouncing same-sex relations is used to condemn homosexuality, 
while Muslims point to the Qur’an and Sharia law. What is so interesting with regards to the 
Qur’an, as was also pointed out in Chapter 2, is that the Qur’an is not that clear on Islam’s 
position on homosexuality. Ireland (2013: 53) argues that “[t]he Qur’an contains only one 
passage (4:15–16) that can be interpreted as laying down a legal position toward 
homosexuality.” Even so, Hélie (2004: 120) argues that even though the Qur’an’s position is 
still ambiguous, anti-homosexuality and a homophobic culture within Islam has become an 
internalised social norm. This internalisation has allowed some Muslim majority countries 
such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen to apply the death penalty for individuals who 
engage in same-sex behaviour (Carroll and Mendos (2017: 40). 
As Kuhar (2013: 6) points out, religious teachings generally interpret homosexuality as a sin 
and as immoral. Therefore, if one adheres to these religious values and norms, one cannot 
accept homosexuality. This can be seen in Christianity as well. African Catholic Church 
leaders and also the Eastern European Orthodox Church leaders have been very vocal in 
promoting the norm of anti-homosexuality, to the point where religion can be seen as 
preventing the process of norm cascading. Symons and Altman (2015: 73) argue that the 
strong support for Russia’s anti-homosexuality laws is largely a result of the influence of its 
Orthodox Church in politics. These church leaders can be regarded as reactionary norm 
champions. For example, in 2015 a Catholic Church priest in Nigeria, Rev. Fr. Raymond 
Tyohemba condemned homosexuality (Ajasa, 2015). Rev. Tyohemba said about 
homosexuality destroying the institution of marriage: 
God has instituted the institution of marriage so that a man and a woman would 
come together as husband and wife, but not the other way round. It is unfortunate 
that today, some groups of persons have chosen to violate what God has ordained 
and go about having sex with persons of the same sex with them… So, the devil 
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introduced lesbianism and homosexuality to destroy the institution of marriage 
(quoted in Ajasa, 2015). 
These sentiments are shared by other church leaders in Africa such as the Catholic 
Archbishop of Abuja Diocese, John Onaiyekan, who said that “the stand on homosexuality 
by churches in Nigeria is irrevocable” (Okonkwo, 2015). Archbishop Onaiyekan stressed that 
even though other nations have accepted homosexuality and marriage equality as a norm in 
their respective societies, this would never happen in Nigeria – in 2014 Nigeria’s Same Sex 
Marriage Prohibition Bill was signed into law. Reiterating and actively pushing a religious 
agenda allows for the norm of anti-homosexuality to be re-affirmed.  
In Central and Eastern Europe some religious leaders have incited violence against the 
LGBTQ community. According to Kuhar (2013: 8), some religious leaders explicitly called 
on the “normal majority” to act violently against those who choose to participate in gay pride 
marches. For example, in 2012 a Bulgarian Orthodox Priest encouraged people to throw 
stones at those participating in pride marches in Sofia (see also Montgomery, 2012). 
Interestingly, during a 2017 interview with Russia’s National News Service, Metropolitan 
Kornily – Primate of the Russian Orthodox Old Believer Church – urged Russian men not to 
shave their beards as this would protect them from homosexuality (Williams, 2017). Kornily 
contends that shaving one’s beard would go against God’s word, while having a beard clearly 
promotes a heterosexual image. The irony here is that the existence of Conchita Wurst clearly 
disrupts this view.5 What is so interesting about Kornily’s argument is that it echoes the 
sentiments of the Nazi regime in Germany, as discussed in Chapter 2, who called on the 
feminisation of women in order to solidify traditional gender norms (see Grau, 1995).  
It is clear that religion plays a big role in the normalisation of anti-homosexuality in countries 
with some form of anti-homosexuality legislation, mostly because in these countries one’s 
religious identity is integral to one’s national identity and the way one defines oneself in 
relation to the state (Kuhar, 2013: 8). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902) argue that states 
comply with certain norms for reasons that relate to their identities as members of an 
international community. It can be argued that this is not particularly true for reactionary 
countries, especially since many Catholic states have experienced a rapid shift in opinions 
toward the acceptance of homosexuality since 1989 (Symons and Altman, 2015: 86). For 
                                                 
5 Conchita Wurst is a fictitious character created and portrayed by Austrian singer and drag queen artist Tom 
Neuwirth. The existence of Wurst, a woman with a beard, became a catalyst for discussions around (normative) 
genders and sexualities.  
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example, many prominent religious leaders of the Catholic Church in many non-Western 
countries who work closely with government officials have been very critical of the Catholic 
Church in the West for not being critical enough or for showing tolerance towards the 
LGBTQ community. This can be seen as an example of norm resistance. Furthermore, many 
religious figures and state officials, mostly in Africa, have denounced LGBTQ rights as 
human rights, and have argued that homosexuality is un-African and a Western import.     
Same-Sex Relations: A Western Import 
Homosexuality is often portrayed by countries with anti-homosexuality policies as a Western 
import, and a phenomenon that is immoral and unnatural. The re-emergence of the norm of 
anti-homosexuality is largely a reaction to the norm cascading and legalisation of same-sex 
marriage in the West. This links to this study’s research problem: the norm cascading of 
same-sex marriage in one direction, and the norm affirmation of anti-homosexuality in the 
opposite direction. Reactionary norm entrepreneurs champion the norm of anti-
homosexuality as a way of resisting Western influence (see Symons and Altman, 2015: 66). It 
is important to examine reactionary claims that homosexuality is a Western import in order to 
illustrate how these arguments are used to prevent a norm cascade, and instead used to re-
affirm the norm of anti-homosexuality.   
As mentioned earlier, anti-homosexuality rhetoric in Africa is in fact largely one of the 
legacies of colonialism. Most African leaders have not acknowledged this. Instead, they 
argue that homosexuality is un-African. The idea that homosexuality is un-African rests on 
the assumption that homosexuality did not exist before the Europeans colonised Africa. In 
fact, many scholarly work has shown that same-sex behaviour and relationships have existed 
in Africa for centuries (see Epprecht, 2008; Mbisi, 2011; Roscoe and Murray, 1998; Spurlin, 
2006; Tamale, 2013). Instead, Awokoya (2016) argues that homophobia is a Western import, 
and not homosexuality.  
There are some African leaders who have acknowledged that same-sex behaviour and 
relations have existed in Africa since pre-colonial times. For example, in 2009 Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni said the following: 
We used to have very few homosexuals traditionally. They were not persecuted 
but were not encouraged either, because it was clear that is not how God arranged 
things to be (quoted in Ssebaggala, 2011: 50). 
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Interestingly, Museveni also acts as a norm champion here with his use of language. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 897), norm champions frame issues through 
their “language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.” It is through this framing that a 
norm champion can push a specific political strategy that will resonate with a broader public 
understanding. Similar to norm entrepreneur, Jennifer Nafabu, Museveni’s choice of words 
that homosexuals are not the way “God arranged things to be” is a clear reference to the 
belief that heterosexuality is normal and the way one should be, which will inevitably lead to 
a heterosexual marriage and a family. These arguments resonate with citizens – usually the 
overwhelming majority – who have already internalised the norm of anti-homosexuality, and 
this allows for norm affirmation to occur.  
Ssebaggala (2011) proffers the argument that homosexuality in Africa is not a Western 
import, but it is the ‘flaunting’ of one’s queerness that is a Western import. In other words, 
you can be queer in private, but just do not live an openly queer life. This argument might 
hold true in some cases but not all. For example, in 2014 the Ugandan tabloid newspaper, The 
Red Pepper, published a list of the ‘top 200’ homosexuals in the country, many of whom had 
not publicly admitted to being gay (Fry, 2014). In 2011 a similar list was published in 
Uganda. After that 2011 list came out, prominent gay rights activist in Uganda, David Kato, 
was murdered. According to BBC News (2012), at Kato’s funeral the priest condemned gay 
people. 
According to Reddy (2001: 84), in 1997 then President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, said about 
homosexuality and the West: 
Most ardent supporters of these perverts are Europeans who imagine themselves 
to be the bulwark of civilisation and enlightenment … we made sacrifices for the 
liberation of this country and we are not going to allow individuals with alien 
practices such as homosexuality to destroy the social fabric of our society. 
Two years prior to Nujoma’s statement Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe called 
homosexuals “worse than pigs and dogs” and stated that homosexuality is a form of Western 
imperialism (Tamale, 2013: 39). It is clear that many African leaders blame homosexuality 
on the West, and that they believe homosexuality goes against African norms and values. 
African leaders are also very critical of Western actors interfering in their affairs regarding 
(homo)sexual and queer governance. For example, during the 2010 negotiations over the 
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Cotonou Agreement,6 the European Parliament demanded that any action taken by 
participating states should be without any form of discrimination of the grounds of, among 
others, sexual orientation. Symons and Altman (2015: 80) notes that “African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific states unanimously rejected this effort and made written demands that the European 
Union ‘refrain from any attempts to impose its values’ concerning the ‘phenomenon of 
homosexuality.’”  
According to Judge (2017), the West is also implicated in homophobia in certain African 
countries. She argues that the re-criminalisation of homosexuality in Uganda, for example, is 
not so much a reaction to the West legalising same-sex marriage; instead, it is more a 
consequence of the interference of right-wing American Evangelical churches that are 
pushing an anti-homosexuality agenda, and it is this interference that is actively producing 
homophobia in certain African countries (Interview, Melanie Judge, 11/07/2017). Ireland 
(2013: 55) argues that reactionary governments often disapprove of Western donors who 
support local LGBTQ organisations. Ireland (2013: 55) refers to Massad (2002: 383), who 
goes even further to argue that the advocacy work of international gay rights groups who are 
pushing for a human rights discourse in places where LGBTQ rights are not considered 
human rights, might inadvertently be contributing the affirmation of the norm of anti-
homosexuality in Africa.  
Peter Tatchell, a prominent human rights campaigner, had an appropriate response to Africa’s 
history with anti-homosexuality: 
It’s one of the great tragedies of Africa that so many people have internalised the 
homophobia of that colonial oppression and now proclaim it as their own 
authentic African tradition (quoted in Awokoya, 2016).  
Unlike Africa, where homophobia is a result of the legacies of colonialism, Eastern Europe’s 
anti-homosexuality rhetoric is rooted in its communist traditions. Kuhar (2013: 8) argues that 
the prominence of anti-homosexuality in the legal structure and societal beliefs is attributed 
to the revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s as well as 
the process of re-traditionalisation, which was regarded as returning to the true (patriarchal) 
values of the nation that were erased by the communist regime. Although the norm of anti-
homosexuality is present in Eastern Europe, same-sex relations are not criminalised in any 
                                                 
6 The Cotonou Agreement is the overarching framework for EU relations with African Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries. The aims of the Cotonou Agreements are to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty and 
contribute to the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy (European Council, 2017).  
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Eastern European country. Symons and Altman (2015) point to Hungary as an interesting 
example of a country that possesses both equality and reactionary traits. For example, as an 
EU member Hungary tends to vote in favour of sexuality rights internationally and has even 
gone as far as accepting the norm of (homo)sexual partnerships – step (3) of Waaldijk’s 
(2001) standard sequences. At the same time, having close ties with Russia, Hungary often 
bans gay pride marches and its police fail to protect LGBTQ activists from violence (Symons 
and Altman, 2015: 82).  
Russian officials in particular have been very critical of the West’s tolerance of 
homosexuality. For example, Vitaly Milonov, one of the norm entrepreneurs for Russia’s 
Gay Propaganda Bill, said of Western Europe: 
While I still consider Europeans our partners and friends, their values have 
altered. And values are the skeleton of a society. We are seeing a moral 
weakening of European nations. Western Europe is becoming something like the 
Weimar Republic, which was so ultra-democratic and tolerant that it perished 
(quoted in Bennetts, 2015). 
This sentiment echoes Kuhar’s (2013) argument that Eastern Europe’s disdain for 
homosexuality is rooted it its nationalist identity and traditional norms and values (see also 
Symons and Altman, 2015: 83). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) acknowledge that Western 
norms tend to be more likely to cascade internationally than non-Western norms. They argue 
that “[n]orms held by states widely viewed as successful and desirable models are thus more 
likely to become prominent and diffuse” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 906). There is a 
clear divide between Western European countries and Central and Eastern European 
countries within the EU with regard to LGBTQ rights and norms (Gill, 2015). The EU 
consists of 28 member states, of which 15 are considered Western European countries and 13, 
all of whom joined the EU after 2004, are considered Central or Eastern European countries; 
12 out of the 15 of Western European member states have legalised same-sex marriage 
(Austria, Greece and Italy have not yet legalised same-sex marriage). Among the Central and 
Eastern European member states, only 2 out of 13 countries have legalised same-sex marriage 
(Malta and Slovenia – both in 2017).  
Some have argued that Russia’s strong anti-homosexuality rhetoric has spilled over to other 
Eastern European countries. According to Carroll and Mendos (2017: 42), Russia (2013) and 
Lithuania (2014) are the only two European countries with explicit anti-homosexuality 
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legalisation in place. In 2017 Vladimir Putin declared that it is his “duty” to stop the 
legalisation of same-sex marriage, because gay and lesbian couples cannot produce children. 
He also said that he is obligated “to uphold traditional values and family values” (Marusic, 
2017). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 901) argue that part of the success of norm 
entrepreneurs is their ability to persuade states or state actors to become norm entrepreneurs 
themselves and adopt norms. Putin can be regarded as a norm entrepreneur, given the fact 
that he has championed the norm of anti-homosexuality through his actions and use of 
language (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). Although the norm of anti-homosexuality 
has been affirmed in Russia’s legal structures, Clayton (2017) raises an interesting argument 
that the prominence of contemporary governance around queer politics is a useful distraction 
to Russia’s widespread corruption, its faltering economy and all the other social ills that the 
Russian government is not dealing with (Interview, Matthew Clayton, 11/07/2017). 
Legitimation, Conformity and Esteem 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902) argue that in the second stage of the norm life-cycle 
model states construct their political identity in relation to the international community. They 
do so in order to conform to ‘peer pressure’ from other states and international norms. This 
has not been the case for countries with anti-homosexuality policies, which is explained 
below. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) give legitimation, conformity and esteem as reasons 
for a state’s response to ‘peer pressure’. 
States view legitimation as an important factor that influences its normative behaviour. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), a state can be labelled as a ‘rogue state’ if it 
does not adapt to certain international normative behaviour. The cost of being regarded as a 
‘rogue state’ often “entails loss of reputation, trust, and credibility” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998: 903). International legitimation is important for states, given that it is seen as a 
reflection of its citizens’ perceptions of a state’s domestic legitimation. Domestic legitimation 
is defined as “the belief that existing political institutions are better than other alternatives 
and therefore deserve obedience” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 903). In terms of the norm 
of marriage equality, Western democracies are very aware of the status of marriage equality 
in other countries. They often learn from these developments and reconstruct their position to 
legitimise their international image. The same cannot be said for countries that follow the 
norm of anti-homosexuality. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 903) believe that citizens take 
note of international alternatives and debate whether or not their government is better than 
these alternatives. Citizens in countries with anti-homosexuality legalisation believe that their 
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government offers a better alternative than international norms. For example, in Nigeria 
same-sex marriage and same-sex relations are prohibited, with 90% of Nigerians believing 
that same-sex relationships should be criminalised (Nwaubani, 2017). For these countries and 
its citizens, domestic legitimation is more important than international legitimation. Keep in 
mind that many non-Western countries, particularly African and Middle Eastern societies, do 
not regard rights around sexuality as human rights. Therefore, part of the reason why the 
conflict between the two movements (marriage equality vs anti-homosexuality) exist – 
international polarisation – is because Western states tend to believe that rights around 
sexuality have a universal application (Symons and Altman, 2015: 68).  
Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that conformity is another possible reason 
for states to comply to ‘peer pressure’. According to Axelrod (1986: 1105), “[b]y conforming 
to the actions of those around us, we fulfil a psychological need to be part of a group.” It is 
possible to argue this point with regard to African states. African state elites are adamant 
about protecting their African values relating to heterosexuality, marriage and family. Many 
have argued that homosexuality and homosexual behaviour are un-African, and any deviation 
from belief that would be conforming to a Western imperialist agenda. For example, when 
South Africa legalised same-sex marriage in 2006, many other African states criticised South 
Africa for violating its African values and not being “authentically African” (Awondo, 
Geschiere and Reid, 2012: 157; Symons and Altman, 2015: 80). Ireland (2013: 54) quotes 
former President of Somalia, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, who said about South Africa’s decision 
to legalise same-sex marriage: 
This is a foreign action imposed on Africa. This is not something that is 
indigenous to Africa; it is something that has come from abroad. 
Re-affirming the norm of anti-homosexuality conveys the perception that African elites are 
part of a group that is staying true to what they believe to be their African values. Lastly, 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 903) refer to esteem as another form of ‘peer pressure’, where 
norms are followed in order for others to think well of them, and for them to think well of 
themselves. States with anti-homosexuality policies are not so much concerned with what 
other countries think of them. Symons and Altman (2015: 65) argue that states with anti-
homosexuality policies are more concerned with defending their (hetero)sovereignty as a 
state than their international image. These states are more critical of other states’ involvement 
or interference in their own political affairs. In 2010 David Bahati called on the USA to 
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respect Uganda’s belief that LGBTQ rights are not human rights, in the same way that 
Uganda respects the USA’s belief that the opposite to be true (Mirkinson, 2011). Ugandan 
President Museveni also called on the West to “[l]eave us alone with our options” in response 
to criticism regarding Uganda’s (homo)sexual and queer governance (Awokoya, 2016). It is 
clear that Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) reasons for norm cascading is limited in 
explaining the prominence of the norm of anti-homosexuality. These states are not concerned 
whether or not other states are following their norm; they are more concerned about 
protecting their (hetero)sovereignty as a state, staying true to their values, and focusing on the 
issues that enhance their domestic legitimation.   
In order for a norm cascade to occur, the process of socialisation needs to be achieved. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902) argue that socialisation is the “mechanism through which 
norm leaders persuade others to adhere.” They claim that in international politics, the process 
of socialisation involves diplomatic praise or censure by states that is reinforced by material 
sanctions and incentives. States who share the norm of anti-homosexuality tend not to impose 
material sanctions or incentives on other states. In fact, it is Western nations that tend to 
impose sanctions or aid cuts on non-Western nations that include anti-homosexuality policies 
in their legal structures. Symons and Altman (2015: 68) argue that the economic and security 
risks for reactionary states who champion the norm of anti-homosexuality are minor, which 
makes the material sanctions or incentives by Western states insignificant in stimulating a 
norm cascade.  
Stage 3: Norm Re-Internalisation 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 904) argue that a norm achieves a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality 
that deem it so widely accepted that the norm has been internalised by actors. The following 
section examines to what extent the norm of anti-homosexuality has achieved a ‘taken-for-
granted’ quality. In other words, has anti-homosexuality been internalised by the state as well 
as the broader public?  
Public Opinion 
In contemporary (homo)sexual and queer politics, one of the ways in which to analyse to 
what extent a norm has been internalised is to look at the social attitudes of a country’s 
citizens towards its LGBTQ community. Unlike the norm of marriage equality which has not 
yet been internalised, it can be argued that the norm of anti-homosexuality has in fact been 
internalised. During the period of 2014/2015 Afrobarometer conducted a study to determine 
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how tolerant African citizens are – the study measured the tolerance levels of 33 African 
countries (Dulani, Sambo and Dionne, 2016). The study found that Africans in general are 
very tolerant, despite perceptions that Africa is a continent filled with religious divisions and 
intolerance. However, the study showed that Africans show high levels of intolerance 
towards homosexuality. When asked whether respondents would like or not care if they had 
certain communities as neighbours, 91% of respondents said they would like or not care if 
they had people of different ethnicities as neighbours, 87% said they same about people with 
different religions, 81% for immigrants or foreign workers, and 68% for people living with 
HIV/AIDS. Only 21% of respondents said that they would like or not care if they had 
homosexuals as neighbours.      
In 2013 Pew Research Center (2013) found that 98% of Nigerians believe that homosexuality 
should not be accepted by society, the figure is 96% for Ghana, 96% for Senegal, 96% for 
Uganda, and 90% for Kenya. In 2017 a NOI Poll found that 90% Nigerians believe that 
same-sex relationships should be criminalised (Nwaubani, 2017). In Jordan 97% of its 
citizens believe homosexuality should not be accepted by society, 95% for Egypt, 94% for 
Tunisia, and 80% for Lebanon (Pew Research Center, 2013). In 2017 a Pew Research Center 
(2017) poll found that the majority of citizens in Central and Eastern European countries 
believe that homosexuality should not be accepted by society: 97% of Armenians believe that 
homosexuality should not be accepted by society, 93% of Georgians, 86% of Russians and 
Ukrainians, 85% of those in Romania, 84% of those in Belarus, and 69% of those living in 
Lithuania.  
These figures are clear indications that the norm of anti-homosexuality is a deeply embedded 
and internalised norm in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, as well as 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
Internal Resistance 
Although the anti-homosexuality can be seen as having achieved a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality 
in many non-Western countries, there has been resistance to these governments and their 
criminalising legislation. In Russia Nikolai Alexeyev who is known as Russia’s most 
prominent gay rights activist, has been vocal in his resistance to the government’s silencing 
of its queer citizens. In 2015 Alexeyev organised a pride march in the city of Moscow, where 
pride marches are illegal. Subsequently, he was jailed for 10 days (Marcin, 2015). Also in 
2015 a lesbian couple was on a flight from Moscow en route to St Petersburg when they 
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noticed Vitaly Milonov on the same flight. They posted a photo that went viral on social 
media of them kissing, with a sleeping Milonov in the background, protesting his anti-
homosexuality policies (Gani, 2015). One particular protest that made international headlines 
was that by the Pussy Riot. 
On 21 February 2012 five women held a protest in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour 
– the tallest Orthodox Church in the world. These women are known as Pussy Riot, a Russian 
punk band (Zychowicz, 2012: 13). According to Bernstein (2013: 220), the group performed 
on the Church’s alter criticising the close relations between Putin and the Russian Patriarch 
Kirill through their lyrics as well as the Orthodox Church’s conservative views on women’s 
rights and LGBTQ rights. They were arrested before they could finish their performance and 
were charged with “hooliganism motivated by religious hatred” (Bernstein, 2013: 220). Three 
of the group members – Maria Alyokhina, Yekaterina Samutsevich and Nadezhda 
Tolokonnikova – were found guilty and sentenced to two years in prison. Samutsevich was 
released on appeal, while Alyokhina and Tolokonnikova served 21 months of their sentence 
(Banks, 2017). Needless to say, the sentencing and treatment of Pussy Riot received 
international criticism from celebrities such as Paul McCartney and Madonna to German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, to Amnesty International. Although the criminalisation of anti-
Putin activism is troubling, Zychowicz (2012: 14) suggests that the Pussy Riot protest is a 
reflection of the tensions of a generation who are “fed up with the inequality, decadence, and 
instability of the 1990s in Russia.” These kinds of resistance and condemnation have not only 
been seen in Russia, but in Africa as well. 
After Nigeria passed its Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition Act and Uganda its Anti-
Homosexuality Act in early 2014, the African Commission on Human Rights and People’s 
Rights (ACHPR) has been critical of these legislative moves, condemning both countries 
(ACHPR, 2014a; ACHPR, 2014b). During its 55th Ordinary Session held from 28 April – 12 
May 2014, the ACHPR, which promotes and protects human rights throughout the African 
continent, went one step further by adopting a landmark resolution – Resolution 275 – that 
condemns “acts of violence, discrimination and other human rights violations against persons 
on the basis of their sexual orientation and/or gender identity” as it violates the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights (IJRC, 2014). There are also countless gay rights 
activists in Africa speaking out against their governments’ draconian laws, many of whom 
faced criminalisation and assault, and some of whom have even been murdered. Even though 
the Reactionary Movement can be seen as a form of resistance to the Equality Movement, it 
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has become evident that there has been resistance within the Reactionary Movement itself 
and in the respective countries with anti-homosexuality policies. Only time will tell whether 
or not these forms of resistance will be strong enough to move towards the Equality 
Movement for its queer citizens, or whether the Reactionary Movement will become even 
stronger and more oppressive.  
Reactionary Effects on the HIV/AIDS Epidemic and Research 
In the Reactionary Movement HIV/AIDS has been a very important issue, because the 
criminalisation of same-sex relations, and the stigmatisation and denial of homosexuality or 
MSM, hinder the fight against HIV/AIDS. In the case of the Equality Movement, as seen in 
Chapter 4, the HIV/AIDS epidemic had a surprisingly positive impact on the legalisation of 
same-sex marriage. This has not been the case with the Reactionary Movement.  Semugoma, 
Nemande and Baral (2012: 313) point out that research on HIV/AIDS in countries with anti-
homosexuality policies is incredibly difficult to conduct, given that most queer men in these 
countries are either closeted or hidden, and these men are also subject to arrest if their queer 
status is known. Also, HIV/AIDS remains stigmatised as a disease only affecting gay men. 
Semugoma, Nemande and Baral (2012) go on to say that queer men living with HIV/AIDS or 
MSM who want to be tested for HIV are not the only ones in danger (see also Alsop, 2009: 
2043). Health-care providers working for specialised clinics reaching out to these men are 
also in danger of attacks or arrests – attacks on these specialised clinics have been reported. 
For example, in 2010 religious leaders in Kenya disrupted a government health centre that 
provides HIV/AIDS services to the Mtwapa community (Ireland, 2013: 48). In the case of 
Uganda, after its Anti-Homosexuality Act was enforced, people who witnessed or had 
knowledge of people who have engaged in same-sex sexual acts could be arrested if they did 
not report this behaviour. Of course, health-carer providers treating MSM would be required 
under the law to report these individuals for their same-sex relations, or they could be 
arrested.  
Needless to say, anti-homosexuality legislation discourages people from taking HIV tests and 
makes it impossible to live an openly queer life. Annually, millions of foreign dollars are 
given to the fight against HIV/AIDS, particularly in Africa, where the epidemic is most 
prevalent. The USA’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, and the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria are the world’s leading entities fighting HIV/AIDS 
each year. In 2009 these two entities contributed approximately US$300 million to Uganda 
(Alsop, 2009: 2043). Note that most programmes that directly target sexual minorities in 
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Uganda were not allowed to register with the government and as such did not qualify for 
funding. Only one group pursuing prevention work among sexual minorities was able to 
register with the government. It received only US$5000. Aslop (2009: 2043) refers to Dennis 
Wamala, spokesman for Icebreakers Uganda, which is a group that works towards HIV/AIDS 
prevention and making care accessible to sexual minorities, who said that the mere fact that 
you are applying as an LGBTQ organisation in Uganda is illegal. It is clear that those who do 
not conform to the norm of anti-homosexuality in African countries are increasingly 
marginalised. It is this marginalisation that severely hinders the progress against HIV/AIDS 
not only in Uganda but also in other developing countries.   
As pointed out in Chapter 2, one’s sexuality (or sexual orientation) is not a fixed identity (see 
Stryker, 2008; Valochi, 2005). It is often the case that MSM do not see a correlation between 
their sexual identity and the sexual behaviour. According to Cáceres (2002: S24), male 
homosexual behaviour does not usually imply a homosexual or bisexual identity. There are, 
of course, misconceptions among MSM that men who are on the receiving end of anal sex are 
gay, and not those who are giving it. In fact, a lot of MSM tend to adopt a heterosexual 
identity. This complexity and fluidity of sexual identities are more widely acknowledged in 
non-Western countries than in Western countries, mostly because in Western countries there 
tends to be a more rigid distinction between heterosexuality and homosexuality. Mumtaz et 
al. (2011) point specifically to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where the nature 
and functionality of MSM (sexual) identities within the sociocultural context of MENA 
complicates the conversation around MSM and HIV/AIDS. For example, in Yemen khafya 
(bisexual males who hide their same-sex sexual orientation) is known as a distinct typology 
of MSM identity, and so too are hijras in Pakistan, who are known as transgender men who 
dress as women (Mumtaz et al., 2011: 3). In MENA countries, similar to sub-Saharan African 
countries, HIV/AIDS research is hindered due to the stigma around same-sex relations and 
HIV as well as the criminalisation of same-sex acts. Mumtaz et al. (2011: 4) found that there 
has been an increase in recent years of HIV infections among MSM populations in MENA. 
For instance, in 2008 MSM transmissions accounted for 52.3% of reported HIV cases in 
Lebanon. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 892) point out that “by definition, there are no bad norms from 
the vantage point of those who promote the norm.” For example, slavery was once considered 
a ‘good’ norm and accepted as such. Similarly, those promoting the norm of anti-
homosexuality believe that their norm is appropriate behaviour.  It is clear that countries that 
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have internalised the norm of anti-homosexuality are doing a great disservice to queer 
individuals living with HIV or those at risk. Much scholarly work, international health bodies 
and donors have made it clear that HIV/AIDS predominantly affects the heterosexual 
population of the developing world. Aslop (2009: 2044) argues that the interpretation of that 
message by queer men was that anal sex is safe. The denial of queer people or MSM by 
governments who are actively policing the norm of anti-homosexuality has led to unsafe 
sexual practices, which inevitably leads to an increase in HIV/AIDS among these individuals. 
For example, in MENA it is reported that only between 31.1% and 50.7% of MSM were 
aware that condoms can prevent HIV transmissions (Mumtaz et al., 2011: 7). Whether or not 
the norm of anti-homosexuality can be justified based on religion, culture or tradition, it is 
clear that anti-homosexuality rhetoric and/or legislation has a negative impact on the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries, particularly for queer men and MSM.  
A Critique of the Norm Life-Cycle Model 
Throughout this study it has become clear that international norm change is a central focus of 
constructivist research. Constructivists rediscovered the importance of non-material and 
ideational factors, which neorealist and neoliberal scholars tended to ignore (Hofferberth and 
Weber, 2014: 1). According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894), “international structure is 
determined by the international distribution of ideas.” This means that constructivists believe 
that shared ideas, expectations and belief regarding what is considered appropriate behaviour 
give the world structure, order and stability. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 916) claim that 
empirical research on norms is focused on people’s ideas about what is considered 
appropriate and how what ‘should be’ translates into political reality. In other words, what 
‘ought to be’ becomes the ‘is’. In order to explain this (international) norm change, 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) designed their norm life-cycle model. However, their model 
poses a theoretical challenge to explaining resistance to norm change, as seen with the 
Reactionary Movement.  
Symons and Altman (2015: 66) call this resistance “international norm polarisation,” which 
they define as a “process wherein a candidate norm is accepted by some states but is resisted 
by others, leading to a period of international disputation between two groups in each of 
which socialising pressures pull states toward compliance with rival norms.” The Reactionary 
Movement (advocating the re-criminalisation of same-sex relations) is a resistance movement 
against the Equality Movement (advocating the legalisation of same-sex marriage). The norm 
life cycle was useful in explaining the change towards the norm acceptance of marriage 
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equality in Chapter 4, given that norm research and the norm life cycle are focused on norm 
change. It was difficult to apply the norm life cycle in the same way in this chapter, mostly 
because norm change did not occur – the norm of anti-homosexuality was already established 
in both the legal structures and societal perceptions. The Reactionary Movement is not only – 
partly – a form of resistance to the norm of marriage equality, it is also a move to re-establish 
and re-affirm the norm of anti-homosexuality as a way for states to consolidate solidify their 
religious, national, cultural and/or traditional identities.   
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 896, 897) argue that “norms do not appear out of thin air”, and 
that it is the norm entrepreneur who “creates” issues that contribute toward the success of 
norm emergence. Hofferberth and Weber (2014: 7) are critical of Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
(1998) use of the term ‘creation’ in stage 1 of the norm life-cycle model, because the model 
deals inadequately with the question of how a particular norm emerges in the first place. In 
other words, a norm’s existence is simply stated. Although it is possible to utilise the model 
to identify reactionary norm entrepreneurs who have re-introduced anti-homosexuality 
policies, the model is limited in tracing the exact origins of the norm of anti-homosexuality, 
given its historical legacy. In other words, the norm of anti-homosexuality in contemporary 
politics does not neatly fit into Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) conceptualisation of norm 
emergence, because the norm of anti-homosexuality is not a new norm. It is the re-emergence 
of an old norm that has been deeply embedded for centuries. Similarly, Krook and True 
(2010: 107) argue that “interest in norm-building by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ does not translate 
into exploration of the origins and internal transformation of norms.” They critique the norm 
life-cycle model for not exploring “the contested space within and among norms and how it 
might result in the fluidity or evolution of norms themselves” (see also Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998: 897).  
Hofferberth and Weber (2014: 8) criticised the life-cycle model’s conceptualisation of the 
socialisation process in the second stage as simply “a one-way street that ultimately leads to 
full compliance.” In other words, there is no room for the norm to be interpreted differently 
or to be reconsidered. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902) regard the process of socialisation 
as “the dominant mechanism of a norm cascade” – it is how norm leaders persuade others to 
adhere to their norm. In terms of the Reactionary Movement, the norm leaders did not need to 
persuade state elites or citizens to adhere to their norm, given that they had already shared the 
same values when the norm of anti-homosexuality was re-introduced by the norm leaders. 
Also, the norm leaders did not have to persuade international actors to conform to their norm, 
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because they are more focused on defending their (hetero)sovereignty as opposed to fulfilling 
a psychological need to be part of a group as seen with Western states accepting the norm of 
marriage equality (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 903; Symons and Altman, 2015: 65).  
In recent years one key part of (hetero)sovereignty has been conceptualised by Western states 
as having a “responsibility to protect human rights” (Symons and Altman, 2015: 75). In the 
vast majority of non-Western countries with anti-homosexuality legislation, LGBTQ rights 
are not seen as human rights, which indicates clear a difference in the conceptualisation of 
sovereignty between Western and non-Western countries. This complicates the discourse 
around (homo)sexual and queer governance, since it indicates a dichotomy between two 
groups. Symons and Altman (2015: 74) argue that the norm life-cycle model has not 
sufficiently engaged with the prospect of long-running international disputation. This is 
mostly a result of constructivist theories not anticipating that states will adopt opposing 
positions with regards to a disputed norm – in this case, the norm of marriage equality vs. the 
norm of anti-homosexuality.      
This chapter was able to use the norm life-cycle model to identify the norm entrepreneurs 
who re-established the norm of anti-homosexuality in the first stage of the model as well as 
illustrate that the norm is in fact an internalised norm in the third stage. What is interesting, 
however, is that the norm of anti-homosexuality had already achieved a ‘taken-for-granted’ 
quality even before the identified norm entrepreneurs introduced re-criminalisation policies. 
Symons and Altman (2015: 85) argue that champions of reactionary norms tend to construct 
the norm of anti-homosexuality in such a way that they enable themselves to define “sexual 
minorities as a threatening ‘other’ and themselves as defenders of national traditions.” They 
tend to adopt this normative approach before significant LGBTQ mobilisation can occur, and 
not as a response to it. This shows that the natural progression of the norm life cycle is not 
applicable to the norm of anti-homosexuality, because stage 3 had been achieved even before 
stage 1 started.  
The norm life-cycle model is designed to explain how a norm moves from A (norm 
emergence) to B (norm cascading) to C (norm internalisation) to demonstrate normative 
change. For example, in Chapter 4 it was evident that marriage was not open to same-sex 
couples. As such, the norm of marriage equality was introduced, it diffused and became 
legalised – a clear move from A to B to C. In terms of anti-homosexuality, the norm was 
already legal and internalised from the outset. The illegalisation of same-sex relations was re-
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introduced and re-accepted. There is no clear move from A to B to C. Hofferberth and Weber 
(2014: 8) argue that the model does not allow for a shift in direction, and it ignores diverging 
interpretations of a norm. Therefore, the utility of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-
cycle model – although useful in demonstrating norm compliance – has limited value for 
explaining resistant norms, or norms that are moving towards re-establishment or re-
affirmation.  
Given the theoretical limitations of the norm life-cycle model, this study proposes an 
alternative model that might prove useful in accounting for contesting norms: the norm 
resistance life-cycle model. This model is an adaptation of the norm life-cycle model. Where 
the life-cycle model explains norm change through its three stages such as norm emergence, 
norm cascading and norm internalisation, the resistance life-cycle model aims to explain 
norm resistance through the three stages of norm re-emergence, norm affirmation and norm 
re-internalisation. The norm resistance life cycle is illustrated as follows:  
 
Norm Re-Emergence Norm Affirmation Re-Internalisation 
   
             Stage 1     Stage 2 Stage 3 
 
Figure 2. Norm Resistance Life Cycle 
(Adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896) 
 
Conclusion 
Over the last few years, it has become clear that many non-Western countries have 
strengthened or introduced new legislation that criminalises same-sex relations or apparent 
propaganda. Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model was used to test its 
utility in explaining the diffusion of the norm of anti-homosexuality. This chapter used this 
model to identify the norm entrepreneurs who re-introduce their norm and the reasons behind 
this re-introduction. This re-introduction of the norm of anti-homosexuality has its roots in 
colonialism – laws criminalising same-sex relations were introduced by colonisers and this 
Western norm at the time inevitably became a non-Western norm over time in contemporary 
post-colonial politics. The norm cascade illustrated – perhaps unsuccessfully – that the norm 
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of anti-homosexuality does not follow the same pattern as the norm of marriage equality did. 
States that uphold the norm of anti-homosexuality are more concerned about protecting and 
enhancing their state sovereignty, their values and their domestic legitimation. It is clear that 
religion plays a big role in the acceptance of the norm, and if anything, the norm of anti-
homosexuality is an instance of clear resistance to Western propaganda and/or imperialism. 
The norm life-cycle model showed that the norm had achieved a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality; 
however, this internalisation had already been achieved even before the norm life-cycle 
model identified its norm entrepreneurs in stage 1. Therefore, as discussed in this chapter, 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) model is not useful in explaining norm resistance. The 
model is focused on norm change, which it was clearly able to demonstrate with the norm of 
marriage equality in the previous chapter; however, the model provides limited room for 
reconsideration or reinterpretation of norms, especially given that no change had occurred 
with regard to the re-criminalisation of same-sex relations. In terms of the Reactionary 
Movement, the model has proved to be restricted in explaining norms that have always been 
internalised but that have seen a resurgence to become reaffirmed and re-internalised. For this 
reason, this chapter proposed an alternative model that explains contesting norms: the norm 
resistance life-cycle model. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
 
At the start of the new millennium marriage equality has become the dominant issue in the 
global politics around LGBTQ rights. This progression is interesting, because after the 
Stonewall riots of 1969 queer activism has mostly revolved around contesting the 
criminalising policies against homosexuality, discrimination policies in the workplace, and 
hate crimes against LGBTQ individuals, to name a few. Although some of these practices are 
still common, there has been a drastic shift towards advocating for the legalisation of same-
sex marriage after Denmark became the first country in the world to legally recognise RPs 
and the Netherlands gay marriage. The interesting backlash that came with marriage equality 
advocacy was the strengthening of anti-homosexuality policies in many non-Western states – 
for example, a country such as Nigeria criminalises any form of same-sex relations. The 
emergence of two contesting norms – the norm of marriage equality and the norm of anti-
homosexuality – presented an interesting problem that this study aimed to resolve. As such, 
constructivist perspectives were utilised in order to describe and explain this international 
polarisation by asking how and why marriage equality has emerged as an important issue in 
contemporary global policy and practice.  
Synopsis of the Study 
In order to understand how and why marriage equality has become such a dominant issue in 
global politics, the study examined the recent history of homosexuality and the evolution of 
marriage equality in Chapter 2. The Stonewall riots are regarded as the pivotal moment in 
LGBTQ history as it resulted in the formation of the modern gay and lesbian movement. Not 
only was Stonewall responsible for the emergence and formation of various LGBTQ 
organisations such as the GLF, the GAA, the National Gay Task Force (which subsequently 
became the National LGBTQ Task Force) and the GRNL, it also allowed gay people to adopt 
and claim the term ‘gay’. The claiming and coming out as gay strengthened the movement 
and signified personal liberation for gays and lesbians. Chapter 2 also demonstrated the 
devastating effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the gay community, and how it managed to 
spark a broader conversation around human rights, sexual rights and health rights for 
everyone. The gay and lesbian movement has been and is still often hampered by internal 
conflicts pertaining to gender and race. The chapter specifically illustrated how race 
complicates the conversation around queer visibility and inclusivity, particularly in the light 
of the fact that queer and trans people of colour were mainly responsible for Stonewall, yet 
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the issues advocated for by the modern gay and lesbian movement often revolve around the 
needs of middle-class white gay men. For example, some queer scholars argue that marriage 
only privileges some and does nothing to improve the lived experiences of those who are of a 
lower socio-economic status in terms of race, class and/or disability.    
The inclusion of queer theory in the study was important as it exposes and disrupts the 
(hetero)normative views around marriage equality. Some queer theorists have argued that the 
legislation of same-sex marriage should not be the ultimate goal for LGBTQ people – sexual 
justice should be. They warn that marriage equality will not necessarily translate into a 
change in societal attitudes, or that the oppressive sexual system will end. Chapter 2 also 
examined historical events such as WWII and the Cold War. The Holocaust of WWII and the 
Lavender Scare of the Cold War are reminders of the severe persecution and oppression of 
queer people, particularly gay men. History has shown that the persecution of, discrimination 
against and stigmatisation of queer people have been passed on from generation to 
generation, and the same arguments tend to influence contemporary (homo)sexual and queer 
governance.  
Interestingly, Chapter 3 revealed that the theory of constructivism emerged as the Cold War 
was coming to an end in the late 1980s. The end of the Cold War allowed a constructivist 
perspective – a perspective often ignored by realists and idealists – to position itself in IR in 
order to explain the behaviour of actors in the international arena. This chapter purposefully 
included the queering of IR to illustrate that queer perspectives are not only limited to 
disciplines such as feminist, queer and poststructuralist studies. Weber’s (2014, 2015, 2016) 
work on queer international theory has been influential. She argues that there is no real 
distinction between what is called IR and queer IR in that queer IR has seeped into 
conventional IR focal areas such as war and peace, international political economy, and state 
and nation formation. As such, the study aimed at utilising IR theory, specifically 
constructivism, to demonstrate its ability to explain norms around (homo)sexual and queer 
governance. Chapter 3 provided an in-depth exploration of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) 
norm life-cycle model to understand how norms work and how they lead to international 
change.  
Chapter 4 applied the norm life-cycle model to the Marriage Equality Movement. Norm 
entrepreneurs in the first stage of the model are instrumental in championing new norms. This 
chapter identified Axel and Eigil Axgil from Denmark as instrumental in advocating for 
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same-sex marriage in the 1960s, which sparked a robust debate on marriage equality. Their 
norm entrepreneurial efforts led to Denmark’s legalisation of RPs – the first country to do so. 
Jack Baker and Michael McConnell played an integral role as norm entrepreneurs in the 
USA. They went to great lengths to solemnise their relationship, even to the point where 
McConnell legally adopted Baker under a gender-neutral pseudonym. McConnell went to 
their local courthouse to apply for a marriage license and they were granted an official 
marriage license. Although the license was subsequently deemed invalid, it was never 
challenged in court. This makes Baker and McConnell the first legally married same-sex 
couple in the USA. This chapter illustrated that the success of the norm of marriage equality 
to cascade is largely attributed to the arguments proffered by norm entrepreneurs. These 
individuals argued that marriage equality should be a basic human right, because not 
extending it to same-sex couples renders them as second-class citizens. The norm life-cycle 
model was able to explain the cascading of the norm of marriage equality by identifying the 
implicit normative kinds of ‘peer pressure’ that Western nations subscribe to: legitimation, 
conformity and esteem. It is evident that Western nations have become increasingly aware of 
their international image and reputation as human rights champions. Although the majority of 
Western states have adopted the norm of marriage equality in their legal frameworks, the 
third stage of the norm life cycle showed that the norm has not yet achieved a ‘taken-for-
granted’ quality. However, changing societal attitudes toward same-sex marriage do indicate 
a move towards norm internalisation or normalisation. 
The study then applied the norm life-cycle model to the Marriage Reactionary Movement in 
Chapter 5. From the outset of this chapter it became clear that the utility of the life-cycle 
model might prove challenging, given that the norm of anti-homosexuality was not a new 
norm. In fact, it is an old norm that has its roots in colonialism and religious beliefs. Chapter 
5 briefly explored the homophobic legacies of colonialism to illustrate how the norm of anti-
homosexuality has been passed on from the colonisers onto the colonised, who subsequently 
adopted the norm as authentically part of their respective cultures. Norm entrepreneurs such 
as Uganda’s Haruna Sebi, Jennifer Nabafu and David Bahati, as well as Russia’s Vitaly 
Milonov and Yelena Mizulina, were identified as actors who managed to re-introduce and 
reaffirm the norm of anti-homosexuality. The theoretical challenge in this chapter was 
highlighted by the norm life-cycle model’s inability to explain the norm cascading of anti-
homosexuality. Instead, the study examined the norm of anti-homosexuality through the lens 
of norm affirmation. Feminist and queer perspectives, the role of religion, as well as 
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arguments around same-sex relations being a Western import were utilised to illustrate the 
prevention of norm cascading. The norm of anti-homosexuality has been re-affirmed through 
a state’s identity based on religion, nationalism, culture and/or tradition. It is clear that 
although resistance is growing in countries with anti-homosexuality policies, the norm has 
been re-internalised not only in the legal structures of the state, but also in societal 
perceptions that show overwhelming support for criminalising legislation against queer 
individuals. The inclusion of a critique of the norm life-cycle model was important insofar as 
it highlighted the limitations of norm research in explaining resistant norms.  
The utility of the model was clear in Chapter 4 in that it was able to illustrate the norm 
cascading of the norm of marriage equality. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) specifically 
created their model to explain norm change in IR. This norm change is demonstrated through 
the model’s three stages: norm emergence, norm cascading and norm internalisation. Their 
model’s three stages explain how and when a new norm is introduced, how it cascades 
internationally after the tipping point is reached, and if the norm achieves a ‘taken-for-
granted’ quality and becomes internalised. The model is illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 1. Norm Life Cycle 
(Source: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896) 
Chapter 5 highlighted that the life-cycle model was limited in explaining the norm of anti-
homosexuality through its three stages, given that norm change did not occur. As such, this 
study proposed an alternative model to explain contesting norms: the norm resistance life-
cycle model. This model is an adaptation of the norm life-cycle model. The resistance model 
aims to explain norm affirmation through the three stages of norm re-emergence, norm 
affirmation, and norm re-internalisation. The model’s three stages explain how and when an 
existing norm is re-introduced, how it is re-affirmed (note that a tipping point is not 
applicable here, given that resistant norms tend not to cascade internationally), and whether 
or not it is re-internalised. In order to see the theoretical differences in the two models, the 
norm resistance life-cycle model is illustrated as follows: 
Norm Emergence Norm Cascade Internalisation 
   
Stage 1 
Tipping 
Point 
   Stage 2 Stage 3 
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Norm Re-Emergence Norm Affirmation Re-Internalisation 
   
             Stage 1     Stage 2 Stage 3 
 
Figure 2. Norm Resistance Life Cycle 
(Adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896) 
 
Solving the Research Problem 
The study aimed to identify, describe and explain the emergence and diffusion of marriage 
equality by utilising constructivist perspectives. The utility of these perspectives has allowed 
this study to examine how norms function in the international system. When the Netherlands 
became the first country in the world to allow same-sex marriages in 2001, the norm of 
marriage equality was placed at the centre of modern LGBTQ politics. The emergence of 
marriage equality has also sparked a reactionary movement of explicit anti-homosexuality 
policies. Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model was applied to the norms of 
marriage equality and anti-homosexuality by examining the model’s three stages: norm 
emergence, norm cascading and norm internalisation. The model was specifically used, 
because it has become influential in demonstrating how norms work in the international 
system. The model proved useful to explain the different stages through which the norm of 
marriage equality has gone through before reaching a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality. The study 
identified key actors who have championed the legalisation of same-sex marriage. The 
activist work done by these individuals has allowed the norm to cascade through the 
international system. The cascading process managed to illustrate what states consider 
appropriate behaviour within a liberal democracy – extending the right to marry to same-sex 
couples became appropriate for Western nations. The life cycle showed that the norm had in 
fact reached the third stage, internalisation; however, it has not yet been fully internalised, as 
there is still a gap between the legal framework and societal perceptions. Nevertheless, the 
norm of marriage equality is moving towards (full) internalisation. 
Interestingly, the norm life-cycle model presented a theoretical challenge for examining the 
norm of anti-homosexuality as norm cascading did not occur. Instead, the model was utilised 
to identify norm entrepreneurs who have re-introduced the norm of anti-homosexuality. The 
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activist work by these individuals, along with state support, allowed the norm to be re-
affirmed and re-constructed as essential in maintaining a state’s identity around traditional 
values. The third stage of the model showed that the norm had in fact been re-internalised. 
Although the life cycle model is influential in illustrating international norm change, it 
proved limited in explaining norm resistance. As such, this study proposed an alternative 
model – the norm resistance life-cycle model – that might explain resistant norms. This 
model is adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model. 
Answering the Research Questions 
The study’s primary research question is: How and why has marriage equality emerged as an 
important issue in contemporary global policy and practice as described and explained by IR? 
The emergence of marriage equality as an important issue was the result of a number of 
developments in Western liberal democratic nations. Firstly, the extensive lobbying efforts by 
norm entrepreneurs and LGBTQ activists allowed the issue of marriage equality to enter the 
mainstream conversation. Secondly, marriage has become a symbol of the idea of gay and 
lesbian people being recognised as equal citizens in the eyes of the law and the state. Thirdly, 
marriage has come to represent a certain form of modern gay and lesbian politics i.e. the kind 
of politics that uses the law to advance certain civil claims around fully equality, and equal 
protection and benefits. Fourthly, marriage has also become a form of political resistance 
against legal exclusion, legal criminalisation as well as social stigmatisation. Lastly, marriage 
has come to represent the normative idea of a nation-state that is non-discriminatory and 
inclusive of gay and lesbian people, best captured in the idea of marriage. 
 
The secondary research questions were addressed as follows: 
1. Who have acted as the norm entrepreneurs in the framing and championing of global 
(homo)sexual and queer governance?  
The study has identified the following norm entrepreneurs who have championed the 
norm of marriage equality: Axel and Eigil Axgil of Denmark, and Jack Baker and 
Michael McConnell of the USA. The norm entrepreneurs who have championed the 
norm of anti-homosexuality are Haruna Sebi and Jennifer Nabafu as well as David 
Bahati of Uganda, and Vitaly Milonov and Yelena Mizulina of Russia.  
2. How have norms related to this materialised and diffused in the international sphere 
of thinking and practice?  
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The successful materialisation and diffusion of the norm of marriage equality, as 
illustrated in Chapter 4, is largely attributed to the active role played by norm 
entrepreneurs in framing the issue of same-sex marriage as a fundamental human right 
and around full citizenship. States that have accepted the norm of marriage equality, 
particularly Western nations, have done so in response to (implicit) ‘peer pressure’ 
that promotes them as exemplars of enlightenment, freedom and equality. States take 
pride in the championing of their liberal identity, and realise that by not extending the 
right to marry to same-sex couples would be deemed inappropriate behaviour for a 
Western democracy.  
As illustrated in Chapter 5, the norm of anti-homosexuality has not managed to 
materialise and diffuse in the international sphere of thinking and practice. Instead, 
the norm has moved towards a process of re-affirmation that consolidates a state’s 
religious, national, cultural and/or traditional identity. The prevention of a norm 
cascade is attributed to the fact that the norm of anti-homosexuality is an old norm 
that has been deeply embedded in the legal structures and societal perceptions for 
centuries. As a way of resisting Western ideals and values, non-Western norm 
champions have managed to re-introduce, re-affirm and re-internalise the norm of 
anti-homosexuality. This was illustrated through the proposed norm resistance life-
cycle model in order to explain resistant norms in IR. 
3. Which institutions have been created and what norms inform their operation in global 
(homo)sexual and queer governance?  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is no international law that recognises same-sex 
marriage as a basic human right. This means that domestic actors and organisations 
promote norms that lead to internationalisation. For example, the creation of the 
Kortmann Commission in the Netherlands was modelled after Denmark’s Marriage 
Committee, which focused on proposals and recommendation that would champion 
the norm of marriage equality. There are institutions that were created before the 
prominence of the norm of marriage equality that have played a prominent role in 
informing the norm’s operation in global (homo)sexual and queer governance. For 
example, norm entrepreneurs managed to get their respective countries’ constitutional 
courts or supreme courts to champion the norm of marriage equality by ruling it is 
unconstitutional to deny same-sex couples the right to marry. Also, an international 
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institution such as the UN has made progress in the last few years by implementing a 
marriage policy in 2014 that recognises the same-sex marriages of its staff who 
married in a country where gay marriage is legal, regardless of their nationality.  
In terms of the norm of anti-homosexuality, no special institutions were necessary to 
be created in order to inform normative operations in global (homo)sexual and queer 
governance. Given that anti-homosexuality is a deeply embedded norm in the 
majority of non-Western societies, state homophobia is often used to reiterate a state’s 
religious and traditional norms and values. Sub-Saharan African societies claim that 
homosexuality is ‘un-African’. This type of rhetoric is used to deflect attention from 
the democratic demands or pressure from their own citizens, and has become a vibrant 
part of political rhetoric to drum up populist support.   
Areas of Future Research 
It is clear that research on norms has become one the major reference points for 
constructivism in the field of IR. Constructivist perspectives have made tremendous 
contributions in understanding norm change; however, they have stopped short of developing 
theoretical frameworks that examine norm resistance. This norm resistance was evident in the 
discrepancy between groups of states that have championed the norm of marriage equality, 
and those that champion the norm of anti-homosexuality. Is it possible to build on Finnemore 
and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life-cycle model to explain contesting norms? This could be an 
interesting study that could explain the international polarisation of norms such as LGBTQ 
rights as human rights, sexual and religious freedom, and the rise of neo-fascist movements. 
Can the norm life cycle be utilised to explain the (possible) normalisation of adoptions by 
same-sex couples, immigration or MSM? It is evident that there are certain countries that 
allow same-sex couples to adopt children. However, the acceleration of this norm is slow. 
This is especially significant given that some research supports claims that same-sex parents 
are as well-equipped as heterosexual couples to raise children. This is an important 
(emerging) contemporary issue around (homo)sexual and queer governance, especially in the 
wake of a country such as Russia that has banned adoptions from countries that allow gay 
marriage.  
Furthermore, in the last few years the issue of immigration has received global prominence. 
The policing of immigration often forces immigrants to choose between their ethnicity and 
sexuality. For example, it can be very difficult for people to immigrate to the USA without 
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some form of state-recognised family connection, which is usually heterosexual marriage by 
default (Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 13/07/2017). It would be interesting to follow the 
norm of immigration through the life-cycle model.  
Lastly, given the stigma that surrounds MSM – in particular those who adopt a heterosexual 
identity – may present an interesting study as the normalisation of MSM might prove not 
only to benefit these men but also research on HIV/AIDS. 
Also, research could be conducted on the impact that international norms constructed by 
international organisations such as the UN have on international norm cascades. International 
organisations play a big role in the norm-cascading process, given that numerous states have 
accepted the Declaration of Human Rights and regard it as a universal norm. Yet 
organisations such as Amnesty International made many failed attempts to repeal Uganda’s 
Anti-Homosexuality Act, for example. The research could focus on the effectiveness of these 
international organisations. A state’s (hetero)sovereignty would be a significant part of the 
research as the aim would be to investigate whether or not international organisations are of 
any relevance, and whether or not they have jurisdiction to extend their authority to sovereign 
states. The reason for this is that even though international organisations draw up universal 
laws, sovereign states still draw up their own laws that may be in conflict with international 
legislation and that often infringe on universal human rights. This is evident in countries 
where same-sex relations are criminalised. 
Further research could also be conducted on the role South Africa plays in the debate around 
the norm of anti-homosexuality in Africa. South Africa is regarded as the human rights 
champion of the African continent. For example, South Africa became the first country in the 
world to protect sexual orientation in a bill of rights, and remains the only African country to 
have legalised same-sex marriage. The focus of the study could be on the blurring of lines 
between South Africa’s domestic policy and foreign policy, as well as its quiet diplomacy 
with other African states on (homo)sexual and queer governance. As such, research can be 
conducted on whether South Africa is contributing to the norm acceptance of anti-
homosexuality or not.  
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